Daniel P. Moynihan

THE NATIONAL INTEREST

NUMBER 2 ◇ WINTER 1985/6 ◇ $4·50

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by HENRY S. ROWEN

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by ELIOT A. COHEN

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THE NATIONAL INTEREST (ISSN 0884-9382) is published quarterly, in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter issues, by National Affairs, Inc. EDITORIAL AND BUSINESS OFFICES: 1627 Connecticut Avenue NW, Washington DC 20009. (202) 483-0630. SUBSCRIPTIONS: $18 for one year, $36 for two years (add $2 annually outside the United States). For subscription orders (prepayment required) please write: *The National Interest* Subscription Department, P.O. Box 3000, Dept. QQ, Denville NJ 07834; for credit card orders call toll-free 1-800-222-2990. Application to mail at second class postage rates is pending at Washington DC and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: send all address changes to *The National Interest* Subscription Department, P.O. Box 3000, Dept. QQ, Denville NJ 07834. "The National Interest" is a registered trademark of News Group Publications, Inc., and is used by National Affairs, Inc. under license; it may not be used without permission of News Group Publications, Inc. Unsolicited manuscripts cannot be returned unless accompanied by a self-addressed envelope with sufficient postage. © 1986 by National Affairs, Inc. *The National Interest* was designed by Tod Lindberg and is printed by the William Byrd Press, Richmond VA.

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Why We Should Stop Studying the Cuban Missile Crisis

Eliot A. Cohen

TWO DECADES after the event, the Cuban Missile Crisis continues to exercise a strange fascination on the American national security community. Learned and polemical articles (and occasionally the two go together) on the events of October 1962, their origins and their consequences, fill journals as different as *Time* and *International Security*. Political scientists and historians quarrel over the meaning of public and private documents, attempting to unravel some of the many unsolved and significant puzzles of the crisis. Why did the Soviets put the missiles there in the first place? How much of a threat did American statesmen really think them to be? Did American nuclear superiority in 1962 play a major, a minor, or a negligible role in the resolution of the crisis?

In our country's burgeoning schools of public policy, aspiring bureaucrats almost invariably cut their analytical teeth on a major work about the crisis, such as Graham Allison's *Essence of Decision*, which uses the events of October 1962 to develop three prisms through which to view governmental decision: the "Rational Actor," the "Organizational Process," and the "Bureaucratic Politics" models. Nor do neophytes alone immerse themselves in this fortnight of the past. For example, the National Defense University—perhaps the most prestigious of the nation's four war colleges, which trains hundreds of senior military officers and civil servants for the highest posts in government—in 1980 produced yet another instructional case study of the crisis. Its author opened his work by declaring, "The Cuban Missile Crisis has become *the* classic case of national security decisionmaking and management in political science literature [emphasis in original]."[1] And memories of the crisis glow for practicing statesmen as well as their understudies. Zbigniew Brzezinski, for example, writes in his memoir, *Power and Principle*, of the ambiance of the White House Situation Room, and the mystique that lingers there from the days of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The Cuban Missile Crisis has a number of meanings for these groups. It stands both as a shining example of crisis management well done and as a caution about how difficult crisis management is. It demonstrates how the national security apparat *really* works—how bureaucrats clash and maneuver, how politicians react to the pressure of narrowing options, how

Eliot A. Cohen is visiting associate professor of strategy at the Naval War College, on leave from Harvard University. The views expressed here are his own, and do not necessarily express those of the Naval War College or the U.S. government.

[1] Richard M. Leighton, *The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962: A Case Study in National Security Management* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1980).

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important decisions get made. Finally, it exemplifies the incredibly high stakes of policy-making (however defined) in the nuclear age. The twists and turns of Kennedy administration policy in October 1962 represent the swaying of an accomplished (or lucky) tightrope artist negotiating the way to *terra firma* over a thermonuclear abyss.

Three clusters of reasons account for this extraordinary influence of a two-week episode that occurred well over two decades ago. The first and least important reason has to do with the unusual quality and quantity of material available to students of this particular event. Some of the critical communications exchanged between and within governments became public at the time (though by no means all of them). More important, those interested in the crisis have had the good fortune to have had a large number of literate and persuasive observers and memoirists close to the action, and eager to write about it. Theodore Sorenson, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., McGeorge Bundy, and of course Robert Kennedy are but a few. Scholarly studies such as *Essence of Decision* (partly the product of a seminar of Harvard faculty members) benefited from the uniquely close personal associations between academics and statesmen that characterized the Kennedy administration.

The second cluster of reasons has to do with the sheer drama of the crisis, a vividness and excitement unmatched by almost any other post-war event. The basic plot is simple enough: Khrushchev puts the missiles in, Kennedy confronts him, Khrushchev relents and pulls them out. Fascinating sub-plots, however, add interest and complexity to a stark story line—a U-2 spy plane wanders over Soviet air space during the crisis, the president is shocked at learning that the obsolete Jupiter missiles have not, despite his orders, been withdrawn from Turkey. Arresting images abound. American warships intercept Soviet freighters, Adlai Stevenson confronts the United Nations with photographic evidence of Soviet duplicity. Even untelevised episodes, such as the confrontation between the secretary of defense and the chief of naval operations over the placement of ships on the blockade line (which, however, may not have taken place) have entered the folklore of American policy-making. Like any good play, the crisis has an easily discerned beginning, middle, and end. Even its length (thirteen days) provides just the right touch of superstitious foreboding. Moreover, its brevity enables even the casual student to follow events day by day—indeed, hour by hour—peering over the shoulders of the great as they play a chess game of world-historical importance.

No playwright could have chosen a more compelling cast of characters—the blustering peasant ruler of the Soviet Union, the driven and brilliant American secretary of defense, the combative but brooding younger brother of the president, and, above all, the young, well-loved commander in chief himself, doomed to fall in a year's time in a still mysterious assassination. The Kennedy legend, which for good or ill still infuses the early 1960s with a bittersweet aura of dashed hopes and blighted strength, reaches its apotheosis in the crisis. Three years ago, in *Time* magazine, a band of Kennedy administration officials, including many whose reputations would later decompose in the mire of Vietnam, concluded their assessment of the lessons of the crisis with a panegyric to "our own President, whose cautious determination, steady composure, deep-seated compassion, and above all, continuously attentive control of our options and actions brilliantly served his country and all mankind."

The context, tone, and authorship of that article suggest a third reason—perhaps the most important of all—for the prominence of the Cuban Missile Crisis in the minds of the national security community. The crisis remains, quite simply, the last major, indisputable, and widely applauded success of American arms since the Inchon landings in 1950, during the Korean war. The contrast between the seemingly successful resolution of the crisis—the sullen Russian withdrawal of missiles from Cuba—and the wretchedness of the Vietnam war, only a few years later, reinforces this sense. All other uses of American military power since the crisis, even such successes as the Dominican Republic intervention of 1965 or the Grenada invasion of 1983, pale in compari-

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son—victories mitigated by their pettiness of scale, our uneasiness of conscience concerning their moral justification, or widely acknowledged difficulties in their execution. The Cuban Missile Crisis, by way of contrast, remains big, clean, and (seemingly) unambiguous in its outcome.

ADMITTEDLY, recent historians have chipped away at this neat edifice. They have argued, variously, that American statesmen triggered the crisis by misleading the Soviets; acted with disproportionate belligerence (or excessive timidity) in confronting them; and accepted an outcome that either caused the subsequent Soviet military build-up or effectively dismantled the Monroe Doctrine, or both. On the whole, these judgments appear excessively harsh and hindsighted. We can agree that the crisis was indeed a success, and that the Kennedy administration handled it with the right blend of determination and caution. The deployment of the missiles, and the accompanying deceit, posed a far from trivial threat to American security by outflanking our early warning and defensive systems and by demonstrating a reckless disrespect for America's declared policies. Because of the Kennedy administration's mix of coercion and prudence, the Soviet Union found itself compelled to withdraw the missiles without receiving any open *quid pro quo*. Nor was much given away in private. The Kennedy administration was no more likely before the crisis than in its aftermath to attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro by force of arms.

Nor should we fault the standard accounts of the crisis for the way in which they describe and analyze it. Rather, we should ask whether the crisis itself can and should serve as an appropriate model either for those studying policy or for those conducting it. We must, in short, ask ourselves whether the uniqueness of the crisis does not destroy its value as an archetype, or worse, make it a profoundly misleading subject for reflection.

Consider its peculiarities. It remains the only occasion during the post-war period in which the United States and the Soviet Union came close to nuclear war (although some historians have begun to doubt even this, holding that American statesmen greatly exaggerated the risk of thermonuclear exchanges). The reason for this is simple: 1962 was one of the last years in which either side could reasonably envisage a successful first strike against the other, an attack leading to recognizable victory—hideously costly victory, no doubt, but victory nonetheless. Even if those who conducted American policy at that time today deprecate the role played by nuclear weapons in the crisis, we may doubt that their Soviet counterparts would agree with them.[2] In short, the crisis occurred under what today appears to be an evanescent, long-gone set of circumstances—namely, far-reaching American nuclear superiority.

The conventional balance, though less skewed, similarly favored the United States. Not only did the U.S. possess overwhelming advantages in the Caribbean theater: globally as well, U.S. forces had reached a post-war peak of size, efficiency, and modernity. In that pre-Vietnam era, American forces in Europe possessed their full complements of men and arms; new weapons filled the inventories; the draft not only provided top notch manpower, but also had created a vast mobilizable reserve. At the same time, Soviet conventional forces had reached their post-war nadir, thanks to Khrushchev's policies of spending vast sums on nuclear weapons and economic development at the expense of traditional arms.

A third unusual aspect of the crisis lies in the virtual absence of the use of force—isolated incidents such as the Cuban downing of an American U-2 spy plane or the unconfirmed depth-charging of a Soviet submarine notwithstanding. To be sure, we had faced non-violent crises before (the Berlin confrontations, for example). If, however, we accept the view that the use of force changes a whole array of political and bureaucratic relationships, we may doubt whether, in an age of increasing violence, the

[2]See Marc Trachtenberg, "The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis," *International Security* 10:1 (Summer 1985).

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Cuban Missile Crisis should stand as *the* model national security crisis. The difference that the serious use of force would have made becomes clear if, for example, we reflect on civil-military relations during the crisis. The events of October 1962 created considerable tension between military men seeking to protect those under their command, in the event of an outbreak of war, and politicians seeking to give the other side time to think and give in. Had men in fact died as a result, had ships sunk or airplanes fallen by the score, the crisis in civil-military relations would have taken a more dramatic turn, one in which, I suspect, civilian leaders would have accommodated commanders far more than they actually did. The British sinking of the *General Belgrano* during the Falklands war suggests that this is indeed the case. In that instance, the demand by commanders on the spot for permission to engage a threat to their forces eventually overwhelmed the fears of statesmen seeking to win more time for negotiations.

The direct clash between Soviet and American forces constitutes a fourth unique aspect of the crisis. Where most post-war crises have occurred between a superpower and an ally of the opposing superpower (e.g., Korea and Vietnam), or even between two subsidiary members of the opposing camps (e.g., the 1970 Syrian invasion of Jordan), Cuba took the form of a direct clash between Soviet and American forces. Perhaps as a result of that crisis, or simply for fear of the catastrophic consequences that could ensue, American and Soviet leaders have since attempted to avoid any direct confrontation between their armed forces. Moreover, allies and neutrals played a minor role in the events of 1962. By and large, American allies (including the normally fractious General de Gaulle) fell into line, and certainly no Soviet ally attempted to use the crisis to defect. Even Fidel Castro, no mere puppet of the Soviets, had little to say about the disposition of the crisis. The focus of the drama on the two gigantic primary antagonists in no way resembles most post-war conflicts, in which coalition politics and the actions of third parties play far larger roles. Whether one looks at Central America, the Middle East, or Southwest Asia, for example, it is clear that local powers (the Contadora group, the Arab states, or Iran, respectively) play a far greater role in shaping the duel between the superpowers than did Cuba itself in 1962.

Finally, the brevity and localized nature of the crisis made it unique. The interplay of men and organizations described by Allison and others, the incessant discussions, consultations, and collective giving of advice, provide much of the raw material for our understanding of the bureaucratic and organizational aspects of national security policy-making. But was the crisis really representative, given that it took place in such a highly compressed period of time? Could, for example, members of the "ExCom" have sustained such a grueling pace of meetings and consultations, have exercised such minute supervision of the ships, planes, and men under their purview, for four weeks, let alone four months? Indeed, and contrary to the claims of critics of the Kennedy administration's handling of the crisis, we may argue that the American presidential system handles such short, intense, and confined crises far better than it does longer, more variable, and more extensive ones.

Thus, the elements of the crisis in 1962: the real or imagined imminence of nuclear war, the condition of American military superiority in nuclear and conventional arms, the absence of the use of force, the directness of the clash between American and Soviet forces, and the brevity and simplicity of the event. But as of 1986, the threats, and hence the crises, we will face *will not* bring us close to nuclear war (unless the conditions of parity change radically), *will* occur under conditions of nuclear equality (or even slight inferiority) and dubious conventional strength, *will* involve the use of force, *will* in all likelihood involve us with Soviet clients rather than the Soviets themselves, and *will*, in all likelihood, be protracted and politically complicated. The Cuban Missile Crisis is and will remain singularly unrepresentative of post-war crises, and it offers precious little historical guidance for American statesmen today.

WERE IT simply a matter of the misapplication of the lessons of history, the problem would be bad enough. But it is much worse than that. In the immediate aftermath of the crisis and referring to it, Sec-

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retary of Defense McNamara declared, with his accustomed self-assurance, "There is no longer any such thing as strategy, only crisis management." What quickly and triumphantly emerged from the post-mortem studies of the Cuban Missile Crisis was a theory of crisis management—a creed as well as an intellectual construct—that exercises as powerful an influence today as it did two decades ago. This creed received its impetus from and was validated by the way the Kennedy administration handled the crisis (still the most frequently cited example of good crisis management, as even a cursory look at the indices of books on the subject demonstrates). One might say that the principles of crisis management take the actions of the Kennedy administration and generalize them, making the crisis the pre-eminent example of how statesmen should conduct security policy.

The crisis management school, which holds that McNamara's denigration of strategy is "exaggerated," but not fundamentally erroneous, argues that "coercive diplomacy" and "signaling" have substituted "politico-military strategy" for the traditional kinds of "conventional military strategy."[3] In brief, the seven requirements for crisis management (as identified by one of the most prominent members of the school, Alexander George) are:

—first, extensive centralized political control over the selection, timing, and conduct of all military moves, down to the lowest tactical levels;

—second, the deliberate slowing down of military movements to allow for communication between adversaries;

—third, the careful coordination of military moves with diplomatic ones, the ultimate purpose being the resolution of a crisis without war, indeed, without any use of violence;

—fourth, the prevention of extraneous military moves which might suggest to one's opponent that one has anything other than limited political objectives;

—fifth, the avoidance of military moves that suggest an impending resort to large scale warfare;

—sixth, the selection of diplomatic military signals that will suggest a desire to end the crisis peacefully;

—seventh, the choice of measures that leave one's opponent a way out of the crisis without forcing him to compromise his fundamental interests.

At first blush, one might think that such a doctrine does not much diverge from more traditional approaches to the use of power. Indeed, the crisis management theorist, preoccupied as he is with political control over the use of military power and the primacy of political objectives, seems to follow closely the views elucidated in Carl von Clausewitz's classic study, *On War*. Clausewitz, after all, argued that war is the continuation, not merely the product, of policy. *During* a war, and not merely at its outset, political considerations must dominate all others, because (as Clausewitz puts it), war has its own grammar (the use of force) but derives its logic entirely from politics. He advocated, therefore, the close supervision of generals and their forces by politicians. Indeed, he said that the commanding general should serve as a member of the cabinet, so that its members can take part in his deliberations.

Despite these superficial resemblances, however, the crisis management theorists cannot claim to be neo-Clausewitzians. By excluding the use of force, or by describing it as a last (rather than an intermediate) resort, they in fact reject Clausewitz's notion that *war*, not simply the *threat of war*, is a political use of military strength. Indeed, they implicitly reject Clausewitz's view that political considerations continue to dominate in war as well as before it. Thus, one prominent work on crisis management, Barry M. Blechman's and Stephen S. Kaplan's *Force Without War*, has as its subtitle, *U.S. Forces as a Political Instrument*—as if to exclude the *use* of force from the realm of politics. Thus, too, Professor George's dubious

[3]Alexander L. George, "Crisis Management: The Interaction of Political and Military Considerations," *Survival* 26:5 (September/October 1984).

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distinction between "conventional military strategy" and "politico-military strategy." For the Clausewitzian all strategy is politico-military: overtly so if it is well-conceived, tacitly so if it is not.

For the crisis management theorist, the threatened (or even the real) use of force serves only as a means of communication with one's opponent. He rejects or ignores other uses of force, for example as a means of affecting the enemy's will, or simply of denying him possession of that which he desires. This restrictive understanding reduces strategy to applied cognitive psychology, or even the art of non-verbal communication. The crisis management theorist fears above all else misunderstanding—that one side will underestimate the resolve or overestimate the bellicosity of the other. The essence of international politics and the roots of conflict are not competing interests and seething hatreds, but misperception. For an example of the catastrophic consequences of such misperceptions, crisis management theorists turn to another favorite case, the eruption of war in 1914. The historical scholarship of the last two decades suggests that Austria-Hungary and Germany embraced war deliberately and knowingly, exploiting a providential assassination of a disliked prince to provoke a European war. Perception had little to do with the issue—for that matter, statesmen understood each other better than they later thought. But for the crisis management theorist, again, the historical record means little. The crisis of 1914 serves as a great cautionary tale, the negative counterpart to the positive crisis management of 1962.[4]

The historical record aside, a Clausewitzian would reject this view, holding that wars come about not because of misperception, but through opposition of interest and profound feelings of antagonism. A third element thus divides the crisis management theorist from his Clausewitzian counterpart: the belief of the former that the fundamental interests of states do not conflict, that war is not merely horribly destructive but unnecessary as well. In this view, the fate of nations hinges exclusively on how well the statesman handles a crisis, whether he remains adroit, calm, and above all, in *complete* control of his nation's forces. Crises need not lead to war. When they do so, it is because statesmen have failed to master the proper techniques of their trade. Here, too, a true Clausewitzian would disagree, arguing that even if one were to accept the crisis management theorist's premises, the statesman must inevitably fall victim to what Clausewitz called friction, or what we sometimes call Murphy's Law—the tendency of things to go wrong, of people not to get messages or to misunderstand or deliberately ignore them, of large organizations to fail in their missions for a host of unforeseeable reasons. If misunderstanding or failure to control one's forces is enough to cause war, Clausewitz would say, mankind is doomed to chronic struggle, and indeed, in such a case, the forty year nuclear peace is an inexplicable accident.

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS gave an enormous impetus to the theory of crisis management, but it shaped equally the real policies of the administrations that inherited its legacy. Curiously enough, only Raymond Aron, to my knowledge, has explicitly drawn the triangular connection between American strategic theory in the early 1960s, the success in Cuba, and the failure in Vietnam.[5] While others have argued that a strong relationship exists between American politico-military thought and the feebleness of American

[4]The crisis management theorists hold that the immediate causes of war dominate the underlying ones—thus Richard Ned Lebow's *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981) concludes with a section, "Thucydides Rebutted," in which the author argues that the Athenian historian's attention to the deeper causes of war was misplaced. For an application of the "lessons" of 1914 to contemporary problems, see Lebow's "The Soviet Offensive in Europe: The Schlieffen Plan Revisited?" *International Security* 9:4 (Spring 1985).

[5]Raymond Aron, *Penser la guerre, Clausewitz*, Vol. II, *L'age planetaire* (Paris: Gallimard, 1976).

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strategy in Vietnam,[6] few if any have seen a connection between the success in Cuba and the failure in Indochina. Yet such connections do exist.

In no area do these appear more clearly than in the escalation of the Vietnam war; here, the initial, incremental commitments of troops bore little relation to any strategic conception of their use, and the tightly controlled escalation of the air war over North Vietnam included the personal selection of bombing targets by President Johnson and his national security advisor, Walt Rostow. The concept of "the gradual squeeze"—of using the commitment of American ground forces and the weight of American air power to signal American resolve—accorded nicely with the doctrine of crisis management, as did its practice of tightly centralized decision-making. In those areas that a crisis management theorist would find unimportant, because they pertain to war rather than communication—Vietnamization or pacification, for example—civilian leaders paid little attention to the misconduct of the war. They preferred instead to concern themselves with what they believed to be the politically significant (if militarily marginal) activity, the coercion of North Vietnam through aerial bombardment. The supreme command in Washington acted as if crisis management were strategy, trying to get right those things the crisis management theorist would consider important, and ignoring those he would think secondary.

We can also gauge the impact of the Cuban Missile Crisis on the conduct of the Vietnam war if we look at the wretched state of civil-military relations during the 1960s. The Cuban Missile Crisis had two effects on the civilians who guided American policy during both the crisis and the ensuing war. First, it gave them a tremendous sense of their own competence, their ability to handle complex politico-military situations confidently, and independent of military advice. As the American ambassador to Saigon during the early 1960's, Fritz Nolting, described the mood of the veterans of 1962 to an interviewer:

> Nolting: Very gung ho fellows, wanting to get things straightened up in a hurry, clean up the mess. We've got the power and we've got the know-how and we can do it. I remember on one occasion cautioning Bob McNamara that it was difficult, if not impossible, to put a Ford engine into a Vietnamese ox-cart.
> Charlton: What did he say?
> Nolting: He agreed, but he said "we can do it." He agreed that it was difficult.[7]

At the same time, Kennedy's men took away from the crisis a profound distrust, indeed contempt, for their military colleagues.[8] It is to the Cuban Missile Crisis, in fact, and not the Vietnam war, that we can date that profound if now subdued mistrust between civilian and soldier that characterized American civil-military relations in the 1970s and the early 1980s, and which has only now begun to abate.

The "micro-management" of American military forces by the president during the Cuban Missile Crisis needs little justification. But McNamara and his colleagues did not, or perhaps could not, understand the strain that crisis management placed on military institutions—by violating the principle of the chain of command, for example, or by forcing commanders knowingly to place their men in tactically exposed positions. Instead, the civilians taught themselves that military men were intrinsically hidebound if not obtuse, and dangerously bellicose to boot. Moreover, by arrogating to themselves not simply the structure of strategy but its implementation, they deprived their military subordinates of a sense of purpose. Deprived of this sense of purpose, the American military not only harbored resentments—it lost any interest it had had in a Clausewitzian understanding of strategy.

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[6]See Stephen P. Rosen, "Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War," *International Security* 7:2 (Fall 1982).

[7]Michael Charlton and Anthony Moncrieff, *Many Reasons Why: The American Involvement in Vietnam* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978).

[8]James A. Nathan, "The Missile Crisis: His Finest Hour Now," *World Politics* 27:2 (January 1975).

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As a result of this intellectual castration, the American military fought the Vietnam war without the benefit of any strategy at all. Stanley Karnow, in *Vietnam: A History*, gives us Clark Clifford's description of the situation when he took over as secretary of defense at the height of the war:

> . . . [Clifford] recollected his attempts at the time to extract precise replies from [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle] Wheeler and his colleagues. "How long would it take to succeed in Vietnam? They didn't know. How many troops would it take? They couldn't say. Were two hundred thousand the answer? They weren't sure. Might they need more? Yes, they might need more. Could the enemy build up in exchange? Probably. So what was the plan to win the war? Well, the only plan was that attrition would wear out the Communists, and they would have had enough. Was there any indication that we've reached that point? No, there wasn't."

The military had not (as some in the Reagan administration later thought) simply been denied their proper role in formulating strategy: they had been told, and many of them have come to believe, that strategy does not exist. If, as many senior officers will tell you, the sole function of American military power of every kind, conventional as well as nuclear, is to deter war by adroitly affecting perceptions in crisis, what need to think about the use of battles and campaigns for the political ends of a war? If, as McNamara proclaimed, crisis management, by definition a short-term outlook, has replaced strategy, what need to consider such long-term strategic problems as the disproportion between capabilities and commitments, the ability of command structures to function in time of war, or the best ways to rend asunder the enemy's alliances?

During the 1960s the American military grudgingly accepted its role in crisis management. America's military establishment did so for a variety of reasons, including its desire to regain civilian approval and its sheer lack of an adequate intellectual defense against the new doctrines. Today, many in the military believe, with the zeal of the convert, that their primary mission is deterrence of both conventional and nuclear war, that their units are pawns in a curious game of chess in which amicable draws will be reached without pieces being exchanged. What the military, together with the civilian national security community, has lost is an understanding of or even an interest in the strategic problems of conventional limited war.

The problem did not originate with and extends far beyond the military community, of course. The excessive self-satisfaction of the United States security community on the occasion of the October 11, 1985 interception of the plane carrying Palestinian terrorists who hijacked a cruise liner and murdered an American citizen reflects this. The feat was, to be sure, a noteworthy (though not an extraordinary) technical achievement, and a thoroughly justifiable and praiseworthy action, but it meant little in the broader context of America's unacknowledged war with Palestinian and Islamic fundamentalist terrorists. Civilian and military leaders have viewed this conflict as a game of cops-and-robbers; they have failed to consider the problem as a strategic one, in which the enemy has a political objective or objectives, which we must deny through the use of force. By confusing the broad range of force legitimate for use by one government against another with the far narrower range acceptable for use by policemen against known criminals, they have boxed themselves into a state of impotent outrage, in which an incident such as the Egyptair interception will serve as a welcome, but all too temporary, sedative. We face a range of security problems (the potential collapse of the government in the Philippines, for example) which require strategy rather than crisis management: unfortunately, our intellectual arsenals for the former are as bare as those for the latter are overflowing.

IF WE ACCEPT the Cuban Missile Crisis as the paradigmatic politico-military event of our age, we accept a host of assumptions: that the short dominates the long term; that conventional forces, like their nuclear counterparts, have utility only in non-use; that

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we have no real enemies, but simply misunderstood, if ambivalent, neighbors. The acceptance of crisis management theory brings with it a host of unexamined institutional and intellectual implications: that the domestic base of strategic policy requires little cultivation; that our institutions of supreme command should be designed to make fast decisions and exercise absolute control for extremely brief periods of time; that neither civilian statesmen nor military commanders need think through the problems attendant upon the use of force for political ends. It is no doubt necessary that the government have the ability to communicate and control in rare times of acute crisis; but to structure a theory of security policy on the recurrence of events like the Cuban Missile Crisis is to insist, foolishly, that the exception replace the rule.

Yet some historical analogies must inform the decision of the harried statesman, the researches of the most present-minded social scientist, or even the musings of the conscientious reader of newspapers. As Ernest May has pointed out, we have only the choice between using historical analogies and metaphors well and using them badly. There is, in the nature of things, no possibility of considering every issue and problem on its merits rather than in light of similar events in the past.

Evidence of this abounds. In the present debate over the Strategic Defense Initiative, for example, the historical analogies undergirding the disputes among proponents and opponents come from the ABM debate of the late 1960s, and the perhaps mythical age of American invulnerability before 1917. Arguments about (more precisely, arguments against) protectionism hark back to certain beliefs about the origins of the Depression of the 1930s. Perhaps our involvement in Vietnam had something to do with images of the 1938 Munich agreement. As a parent shapes his dealings with his children by memories (be they accurate or distorted) of his own childhood, participants in the great policy debates rely on history, be it their own recollections or their impressions from books. For the parasitic breed that has flourished on the fringes of power in the past three decades—the policy analysts and kindred social scientists—history is a storehouse of data, which the irresponsible can plunder, and the sober can explore.

To which historical cases, then, if not to the Cuban Missile Crisis, should we turn? Let me suggest first that we (by whom I mean primarily the social scientists, of whom I am one) examine a variety of episodes, rather than build our theories on the narrow and treacherous foundations of one case, no matter how attractive the building site may appear. Given the nature of the American position in the world—our global responsibilities and the likelihood of conventional conflicts—four categories of problems seem particularly deserving of investigation.

The first of these is the problem of overextension. We are not, after all, the first power to juggle farflung political commitments, a need to control the sea lanes, and a continental commitment against a first-class landpower. Great Britain shortly after the Boer war, in the first decade and a half of this century, found itself stunned by the difficulty and the human and material costs of an inglorious Vietnam-like struggle. It faced the necessity of preparing to fight a land war against Germany on the continent while defending its possessions and dependencies against a host of indigenous and European enemies, and maintaining command of the sea. We should study and if possible emulate the clarity with which such British statesmen as Arthur Balfour saw the problem and the vigor with which they addressed it: through the creation of new institutions (the Committee of Imperial Defence); the reinvigoration of some old ones (the British Army under the stewardship of Richard Haldane); the complete recasting of others (Admiral Jackie Fisher's ruthless scrapping of old warships, construction of completely new types, and the radical redeployment of the fleet), and an innovative foreign policy (beginning with the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902). The British realized, as we have begun only too recently to see in our own case, that they could not simply outspend all of their many opponents; they understood too that they could not accept organizational inefficiencies with the excuse that tradition forbade change.

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Second, historians and historically-minded social scientists might try to think more systematically about the problem of coalition warfare. Without exception, every war the United States has fought since the turn of the century has raised acute difficulties for this country, which was not accustomed to conducting a war within an alliance. Our public (and all too often, I suspect, our classified) thinking about any conflict with the Soviet bloc makes entirely unrealistic assumptions about the cohesion of alliances in war. We would find, from even a cursory review of some relevant cases (the wars against Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm II, and Hitler), that even a liberal democratic state leading a coalition finds itself compelled to use force against laggardly allies or ambivalent neutrals—think of the British assault on the Danish fleet in Copenhagen in 1807, for example, or Churchill's order to sink the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir in July 1940, or the skirmishes between American and French forces during the invasion of Northwest Africa in 1942. In wartime, we might be able to conduct such bitter and unhappy operations efficiently, at least, if we understand their necessity in peace. Conversely, if a study of coalition wars would reveal that a promising path to victory lies in deliberate attacks on the cohesion of the *enemy's* alliance, we might adapt our peacetime strategic thinking and posture accordingly, and perhaps thereby decrease the chance of conflict in the first place. Thus far, at any rate, writers on NATO strategy express confidence (misplaced, perhaps) in the uncertain allegiance of East European states to the Warsaw Pact: almost never, however, do they explore the means that history might suggest to induce and support successful mutinies in the event of war.[9]

BY AND LARGE, our policy analysts and statesmen think in terms of analogies that bear on the beginning of wars—is this crisis like 1914 or 1941 (meaning, do we need to worry about accidental war or surprise attack?). Does a dispatch of American advisers to El Salvador resemble the first perilous steps into Vietnam? Is the deployment of a Marine battalion to Beirut analogous to the first two Marine battalions wading ashore in Danang in 1965? And so on. This preoccupation with how wars begin stems in large part from the theory of crisis management discussed earlier—a theory concerned with how nations get into wars, rather than what they do once they get there. My third suggestion, therefore, is that we study the *middle* and *ends* of wars, as well as their beginnings. What made World War I so ghastly was not so much its outbreak; it was the spread and intensification of destruction once war had begun, the seeming inability of statesmen to find ways to bring it to an end, and the failure of war councils to find strategic detours around the slaughter of the trenches. This last point is particularly important. The crisis management theorists and their students in government have devised systems of supreme command not unlike those of July 1914—in which, after all, the French government was able to "micro-manage" the deployment of French troops up to ten kilometers from the border in order to avoid "misperception" of French intentions by the German government. What we do not fully understand, and what we will desperately need to understand in the event of another war, be it large or small, is how the organs of the higher direction of war must change in wartime, what balance of responsibility and authority we must arrange between civilian and military officials, how we can coordinate campaigns, and so on.

All three of these problems have particular importance in the matter of small wars, the fourth area in which we might explore a range of historical cases. By small wars I refer to wars conducted against medium or lesser powers, rather than against our primary opponent. This is the only kind of war we have fought since 1945, and I suspect that it will be our lot in the future. Consideration of our most important post-1945 small war, Vietnam, will show how little we have understood the issues I have raised, for in Vietnam we failed with respect to all three elements of war mentioned above. The voracious manpower and material demands of the Vietnam war debilitated our forces else-

[9]See Stephen Peter Rosen's "Mutiny & the Warsaw Pact" on page 74—Ed.

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where in the world, leading to a pernicious turbulence in our personnel system, and a diversion of resources from modernization of our ground forces. The war thus exacerbated a latent problem of overextension. We did our best to avoid seeing Vietnam as a coalition war. We shoved our client state aside in order to fight the war our way, while, curiously enough, refraining from the kind of interference in its personnel systems and command structure that our own history (in the Korean war, in particular) had shown to be imperative. Finally, we did not think through the problems of sustaining the war and ending it, preferring instead to hope that by convincing the enemy of our seriousness we could avoid them altogether. A serious study of our own small wars in this century, and those of other states (particularly France and Great Britain), would help us think about these problems.

All historical events are unique, and all historical analogies are suspect, but some episodes are more singular, and some metaphors more dubious, than others. Through their ceaseless pondering of the events of October 1962, policy analysts have not merely dulled our historical sense through sheer monotony; they have also (unwittingly, to be sure) helped produce poor policy and misleading analysis. Of course broadening the menu of historical case studies cannot alone enable us to master all our strategic difficulties. But widening our investigations may very well clarify problems we now see dimly or not at all. That would be no small contribution.

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Living with a Sick Bear

Henry S. Rowen

WITH the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union has what looks like functioning, continuing management for the first time in over a decade. This new leadership faces formidable internal problems, ones that have been neglected and have worsened during this period. These domestic problems are so basic and intractable that we should expect important initiatives towards the West in the next several years. Although, naturally, one cannot be confident of how the new regime assesses its situation, what its priorities will be, and how it will proceed, a significant foreign policy shift is likely—although its timing is uncertain. There is one central reason for expecting this to happen.

I

The stagnation of the Soviet economy

The dominant motivation will be economic. The most authoritative source, the CIA, says that GNP growth averaged 2.5 percent annually over the past decade. There is inevitably some uncertainty about such estimates, and there are reasons to believe that this number is probably the upper bound of performance. Actual growth overall might have been less, perhaps close to zero. For instance, most emigres report worsened conditions over this period. Paul Gregory of the University of Houston (as quoted in the Chicago *Tribune* in December 1984), reporting on a large scale survey of Soviet emigres, says that: "About 62 percent of the emigres said their standard of living had gone down in recent years. About 75 percent said productivity was declining. Most put the blame on incentives, particularly a shortage of consumer goods on which to spend their salaries." Although emigre testimony is widely discounted by Western scholars—and obviously should be treated cautiously—there is a consensus among specialists on the Soviet economy that there was a marked slowdown in Soviet growth after the mid-1970s. Several factors seem to be responsible: slower growth in investment and labor inputs, declining productivity of capital and labor, the emergence of bottlenecks in the economy in the late 1970s, increasing costs of raw materials, and the increasing difficulty of producing complex goods in a centrally planned economy. There might also have been a deterioration in the quality of statistics on production as real performance worsened; also, increased inflation in the Soviet Union during this period may not have been adequately reflected in Western output estimates. Beyond measures of goods produced, the increasing divergence between the controlled prices of goods in state stores and market clearing values (given the growing stock of money) has made it increasingly difficult for people to acquire the

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goods that are available; there is an additional loss of consumer welfare on this score. In sum, we need to take seriously the possibility that the Soviet Union has been close to a no-growth society in the last decade—at least per capita and in terms of people's perceptions of their own well-being.

Another way of assessing Soviet economic performance is to observe that after closing part of the enormous gap with the West that existed in economic productivity during the 1950s and 1960s—largely through a high level of savings and investment—the gap stopped closing in the mid-1970s. Looking ahead, it is unclear whether this gap in productivity will remain roughly constant (at ten to thirty years for most nonmilitary sectors), grow wider, or resume the process of closure on the West. A continued widening is not out of the question, as the West moves increasingly towards the production of more complex goods and services, ones which pose increasing difficulties of production and distribution for a top-down command economy of the Soviet type.

The immediate future looks bleak—although failure to predict the near stagnation in Soviet performance in the past decade should induce modesty among forecasters. Nonetheless, additions to the labor force will be much smaller than in the past decade, capital inputs are growing slowly and capital productivity has been falling, energy and other raw material costs are rising, and the fall in the real world oil price is worsening Moscow's hard currency earning capacity and, therefore, its potential for importing Western machinery. The CIA forecasts a growth rate of 1.5 to 2.5 percent annually for the rest of the 1980s. This range may be too high and one should not rule out the possibility of declining per capita output over the next decade.

Tougher military competition with the United States

Despite its sustained and successful military build-up, two developments in the military competition with the U.S. and other adversaries must be worrying the Soviet general staff: One is the increase in U.S. weapons procurement since 1980 (although it must be taking some comfort lately from the prospect of a leveling off). The other is the steadily increased importance of technologies, especially those centering on information processing and communication (computers, stealth, precision weapons) in which the Soviet Union is weak. The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative is a primary case in point; it is the kind of Western military development that most bothers the Soviet military—because it promises to make obsolete much of what the Soviets have painfully built, and involves technologies that they have great difficulty developing.

The Soviet problem in competing militarily with the West is compounded by the large share of the Soviet security sector in the economy: probably over 20 percent of GNP. (This share includes not only the cost of the military, but also the cost of supporting Cuba, Vietnam, and other parts of its empire, and the hidden and hard to estimate costs inflicted by the military sector on the nonmilitary one.) Despite this strain, there is a widely shared view among Western specialists that Moscow will continue to increase its military spending throughout the 1980s at a rate of 2 to 3 percent per year. This may happen, but if the Soviet economy doesn't grow much, the military sector can increase only at the expense of consumption, investment, or support of the overseas empire. The regime will probably protect the level of consumption; this leaves investment and the military to absorb shortfalls.

A new party ideology—but within a Stalinist economic model

There is growing concern in the ruling elite about economic stagnation, increased corruption and worsened popular morale. Vladimir Shlapentokh of Michigan State University holds that a new ideology has been developing within the party that regards economic efficiency as the basic factor affecting not only the standard of living but also the international position of the country. Peter Reddaway, of the London School of Economics, in a recent issue of the *New York Review of Books* argues that many people find the status quo "unacceptable," one

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characterized by a mounting and intolerable "lack of order"—corrupt, ineffective, increasingly burdened with social ills of many kinds. He expects change—in the direction of reform rather than reaction—led by Gorbachev after he consolidates his power, at the earliest next February at the Twenty-seventh Party Congress. He sees Gorbachev as tempted by restricted forms of capitalism but not now in a position to risk making radical changes.

If Gorbachev is biding his time until he has more power, he is concealing his radical intentions well. He says (to *Time* magazine's editors and others) that progress is to be made through increased discipline and the strengthening of centralization in strategic areas of the economy; he also says there is to be a broadening of autonomy of enterprises and the encouragement of initiative and enterprise. The themes of increased labor discipline and attacks on corruption were prominent in Andropov's brief reign and are receiving fresh support under Gorbachev. An unprecedented campaign against alcohol consumption is already under way. These efforts may have some effect, but there are good grounds for skepticism as to how long they will last given the irrationalities of the economic system. As for decentralization, in order for it to make a significant difference, the power to hire, fire, and set prices—among other economic decisions—would have to be moved far down in the system and a looser labor market would have to be tolerated. In short, it would require movement towards a market system. For instance, much good could be accomplished by legitimizing the second economy and allowing it to expand. Such steps in a market direction can have a dramatic and rapid effect, as the recent experience of China shows. There has been discussion of such ideas in the Soviet press but there is no evident top-level support for them—so far.

The chairman has recently announced economic goals for the next five year plan, and to the year 2000, which are held to be free of the "groundless fantasies" of past plans but which call for a near doubling of national income by 2000 (implying a real annual average growth rate of 5 percent) and an increase of labor productivity of 130 to 150 percent (implying around 6 percent annual improvement). This is to be achieved through better technology and re-equipping and reorganizing existing plants and not expensive new projects. A Soviet Union that allowed the market much more scope could very likely achieve such goals, but not the present system. Either Gorbachev is a closet quasi-capitalist, as Reddaway suggests, or these goals will turn out to be like Khrushchev's "fantasies."

What is particularly striking about Gorbachev's line is the virtual absence of measures that would produce economically meaningful "autonomy" of enterprises. The French historian Michel Heller observes that

Gorbachev v. Alcohol

Pravda, the official newspaper of the Soviet Union's Communist Party, has been making regular progress reports on the success of Mikhail Gorbachev's campaign against drunkenness and alcoholism, which the newspaper said has met with wholehearted approval of the people. A Soviet leader's programs invariably are reported to be successes, and Gorbachev's is no exception. *Pravda* said alcohol-related crimes and "hooliganism" have decreased in number; among workers, pressure from management has cut down the rate of drunkenness; and a new magazine, *Sobriety and Culture*, is about to hit the stands.

Propaganda campaigns urge universal ostracizing of anyone who deviates from "communist morality." That apparently includes those who engage in "dishonesty, bureaucratism, arrogance, and money-grubbing," not to mention sneaking a nip at the bottle. Huge increases in liquor tax have led to expansion of the moonshine industry. Soviet authorities have seized a large number of illegal stills. They say that working people's leisure time now "is becoming meaningful." Production of soft drinks, ice cream, and confectionery has been stepped up. Evidently Ogden Nash's immortal words have not yet reached the Kremlin: "Candy is dandy, but liquor is quicker."

Reprinted from Insight *(October 14, 1985)*

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Gorbachev's formulations are remarkably like those of Stalin in 1931–32; Stalin is cited as the creator of the relevant economic model for the Soviet Union today. There is no place for the workings of the market in that model. And, despite contrary indications, if Gorbachev tries to move in this direction, the resistive forces in the party apparatus will be powerful. In short, more than *policy* changes are needed; *system* changes are needed, and these now look unlikely. Instead, the new team in Moscow apparently will try policy tinkering and, if that is all it does, it will discover over time that things have not gotten better. The tinkering may even worsen them.

Sooner or later other approaches will be needed. The only truly effective one, and one such a regime will be most reluctant to try, is to follow the Chinese down the capitalist road.

Other aims: some even more pressing

Although improving on poor economic performance is the basic problem his regime faces, Gorbachev has a more urgent personal aim: establishing firm control over the party apparatus and government organs. He will also be working on making sure that Eastern Europe remains under firm control, moving ahead with military modernization and endeavoring to pursue gains—and limit losses—in the Third World. He is already fast off the starting line with a major nuclear arms control proposal. Although operating from a position of increasing relative economic weakness, Gorbachev is also operating from a position of current military strength, and there is good reason to believe that traditional Soviet geopolitical goals will be pursued: the use of its great military power to maintain control over the country and the East European sector of the empire, the dominance of peripheral areas, the build-up of nuclear forces as a background element in the overall correlation of forces, and the support of friends around the world where such support can be provided at no great cost or risk. Gorbachev's relative youth, vigor, and apparent competence are a plus, but the stagnant state of the Soviet economy is likely to be an increasing drag.

The question needs to be asked whether a situation of current relative strength and likely future weakness could produce a Politburo decision to strike a decisive blow against the West. There is no basis for believing that it would risk nuclear war, or any major war for that matter. But it might take more chances than in the past in exploiting opportunities to extend its power in circumstances that promise to produce a major strategic gain. Among the potentialities, a move against Iran and the oil resources of the Persian Gulf, if an opening presents itself or can be created, seems the most important contingency against which to guard.

Turning Eastern Europe into a source of help

During the 1970s the Soviet Union subsidized the economies of Eastern Europe mainly by underpricing the oil that it shipped to them. There is controversy about the magnitude of the net transfer involved, but there is wide agreement that it was positive. Despite this subsidy, the economic performance of Eastern Europe deteriorated badly after the late 1970s. This help has been a price paid by Moscow to hold down the probability of political instability in the area.

The new management in Moscow may have a different view. A June 21, 1985 article in *Pravda*, widely taken in Eastern Europe to be an important policy signal, said that "a widening of the private sector is fraught with serious economic, social and ideological consequences." Instead, what is needed is a "qualitatively new level of economic integration" within the Soviet bloc. Other channels have been communicating the same message to the East Europeans. This position not only bodes ill for the East European economies, it reinforces other signs of no market-type reforms within the Soviet Union itself.

This position implies no or reduced subsidies on the pricing of oil and gas and increased shipments of relatively advanced machinery to the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe, instead of their export to the West. A major shift in the terms of trade would be a serious blow to the East European economies, which even now are struggling to meet their delivery requirements

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to the Soviet Union, to generate current account surpluses with the West in order to service their debts, and to meet consumption levels essential for political stability at home. The vetoing of greater use of the market would deny the East Europeans the only path out of their economic stagnation. There is evidence of differing views on these matters in Moscow, and the *Pravda* article line is unlikely to be the last word. But if Moscow adopts a Stalinist line, this can only produce a further worsening of economic conditions and increase the likelihood of political turmoil. Over the longer run, there is no real economic relief for Moscow in such a policy.

II

The search for reduced pressure—and help—from adversaries

In this situation it seems likely that the main line of policy will be to seek relief and even help from the West in the near term, while still pursuing the long term goal of trying to do the West in. Such a line should not surprise us; it is essentially the early 1970s detente formula as seen from the Soviet side. It worked for a while then, for reasons that had much to do with the weakened American condition caused by Vietnam and Watergate, and Richard Nixon's vision of how to deal with the Soviets. Although circumstances are less favorable now, no more attractive scheme is likely to be perceived in Moscow.

Soviet leaders see the democratic West as a permanent foe—fortunately, one that is far from unified on its policies towards Moscow, but unfortunately, one that is stronger technically and economically. They must be powerfully attracted to a strategy seeking the weakening of U.S. defense efforts, the further political division of the West, and the acquisition of Western technology and capital.

Signs of such an effort are multiplying. Soviet officials are dangling increased business opportunities before Europeans and Americans; there are approaches to the American Jewish community and to Israel; there are rumors of impending replacement of the officials responsible for the especially hard-nosed Moscow line towards Japan; and an agreement for increased trade with China has been announced.

Most immediately important, both to set the stage for other initiatives and for its potential direct military benefits, is the ambitious line Moscow is taking on nuclear arms control. Reduced military competition from the U.S. will continue to be sought via the arms control process. An important purpose is to free the regime from the burden of having to make even greater military investments than it has made in the past two decades, many of which it now sees as threatened with obsolescence by advancing Western military technologies. In addition to killing the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, cuts are sought in U.S. offensive missile programs (e.g. the INF deployment in Europe, the MX and Midgetman ICBMs, the Trident II, the Stealth bomber). The Soviet proposal to limit "nuclear charges" to 6,000 on each side, along with its proposal to ban new types of arms after a certain date, fits such a strategy.

The Soviet military seems to recognize the importance of moving more rapidly to incorporate what in the West are called "emerging technologies," for the most part ones based on electronics. How is this to be done given Soviet backwardness? Some designs, products, and production equipment are bought or stolen in the West, but many more are needed. It seems likely that the Soviet military is an important voice lobbying for the import of more equipment and technology from the West, both to strengthen the industrial base and to get more technology for incorporation directly in weapons.

There may even be a faction looking for military cuts analogous to those Khrushchev made. If such a faction exists, it probably won't get very far given the centrality of military power to the regime and the important role in Soviet doctrine of having dominance in *both* nuclear and conventional forces. But the regime surely is trying to avoid having to spend significantly more money on the military.

For these reasons, help will be sought from several sources, especially Western Europe, and within Europe especially from the Federal Republic of Germany. Moscow will seek technol-

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ogy, joint projects that bring capital equipment, and subsidized loans. It will also try to get these from the U.S. and Japan, but with lower expectations of success.

Objections to dependence on the West

The Soviet Union's economic policies have always been autarkic; heavy involvement with the capitalist world has always implied vulnerability. Gorbachev has said that the regime will lose its justification if, among other things, it "becomes economically dependent on Western countries." Significantly, although most of the East Europeans got into heavy debt with the West in the 1970s, the Soviet Union did not. Its hard currency debt (net of its foreign assets) is only around $10 billion, while its hard currency exports are around $30 billion a year. (Wharton Econometric Forecasting estimates that the Soviets have $35 billion in outstanding loans to LDCs. It isn't clear how much of this amount could actually be collected, though.) It probably could borrow another $25 billion or so from Western banks before they reach their limits (although a weakened debt service capacity stemming from a decline in the price of oil would temper the bankers' enthusiasm). But with enough Western government guarantees there would be practically no limit to what could be lent.

Despite a preference for autarky, there has been growing economic interaction with other nations. Most striking has been the Soviet Union's growing—and practically unavoidable—dependence on Western grain supplies. Vladimir Treml of Duke University has estimated an overall growth of dependence on imports (from all sources including Eastern Europe) from 8 percent of national income in 1960 to 20 percent in 1980 (measured in domestic ruble prices). A recent Soviet statement by V. Seitsovskii has revealed that the share of imports in total investment in machinery rose to 35 percent in the early 1980s by comparison with 15 percent a decade earlier. Despite this growth—or in part because of it—there is a powerful lobby in the Soviet Union opposed to dependence on imports of Western equipment. The state of the domestic economy being what it is, the advocates of non-dependence on the West are likely to lose more ground in the internal debates, but they will be continuing cautionary voices on the perils of excessive dependence on the West. The result is likely to be a mixed strategy, one that includes internal tinkering, increases in equipment imports from Eastern Europe, plus an approach to the West for technology and equipment.

What does Moscow have to offer?

The natural level of trade between the Soviet Union and the West is low. Raw materials, and weapons, make up most of what the Soviets have to offer the rest of the world. Its manufactured goods are too low in quality to be of interest outside the less developed world. As for raw materials, these have been intensively developed and sold in the West. But these commodities are also available from other parts of the world, and declining prices in the 1980s have greatly reduced the value of these Soviet assets. Probably the only commodity not fully exploited in the Western (in this case European) market is Siberian natural gas; worries about security of supply limit European purchases. In short, although there is money to be made by some Western businesses on particular deals, Moscow does not have a great deal in hand economically with which to tempt Western governments. It has other assets of value, however: military forces and programs; ventures in the Third World; Jews and other minorities and political dissidents; and control over Eastern Europe.

Its military programs are at the core of the regime's power in the world. The impressive increases in Soviet power, both conventional and nuclear, and the growing reach of this power are a well known story. Europe, Japan, Southwest Asia, and China are directly threatened. Overarching is the enormous increase in Soviet nuclear power.

Arms control treaties and agreements have failed to contain the relative growth of Soviet military power. The method that was highly successful in SALT surely commends itself to Gorbachev for the future. Through SALT I, Moscow in 1972 succeeded in killing the nascent

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U.S. ABM program while preserving the core of its own program (the Moscow ABM system plus an ambitious research and development program), and reinforced the existing American disposition not to invest heavily in offensive forces even as the Soviet Union greatly expanded its own offensive investments. This arrangement ran into serious trouble after the late 1970s and is in need of refurbishment. Gorbachev's recent proposal for drastic cuts in offensive forces and an end to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative is a bold attempt to bring back the old SALT-detente regime.

This move is well matched to Western public susceptibilities; it is a good example of how to play a not-very-strong hand boldly. We are not seeing Gorbachev coming hat in hand looking for relief from the military competition, and we will not. Instead, playing from near term strength (and perhaps hidden fear of long term weakness) we should expect a bold stance on the main fronts, threats of an even greater arms build-up, or more activities in the Third World (for instance against Pakistan). The message is that the new management is able to make things tougher for the West—but is willing to be more flexible. But although the Soviets can expand selected military programs, they are in an increasingly poor position to compete with the West on a broad military front.

The major target of this campaign will be Western Europe and, especially, the Federal Republic of Germany. Moscow sees a strengthened Euro-detente as likely to yield not only substantial economic benefits but also a reduced NATO military effort and a further widening of differences between Europe and the U.S. Although the Soviets will not consciously endanger their hold on Eastern Europe, they are likely to soften their position on MBFR and in the Euro-missile negotiations.

Japan is a more difficult case. The potential has long existed for a large Japanese contribution to the economic development of the Soviet Union, especially Siberia, but gaining these benefits would require a marked shift in Moscow's line toward Japan, and especially a Soviet change on the four northern islands. A visible reduction in forces there would soften the Japanese, but a real breakthrough requires the return of these islands to Japan, an unlikely Soviet move given arguments by the military about their value and worries about the precedent for Chinese territorial claims. The new management will be tempted, but is unlikely to decide that Japan's economic contribution would be worth that price.

An accommodation of sorts with China might be sought. It would not yield important economic benefits, but it might make possible reduced spending on Soviet forces on the Chinese frontier. This, one of the three principal concessions sought from the Soviet Union by China (along with Soviet concessions on Afghanistan and Vietnam), is probably the least difficult one on which Moscow could make a modest change.

On the second asset, its ventures in the Third World, Moscow might dangle suggestions that its support for Nicaragua is negotiable if linked to the ending of U.S. support for the Afghan resistance, or that something might be done in Africa or other places of marginal interest to it. On balance, the record suggests that no basic concessions will be made on the Soviet periphery (e.g. Afghanistan) and that the regime will not easily be discouraged from continuing to try for gains in the Third World whenever these seem possible at no great cost or risk. Achievements in this latter arena have been one of the chief accomplishments of the Soviets in modern times, and they will not easily be dislodged from seeking further gains if they can be gotten on the cheap.

With respect to internal hostages, and the political dissidents, the condition of the Jews has worsened; emigration has been reduced, and the Jewish refuseniks are under attack. Its feelers to the U.S. Jewish community, and the hint of renewed relations with Israel, suggest the potential of an increase in Jewish emigration—in exchange for Israeli acceptance of a greater Soviet role in the Middle East, and as a way of reducing American objections to economic help to the Soviet Union. The reduction of these abuses would be part of the stage-setting for a wider detente, and a higher level of emigration would in all likelihood be a compo-

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nent of a deal, as they see it.

In contrast, we should expect no easing of the repression of political dissidents. On the contrary, everything points to a continuation of their systematic suppression.

Its control over Eastern Europe—a position from which it also poses a profound threat to Western Europe—is a fourth asset, one of great interest and concern to Western Europe and the United States. However, the maintenance of this control is seen as so essential to the security of the Soviet Union and even to the regime's control over the Soviet Union that it is not an asset to be considered in negotiations. Put differently, if the regime is eventually willing to enter into discussions that bear on the status of that region, its view of its own future at that point would indeed be bleak.

Economic benefits Moscow might seek

What Moscow *needs* is the wholesale reduction of central control over its economic system. What it will probably *seek*—overcoming the objections of the economic chauvinists—is technology, especially, and Western capital equipment (with embodied technology). Moscow will suggest, mainly to Germany and other countries of Western Europe, an array of projects in electronics, robotics, computers, energy, transportation, genetic engineering, etc. Many of these technologies will, of course, have important military applications. Proposed financing will be on concessional terms. The Soviet Union will offer to pay the West back with some of the outputs, with raw materials—its main economic asset—and with modest military and human rights concessions if pressed.

The Soviets will be prepared to strengthen a Euro-detente, offering benefits both tangible (e.g. export business and emigration of Germans from the Soviet Union and the GDR) and intangible (e.g. bolstering Moscow's "stake" in good relations with Western Europe). Moscow will calculate that the West Europeans, in their own not-too-vigorous economic condition, will be strongly tempted to deal for both economic and political reasons; certainly companies that are potential beneficiaries are willing. Moreover, the West European governments are accustomed to mercantilist subsidies on foreign trade, and the subsidizing of communist countries is an established practice. (Daniel Kohler of the Rand Corporation estimates that in 1981 alone total subsidies to the communist world by the OECD countries came to $3 billion. Much of this came from Western Europe.) Moscow will try, of course, to change its general political line as little as possible, but some softening of its political assault on Western Europe in the last several years is to be expected. It will be warmly received.

III

What should the West's position be?

An angry bear is an especially dangerous creature, but what we are faced with now, as Charles Wolf of the Rand Corporation puts it, is a sick bear. The reputation of Soviet leaders for prudence and caution is well deserved and the new management looks like it will maintain it. If the West can make foreign military moves dangerous, Gorbachev's regime will be reluctant to engage in them. Although there will continue to be a strong preference to avoid direct conflict with the West, the caveat expressed above concerning the possibility of greater risk-taking in the Third World bears repetition.

Without outside succor the Soviet economy will remain backward relative to the market economies (even the not-so-vigorous ones of Western Europe) and will probably weaken relatively. It will weaken dramatically vis-a-vis China if that country remains on its present course. Such an evolution would have several positive consequences for us. The last decade has already seen a slowdown in the growth rate of Soviet military investment, and the chances are good for a further diminution in this rate in the next decade.

The other, potentially even more important consequence is an eventual loosening up of central control of the economy. Such loosening would inevitably entail—sooner or later—the relaxation of political controls and constraints on the authority of the oligarchs in Moscow. This is the key reason for their resistance to such a change. Worsened economic conditions

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might also lead to more latitude for East European governments, in order to prevent political outbursts there.

Economic sickness, as opposed to negotiations on arms, is a much more promising path to achieving an improvement in our security. We clearly haven't obtained gains in the past via the nuclear arms control route, and there is little reason to believe that this process will do much better for us in the future. (For instance, the MBFR negotiation has the principal effect of legitimizing the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe.) So, arguably, the right position for the West is no technology transfer beyond that inevitably associated with the present low level of East-West trade, no long term loans, and no subsidies. There is no reason to expect an early payoff from such a stance, but the longer term prospects are good. There was much unwarranted optimism at the beginning of the cold war about the ability of the Soviets to stay the course. Although they no doubt have the capacity to struggle along, and there is little reason to expect that the regime will lose control as a result of these difficulties in the next decade, we have a much better basis for optimism today than at any time since the late 1940s. Our principal competitor's strength is likely to erode visibly. Left to itself, the sick bear's condition will worsen.

There is, of course, an alternative view. For example, Peter Reddaway holds that we should try to strengthen the position of the reformers, the dissenters, the closet liberals (among whom he counts Gorbachev). These groups are opposed by the neo-Stalinists, members of the *nomenklatura* who feel threatened, and others who believe that the old ways are the best ways. The reformers and their putative allies, the dissidents, need support against the forces of reaction, and the West should help them through a willingness to implement further arms control measures and economic "easement"—but the West should also exert pressure on the regime on behalf of the dissidents.

The trouble with this argument is that we have been told before about the "good guys" in the Kremlin who need Western support, only to find that they were largely a figment in the minds of hopeful Westerners. Although there is much to be said for trying to help oppressed people—and this could have a strategic payoff to the West in time—the evidence is much too tenuous to support the position that the new regime is ripe for a major liberalization and that the West can do much to help bring it about.

Suppose the Western front doesn't hold?

A European might say of this analysis that it reflects American interests, but not European ones. The European interest, it is often held, lies in developing closer relations with the East independently of what happens between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world, including the United States. A not especially sympathetic way to describe the European position is that the Europeans want the benefit of protection from the United States while reinsuring with a more powerful Soviet Union. The upshot is that the United States bears the heavy costs both of helping to defend Europe *and* of competing with the Soviets elsewhere in the world.

An American view—or at least this American's view—is that the divergence of interest is not nearly as great as is often represented, that Western Europe and the United States are really in the same boat. If there is a difference, the fact that Western Europe is noticeably more exposed to Soviet power than the United States is gives the Europeans an even stronger interest in the decline of Soviet power.

Nonetheless, suppose that the Soviets are correct in the judgment that the West Europeans, and among them particularly the Germans, will deal. There is inherent in this situation the possibility of considerable strain within the Western alliance, itself an important goal for Moscow.

Given the view expressed above on the results of letting the bear falter, but recognizing that this aim isn't likely to be fully shared in Europe, what then might American goals be? An arguable position would be to minimize the help given to Moscow and to extract meaningful benefits for the West in exchange for whatever relief Moscow gets.

The West's assets are, of course, liabilities

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as perceived in Moscow, given that regime's nearly zero-sum-game view of the competition. High on the list is the U.S. military capacity—and its potential for growth and technological change. Our increasing ties with China must also be a worry. Our economic strength is an attraction, but the Europeans and Japanese are well-endowed in almost all of what the Soviets need by way of technology and capital equipment. Despite this fact, the U.S. must be seen as the central party with which to deal. Aside from the direct benefits we might produce, things will go much more easily with the others if the U.S. legitimizes increased dealing with Moscow. We obviously do not have veto power over the help our allies give to Moscow, but we do have some influence.

If there is dealing, what would be useful to get?

If things work out badly, what we will get is tension with our allies—similar to the tension over the Siberian gas pipeline deal—and a lot of Western help to the ailing Soviet system. This prospect suggests that we should pursue several specific aims:

- —Develop a shared appreciation on the internal economic and political situation of the Soviet Union and the moves it might make.
- —Try to win acceptance for a tougher line on the credit-worthiness of the Soviet Union, given declining energy prices and the resultant worsening of Soviet debt service capacity. For instance, bank regulations should be changed to reflect adequately the risks involved in lending to the East.
- —Discuss various strategic goals that the West might seek and what they would be worth—and to whom. There will probably be no agreement possible on these goals, but there might be a measure of clarity reached on them before we get embroiled in specific controversial cases.

Consider again the four main Soviet assets discussed above: its military posture, its Third World enterprises, its human rights abuses, and Eastern Europe.

The most important of these assets, its military strength, has been the object of negotiations for over fifteen years. It should be clear after much experience that no fundamental reduction in the Soviet nuclear threat to the West is likely to be achieved by such negotiations. To the extent that negotiations have been based on the concept of assuring mutual destruction of our respective societies, the efforts have been conceptually perverse. Moreover, the Soviets are violating both the spirit and the letter of these agreements. They have learned that these negotiations are a useful way to bolster opposition to U.S. programs they dislike (e.g., the Safeguard antimissile system in the early 1970s and the Strategic Defense Initiative today) and to create divisions within the West (e.g., on the Euro-missile issue) without imposing serious constraints on themselves. Useful understandings have been reached in limited areas (such as the atmospheric test ban) and some additional narrow areas of accord might emerge, but there is little profit to be had, overall, in pursuing this line.

There may be more profit in focusing on Soviet general purpose forces. After all, it is the Soviet ground, air, and naval forces that pose the greatest danger to Europe and other of our allies. Significant reductions in these forces, or their relocation, could make an important contribution to Western security—but not through "balanced" reductions with the West (as in the negotiations for Mutual, Balanced Force Reductions—MBFR—in Europe). Western Europe needs "unbalanced" force reductions.

Of course, it will be said that because the Soviets will, above all, try to preserve their military superiority versus Western Europe, such an effort would fail. But that is hardly an adequate reason for not staking out a position focused on the most pertinent elements of Soviet power, those that have much more bearing on events that might actually happen in the real world than the possibility of nuclear war does.

A second possibility is to seek changes in Soviet activities in the Third World. Much of what the Soviet Union does there does not have high strategic importance to the Soviets, but these ventures are certainly useful in distracting the Americans; they must also provide deep

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satisfaction to the rulers of the last great world empire, which has come a long way in less than seventy years. Now they get to play on the world scene in a way that must be gratifying, particularly by comparison with the limited satisfactions of dealing with problems of drunkenness in the factories or how to handle the irresponsible Poles.

From the American standpoint, it is not difficult to draw up a list of places from which we would like to see the Soviets draw back. High on such a list would be Cuba: for instance, getting Cuban troops back home and Soviet forces out of Cuba (thus rectifying the flaw in the deal on the removal of the missiles in 1962). One's imagination can roam to other regions. Vague "linkage" along these lines failed in the 1970s detente, and we might try harder again. However, given the Soviet leadership's notions about the prerogatives of a great power, the prospects for success are not good. Moreover, Gorbachev might decide to initiate this game himself. The most obvious ploy for him is a "spheres of influence" proposal, conceding U.S. dominance in Central America in exchange for Soviet dominance in Afghanistan—and in Southwest Asia as a whole. Neither on strategic nor moral grounds should such a trade be considered.

Under the third category, abatement of its human rights abuses, Soviet violations are integral to the problems we have with the Soviet system. Much of the time we put this fundamental factor aside in order to deal with others, such as the control of nuclear arms. In contrast, arguably the major and perhaps only concrete payoff from the 1970s detente was a substantial flow of Jews, ethnic Germans, and other minorities out of the country.

The case for giving human rights a high priority has much more to be said for it than those disposed to think only in narrow realpolitik terms might realize. (This is a strong point in the Reddaway position.) The Great Russians no longer make up a majority of the population, and many groups are alienated: the Baltic peoples, the Western Ukrainians, most of the Moslem peoples, the Jews, the ethnic Germans, many Armenians, among others. As for the East Europeans, it hardly needs to be said that they overwhelmingly reject the Soviet system. The political dissidents' objective is to have a more just society. This is why the Helsinki Accords are potentially important, despite the systematic violation of the Soviet commitments in Basket III. They commit the Soviet Union to the granting of rights which, if granted, would undermine and constrain the Soviet system. That is why Moscow doesn't comply and why their pursuit by us is important. The more that the regime in Moscow is forced to make concessions on these internal matters, the more this reinforces the belief by those peoples who resist Moscow's domination that Soviet power is not unlimited and that the West can force it to make concessions at home. Admittedly, one shouldn't go too far with this argument. Soviet control is firm, and the regime will do nothing (at least consciously) to undermine it. But the regime *is* in trouble and it has made internal concessions in the past.

So, on this view, if we do get caught up in a negotiating process, we should put specific measures related to human rights high on our list of aims—including the ending of repression of dissidents, improved access by the Soviet peoples to Western media, and the rights of all people to emigrate (not only Jews, Armenians, and ethnic Germans). We should also seek similar steps in Eastern Europe.

We need to think creatively about demands that might be made under this heading. For instance, we should avoid a situation in which we, in effect, pay ransom per head for emigres. This is what the West Germans do with East Germany. It has little moral effect, no fundamental impact on the system. What we should do is try to create a process by which Soviet citizens acquire *rights* to emigrate and rights to the expression of independent views. That is, we should be at least as interested in creating internal dynamic changes as in the head count of people leaving. Only through such internal changes can the authority of the oligarchs in Moscow eventually be limited.

Regarding the fourth area of possible concessions, the East European part of the Soviet empire, the main goal should be to seek a

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relaxation of Soviet control over these societies. Military reduction by the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact might be sought, as well as Soviet force reductions. Again, Soviet nervousness about the stability of these regimes and the threat of loss of its control will set limits to Moscow's concessions.

Although in principle there is a combination of reduced arms, pullback in the Third World, human rights changes, and reductions in Soviet control over Eastern Europe that might warrant major concessions by the West, concessions that would be significant in *strategic* terms are not very likely to be obtained. Perhaps something truly significant will be possible in five to ten years or so if internal conditions worsen, a possibility that should be alive in our thinking.

The need for protection against reneging

Our experience with SALT, detente, and the Helsinki agreements should make us keenly aware that the odds are substantial that agreements will be violated. The difficulties we would then face are illustrated by current domestic pressures for us to continue observing SALT II even as the Soviets depart from it. We obviously need to be able to change course as the Soviets renege on their side of bargains. But in addition to the predictable arguments that we mustn't do anything that would heighten tensions, there would be private interests with a continuing stake in Soviet projects (as in the Siberian gas pipeline case). European governments would, predictably, be less concerned about Soviet violations than the U.S., and most of the increased business activities would involve European and perhaps Japanese firms.

There is no good solution to this problem. However, the more tangible the Soviet concessions, the tighter the link to explicit U.S. and Western benefits, the greater the likelihood that we, at least, would react to violations. And at a minimum, any deal we enter should not be accompanied by the usual paeans to the achievement of a fundamentally changed world order.

How should the West proceed?

In short, even allowing for perceived differences in interest among Western nations, arguably the collective interest of the West lies in letting the Soviet system decay. This will force it in time to move towards an economically and therefore a politically decentralized system. Such a system will have more constraints on its behavior. If we do—contrary to this advice—get caught up in a broad negotiating process, mainly because the West Europeans will see things differently, probably the least promising objective is a reduction in Soviet nuclear forces and the most promising is action on human rights issues and on Eastern Europe. Not surprisingly, the negotiability of these aims is likely to be in inverse order to their worth to us: it is not difficult to imagine a (mostly cosmetic) nuclear arms accord, some minor concessions on Afghanistan or Nicaragua, and the emigration of a few more Jews than have been let out lately. Such a package would do essentially nothing to change the nature of the struggle between the Soviet Union and the West, while perhaps giving enough economic relief to Moscow to help keep it from scaling back its military programs and to help delay fundamental internal changes.

Fortunately, external help within the bounds of what—pessimistically—might take place won't do much to help such an irrational economic system. This is not an argument for indifference, because even small increments of outside support might enable that system to continue in ways that are dangerous to our health. But it should be some comfort that even the foolish, coerced, and venal capitalists probably won't be able to save that system.

George Kennan, in 1947, supposed that a Western policy of containment would, within ten or fifteen years, promote tendencies to moderate or break up Soviet power. The weaknesses he discerned were its economic backwardness, the disillusion and exhaustion of its people, the uncertainties associated with the transfer of power from Stalin, and the inevitable

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emergence of strains within the party structure.

This analysis shares some elements with the Kennan position of 1947, especially on Soviet economic weakness. The Soviets managed the transition from Stalin and have succeeded well beyond Kennan's forecasted period. This analysis does not make a firm prediction about "the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power." There is good reason to believe that the Soviet system will be in place ten or fifteen years from now; there is also a good chance that it will be relatively weaker and there is a possibility that it will have "mellowed." But it would be a serious mistake to count on this.

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Quid Pro Quo

Jim E. Hinds

WESTERN publics assess and define the state of U.S.-Soviet relations in terms of negotiations—usually arms control negotiations. People seem to require publicly visible negotiations in order to believe that U.S.-Soviet relations are "improving." For relations to be thought good, negotiations must be "successful." Success means publicly showing progress. The analysts who inform public opinion tend to emphasize the "process" and ignore the substance, thereby setting up pressures to succeed by showing progress and ultimately reaching agreement. Ignoring substance and demanding progress leave the concept of mutual benefit out of the measure of success.

We worry about the absence of public "dialogue." Relations were thought particularly tense, for example, when the Soviet Union pulled its negotiators out of the START and INF negotiations: we were not talking to one another. When the Geneva talks resumed, the important thing was that we were talking (continuing the arms control process). During preparations for the November Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, one often heard analysts who sought on the one hand to lower expectations for success (as in "breakthrough"), but who believed on the other hand in the critical importance of the meeting as a significant symbol of communication (the summit process).

Of course, we communicate with the Soviet Union all the time. We communicate by our policies toward other countries and regions, by our military deployments and programs, by our diplomacy, and by our public statements. We also communicate at important negotiations that happen to be below the news threshold, such as the multilateral Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the conventional force reduction talks (MBFR) in Vienna, the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CDE), and at all manner of United Nations activities.

We also communicate continuously—even negotiate—about things that, taken singly, seem relatively unimportant, but taken as a whole, add up to an important measure of the state of our relations. Even though these kinds of talks do not generate much public interest, they too tend to be measured in terms of the process, not by their substance.

One may place these daily transactions under the general heading of reciprocal diplomacy, or "reciprocity."

> *Reciprocity:* Mutuality. The term is used in international law to denote the relations existing between two states when each of them gives the subjects of the other certain privileges, on condition that its own subjects shall enjoy similar privileges at the hands of the latter state. (*Black's Law Dictionary*, revised fourth edition, 1968.)

For many diplomats posted to Moscow (not

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just Americans or other Westerners, but most), the concept of reciprocity comes to mean reciprocal *action*, retaliation, getting even. Americans like to show that we are a friendly, understanding people, willing to judge anyone as an individual, proud to grant everyone the easy liberties of our democracy. One soon recognizes, however, that the instinctively helpful American treatment of Soviet diplomats, journalists, exchange scientists, tourists, and so on, has little to do with the treatment of Americans temporarily in the Soviet Union. One also notes that Soviet harassment met by retaliation in kind (for example, responding directly to a Soviet refusal to permit an American diplomat to travel by turning down the next Soviet trip request) occasionally leads to temporary Soviet relinquishment. Consistent reciprocal action of this type sometimes results in relatively long-term easing of seemingly arbitrary Soviet interference. Even if such reciprocity does not work in specific cases, the individual subjected to the heavy Soviet hand at least feels better; he has a small revenge for numerous small indignities.

Understanding the principle of reciprocity in such a way makes it seem a trivial matter. As the term "reciprocity" is applied to the general state of U.S. or Western relations with the Soviet Union, it often describes the petty end of the diplomatic scale. We speak of reciprocity when considering the numbers of diplomats exchanged, journalists and commercial representatives accredited, travel restrictions, living and working conditions, general privileges and immunities, numbers and types of scientific, cultural, trade, and information exchanges, and the like.

One recalls the squabble a few years past when New York residents of Glen Cove applied grass roots reciprocity by denying Soviets the free use of Glen Cove recreation facilities—facilities for which there is no American equivalent in the USSR. (When the Soviets closed the Moscow River's shabby banks to Americans, it was the first most Americans in Moscow had heard of such a "dip beach.") Dimitri Simes, interviewed at the time, said approximately the following (as quoted from memory): "In competition with the Soviet Union, one should avoid the field of petty nastiness—an area in which the Soviets enjoy clear superiority." That is an American sentiment, even if expressed by an emigre.

IF THESE KINDS of issues seem trivial, one must remember that the principle of reciprocity is among the oldest guidelines for relations between states. In the 13th century, when the Russian principalities were beginning to build a Russian identity, the principle of diplomatic reciprocity was applied in its basest form. When Genghis Khan sent envoys to offer an alliance with the Novgorod, Kievan, and other princes, the Russians showed their dislike of the idea by killing the Tartar ambassadors. The Khan's Russian desk officer presumably did not argue that this treatment demonstrated the need and opportunity for increased dialogue, for the Russians' defeat followed swiftly. The Mongols, assaulting the prince of Novgorod's final defense, offered for a ransom to let the Russians withdraw in peace. The offer accepted, the Novgorod prince withdrew, whereupon his soldiers were slain, and the prince himself perished as part of the foundation for the platform upon which the Tartar generals gathered for their victory feast.

A few centuries later, when Ivan the Terrible was presiding over the birth of modern Russia, more civilized reciprocity was already common. For example, Ivan granted commercial access to English merchants in return for reciprocal arrangements (which could never be realized) and offered Russian sanctuary to Queen Elizabeth in return for his own English sanctuary in case either should be deposed (a proposal of no interest to Elizabeth). Ivan IV did not, however, limit his well-known terrible side to domestic issues, and English emissaries and merchants were often imprisoned, tortured, robbed of their goods or murdered over some diplomatic frustration on Ivan's part.

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961 recalls "that peoples of all nations from ancient times have recognized the status of diplomatic agents . . . ." The Convention, based on customary international law, is a document about reciprocity. It pro-

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vides for equal treatment of all diplomats (and others) and prohibits discrimination among states. Article 47, paragraph 2, further provides, however, that discrimination shall not be regarded as taking place:

> (a) where the receiving State applies any of the provisions of the present Convention restrictively because of a restrictive application of that provision to its mission in the sending State;
> (b) where by custom or agreement States extend to each other more favourable treatment than is required by the provisions of the present Convention.

Reciprocity has had its serious moments in diplomatic history. Failure to insist on reciprocity, especially with the Soviet Union, can still have serious consequences. Ever since Trotsky, as Lenin's first Peoples' Commissar for Foreign Affairs, tried to abolish diplomacy altogether, the Soviet Union has exhibited symptoms of schizophrenia as both a Russian nation and a world revolutionary party.

One would think it advisable to deal with such a state rather rigorously in terms of the reciprocity principle. But the American approach to the question has reflected the attitude that it is all, somehow, a distasteful exercise in pettiness.

The application of this attitude to foreign policy is surely based on the idea that Soviets are just Americans who haven't discovered it; that is, if they could only see how America works, they would choose to work the same way. There may be something to the idea that individual Americans and Russians are similar. Nevertheless, Russian hospitality and desire for the good life have nothing to do with the Soviet bureaucracy. The Soviet leadership's values have nothing in common with the common citizen's values. The American citizen's view of the "American way of life," however, has found its way, in part, to American officialdom. Fair play has become an underlying assumption in American affairs. American consumers expect fair treatment to such an extent that many are embarrassed to insist on the best price; the merchant is expected to compete for the consumer's loyalty by volunteering fair treatment and prices. Once stung, however, the consumer takes his business elsewhere.

Applying such a spirit to "business" with the Soviet Union translates into a national expectation that niceness begets niceness. Those who manage the "trivial" side of U.S.-Soviet relations, however, have no place to take the U.S.'s business when we are stung. They tend, therefore, to overlook small inequities as manifestations of the difference between our societies (partly true) and to believe that our generous behavior costs us little and may be helpful in bringing about eventual improvement (highly doubtful). In any case, it is uncomfortable to quarrel over petty affairs.

AT a more serious end of the reciprocity scale is the management of espionage. When a spy-master acting under diplomatic cover is discovered or, more likely, becomes too blatant or effective in his activities and is expelled by the host state, one expects prompt retaliation by the sending state's declaring a corresponding offender *persona non grata*. The recent British expulsion of 25 of the Soviet Union's most flagrant intelligence operatives, followed by Soviet retaliation and further expulsions in which the final score was tied at 31 apiece, was an example of reciprocity.

Even with such serious stuff, after an initially serious reaction, Westerners tend eventually to view the subsequent moves and countermoves as more petty gamesmanship. The press is tempted to report these cases after a time as if the two powers were engaged in simple tit for tat. One doubts, however, that in the small British mission to Moscow 31 people were engaged in intelligence work. One does not doubt that Moscow had more than 31 KGB and GRU officers at work in London.

Reported but little noted at the time of the UK's expulsions was the slight adjustment in the numbers of Soviet diplomats and others authorized to serve in London. The ceiling on diplomats was actually raised slightly, to 46, matching the number of British diplomats in Moscow, but the overall ceiling, which also includes trade representatives, journalists and others, was lowered by the numbers expelled,

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from 236 to 205. This small adjustment was in fact the more important manifestation of reciprocity to come out of the action. The number of Soviet officials in London is still about twice the number of UK officials in Moscow, but the reductions represent a step toward equivalence in what is probably the most immediate and important technical application of reciprocity—*control of hostile intelligence efforts.*

The American consumer, expecting fair treatment, but moving his business elsewhere when stung, might ask why the UK puts up with such a number of Soviet officials in the country when everyone knows the Soviet penchant for massive intelligence operations. He might well ask how the United States manages the same problem.

While it is difficult to get a count of all Soviets in the U.S. at any time (the U.S. had little capability before 1984 to check the status of "unofficial" visitors whose visas had expired), a fairly reliable average seems to be about 550 to 600 Soviets accredited to diplomatic missions (embassy, consulate, UN), another 250 to 300 employed as international civil servants by the UN Secretariat, and around 150 as trade representatives, correspondents and others. These averages do not include temporary duty assignments or spouses who work.

How does the United States stack up against the Soviet thousand or more? The U.S. has 200 or fewer accredited to the Moscow embassy and Leningrad consulate and perhaps thirty journalists and twenty business representatives. Moscow has no UN; thus we have no mission to an international organization, and we have no Americans serving as international employees (unless COMECON starts hiring).

We do employ an additional 200 or more to do administrative and service jobs for our embassy. All but a few of those are Soviet citizens, however; the rest are from third countries. In other words, Soviet officials in the U.S. outnumber U.S. officials in the USSR by four or five to one. And, one might add, for every American working in the Soviet Union, there is by his side (at least figuratively) a Soviet citizen paid by the U.S. And as anyone who has served in Moscow can attest, the amount of equipment and the number of easily identifiable people (not on the U.S. payroll) keeping foreigners under surveillance stagger the imagination. Giving the FBI a similar capability would offend the public and break the budget.

SEVERAL QUESTIONS come to mind. How did the balance get so *far off? What do the Soviets do that we don't to* make them want higher numbers? Who cares?

Many believe that we should not worry overly much. Some of their arguments are: We are an open society, and have nothing to hide. The more the Soviets see how we live, the more dissatisfaction there will be with their own regime. Mechanistic "balances" do nothing to change a closed Soviet society. Maybe our example of how civilized nations behave will help bring them into the 20th century. Tighter controls on Soviet numbers and behavior will mean even tougher action against our people in the Soviet Union, and we have more to lose given the nature of our societies. The Soviets learn more than they can use from our open press; we depend on limited contacts. We choose to do things our way; they do things differently. We hire Soviets for administrative and service jobs because it is inexpensive and convenient: what American knows the Soviet system well enough to work in it? How many Americans who are willing to do boring work speak Russian well? (What American would wash my car for a small bottle of vodka?)

President Reagan drew some conclusions about this situation in his radio address to the nation on June 29, 1985. The president, adding the 1,000 Soviet officials to other Soviet bloc authorities, referred to 2,500 officials of whom 30 to 40 percent "are known or suspected intelligence officers and all can be called upon by the KGB." That means that we have evidence that 750 to 1,000 of these officials are intelligence officers. The number may be higher—and that includes only those identified and accredited as officials of the Soviet Union or its allies.[1] President Reagan said in his address

[1]The U.S. government recently circulated a paper, "Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Signif-

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that he intends to take steps to reduce the Soviet numbers, to exercise better control over Soviet intelligence officers in the U.S., and to bring into balance the size of the Soviet diplomatic presence in the U.S. and the U.S. presence in the USSR.

The president obviously takes the issue seriously. In his radio address he referred to a major Soviet effort to steal or buy "what they need from classified information on American satellites, reports on future weapon systems, including our combat aircraft bombers, to our most advanced technologies from high tech areas like Silicon Valley in California." The government paper referred to reports that more than 5,000 Soviet military research projects benefited significantly from illegally acquired Western technology.

The secretary of defense also takes the matter seriously. He has said many times that there are far too many Soviet "so-called diplomats and trade personnel" in this country and that we should cut down the numbers of Soviets who are employed in the American embassy in Moscow. He has told *Human Events* that "in a society like the Soviet Union they don't send people to this country casually, or with any purpose other than to aid their overall purpose, which is to gather as much of our technology as possible."

On Capitol Hill, Senator Patrick Leahy, vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, supports a limit on Soviet personnel stationed in the U.S. to the number of Americans in Moscow and Leningrad. Representative James Courter seeks to reduce the number of Soviets working in our Moscow embassy.

Those who serve in Moscow care that their offices, typewriters, and homes have been bugged, that they have been bombarded by microwaves and "spy-dusted" with harmful chemicals in blatant disregard for one of the oldest diplomatic reciprocity principles—inviolability of the diplomat's person. They care that they have been used illegally by Soviet authorities to repress Soviet citizens.

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan has tried to make an issue of this for years, because of Soviet electronic spying from the Soviet embassy and other buildings. The Senate Intelligence Committee reported that the Glen Cove facility (the source of Dimitri Simes's "petty nastiness" competition) "is believed to be intercepting so many U.S. telephone and telex messages that it requires the shipment of tons of material to Moscow." And Senator Moynihan has told the Washington *Post*, speaking of the construction of the new Soviet embassy on Washington's highest ground (perfectly situated to eavesdrop on the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon), "We just got snookered; it's inexplicable."

The differences between Western and Soviet societies that tempt us to overlook "small inequities" are the very differences that cause strict reciprocity to be both important and impossible: important because our open society produces the things and technology that their closed society produces poorly or not at all, but upon which they depend for their military power; our openness also provides ease of access to both these products and our defense-related plans and procedures. Impossible because we cannot change the openness that is so much a necessary basis of the liberal democracy and technical productivity we enjoy; and we cannot penetrate their closed society to the extent required to offset their knowledge of our security procedures. That does not mean, however,

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icant Western Technology: An Update" (September 1985). It detailed the organization of technology acquisition under the direction of the Military Industrial Commission (VPK). Collection requirements levied by the VPK are high-priority matters not only for Soviet and East European intelligence services (both civilian and military), but also for the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (GKES), the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT), the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and the Academy of Sciences. Most of these conduct their business as counterparts to private American scholars, scientists, engineers and trade representatives, not as diplomats. They are all, of course, officials of the Soviet state.

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that we must adopt policies surrendering to apparent inevitability. One would think it means that we must control with all diligence this inherent disadvantage.

The answer to the questions of who cares and why we should care becomes quickly obvious. The reason the Soviets want high numbers of officials in the U.S. is plain from the short list of activities above. The harder question is the one that asks why we allowed things to reach such a state.

IN ADDITION to the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations, there are many general bilateral agreements and agreements on specific issues, such as the construction of embassies in Moscow and Washington. Many of these agreements refer expressly to the principles of reciprocity. The 1972 agreement on Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union says that our relations shall be based on reciprocity, mutual accommodation, and mutual benefit.

What happens in practice? We have already seen the Soviets' advantage in sheer numbers of personnel. That happens simply by not insisting on agreed principles—equivalence in numbers of personnel, privileges, and immunities. What about some of the other reciprocal and mutually beneficial arrangements of these kinds?

One example of our approach to reciprocity is a property swap between the U.S. and the USSR in 1979. The Soviets wanted to add four acres—the estate of "a leading American capitalist"—to their lush 45-acre recreation area at Pioneer Point on Maryland's eastern shore. The new site was to be used for tennis, swimming, and other recreation. The Soviets owned the 45 acres (and 36 acres at the Glen Cove complex), but someone, probably concerned about reciprocity, and noting that foreigners are not permitted to own Soviet property, decided it would be better to make a trade.

The swap: the Soviets got an 85-year rent-free lease and gave us a five-year lease on a lot to be used for a storage shed and a twenty-year lease on 2.4 acres of recreation property. There was nothing on the Moscow recreation property. Last heard, the Soviets were talking about the enormous costs of bringing utilities to the site—for which they would have to be reimbursed.

But it was considered a good deal for the American taxpayer. The Soviets had asked $187,000 rent per year ($360,000 by some accounts) for the two Moscow properties. The eastern shore site cost the State Department only $400,000 (in 1979, the most money ever paid for Pioneer Point property). Thus the taxpayers saved millions of dollars. Or, should one say, we paid $400,000 and the loss of prime property for 85 years for five-years' storage on barren land and twenty years' use of land that is unusable until other disputes are settled and construction is completed.

How much did we get for our $400,000? Ten or fifteen years useful recreation time? What swap will we make to renew the lease? The Soviets will still have 65 years' free use of our trading material. What use do the Soviets make of Pioneer Point? Do the data gathered there compete for analytical attention in Moscow with the tons gathered at Glen Cove and Washington?

The storage shed we wanted to build on the other Moscow site was needed for five years' storage of building materials for the new U.S. embassy. Six years have passed, the Soviet part of the construction of the American embassy may be 30 percent complete, and the construction has not even reached the point at which Americans will take over the sensitive interior finishing.

The history of negotiations and construction of the American and Soviet embassy complexes is instructive. A superficial look at information available to the public yields the following chronology:

1969

—Plans completed for construction of a new U.S. embassy and living compound in Moscow, but legal details concerning the land have held up final accord (New York *Times*, March 22, 1969).

1972

—Following ten years of negotiations, agreement on construction of new embassies in

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Washington and Moscow near completion;

—accord reached in 1969 gave Russians 12.8 acres just north of Georgetown and Americans 11.9 acres in Moscow near existing embassy;

—agreement could permit building to begin early in 1973 (New York *Times*, November 11, 1972).

1974

—"Big Russian 'Ears' Feared in Complex"; new Soviet embassy complex on high ground of Mount Alto gives Soviets eavesdropping advantage;

—highest elevation in town plus eight and nine story buildings give Soviets distinct advantage in monitoring White House, Pentagon, and State Department communications;

—no interference from electronic clutter; line of sight view; impossible to monitor electronic gear on roof due to height;

—intelligence specialists worried about possibility of monitoring conversations by focusing laser beams on windows of government buildings (Washington *Post*, December 7, 1974).

1975

—USSR receives last of clearances from U.S. and local governments for construction of new embassy complex in Washington (Washington *Post*, May 20, 1975).

—State Department said it submitted plans for U.S. embassy to Soviet authorities in February, and is still awaiting approval; water discovered under low-lying American embassy site (Washington *Post*, May 21, 1975).

1977

—Soviet approval given for construction of U.S. embassy near Moscow river;

—Mr. Vance's imminent arrival sweetened atmosphere, making Soviet bureaucrats more cooperative than usual;

—the new embassy, first agreed to in 1969, has been delayed by Soviet refusal to turn over the site (New York *Times*, April 2, 1977).

—Construction work has begun on new Soviet embassy;

—work was to have begun on U.S. embassy simultaneously, but did not;

—according to a State Department spokesman, technical problems encountered with U.S. site in Moscow: "We are now scheduled to begin work on our embassy in Moscow next May, and we gave the Soviets permission to begin early on theirs in an amended version of our agreement" (Washington *Post*, August 23, 1977).

1978

—Soviet intelligence illegally penetrated U.S. embassy through secret tunnel from adjoining apartment to implant listening devices in embassy chimney (New York *Times*, June 9, 1978).

—Soviet guards prevent member of American group planning construction of new U.S. embassy from entering embassy (New York *Times*, July 29, 1978).

—Soviet bureaucratic red tape has delayed construction of new U.S. embassy;

—work on Soviet embassy complex in Washington well along, ground yet to be broken in Moscow;

—doesn't matter who builds first, State Department says, Reciprocal occupation will govern;

—projected date for completion of American complex is July 1, 1982;

—U.S. fears that Russians have already implanted listening devices in the subsoil under the project (*U.S. News and World Report*, August 21, 1978).

1979

—Low-lying, muddy stretch of land near Moscow river is the focus of a prolonged dispute that American officials say might dampen the atmosphere of next month's superpower summit;

—U.S. Ambassador Malcolm Toon has said he would consider resigning in protest

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unless Washington takes a firm stand in the dispute;

—Soviets demanding 60 percent more than what Washington views as a reasonable price for construction;

—by contrast, in Washington the apartment complex has been completed on the new Soviet site (Associated Press, May 17, 1979).

—State Department officials reported that microwave bombardments of the embassy building had resumed during the week of July 15 (*Facts on File World News Digest*, July 27, 1979).

—Cornerstone of new U.S. embassy set during Moscow ceremony;

—new building to replace much-bugged U.S. mission to be completed in December, 1983;

—Soviets have moved into living quarters in Washington's Mount Alto site;

—new U.S. embassy is a few hundred feet from existing embassy, but is in a depression and on a side street (surrounded by apartment buildings) (Washington *Post*, September 15, 1979).

1980

—Soviet authorities are harassing American diplomats with small-scale administrative irritants, including protracted visa delays for American support personnel;

—reported dispute over inspection of shipments containing construction material (Washington *Post*, August 30, 1980).

1983

—Soviet embassy a mini-city, begun in 1977 and partially occupied since 1980 by roughly 500 Soviets and their families;

—Glover Park residents annoyed because Soviet children play noisily behind the black iron fence facing their back yards;

—television reception has never been the same since the Russians came (Washington *Post*, April 27, 1983).

—Construction on new U.S. embassy halted by Soviet crews protesting U.S. supervisors' use of X-ray machine to detect implanted listening devices;

—American embassy about 30 percent complete, not expected to be complete until late 1985 (Washington *Post*, May 27, 1983).

1985

—Mounting mistrust; Americans, long complaining about the red tape and delays, look forward to taking over construction duties from Soviet construction crews for interior finishing (New York *Times*, May 29, 1985).

—"Soviets Take the High Ground"; sweeping view of White House, State Department, and much of Washington gives prime location for electronic surveillance—"inexplicable" said Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan;

—State Department says "If we knew everything then that we do now we wouldn't have made the same selection. We wouldn't have picked nearly the highest site in the city";

—the new American complex is a block from the Moscow river at a vantage point below the existing embassy; "We're down in a swamp," Moynihan declared;

—American facility may be complete by late 1987 or early 1988, State Department officials say; U.S. intends to adhere to "reciprocal occupancy" principle with regard to offices;

—in hindsight, "we wouldn't have let the Soviets occupy the housing here until the entire U.S. compound is ready in Moscow" (Washington *Post*, June 16, 1985).

—The Senate approved a proposal to require the Soviet Union to pay more than $20 million in damages for construction delays on the U.S. embassy in Moscow (Washington *Post*, June 21, 1985).

—"Who Lost Mount Alto?"; laser beam listening devices being installed by Soviet technicians;

—clear line of sight to White House and Capitol;

—Washington beginning to get the feeling long held by New Yorkers, surveyed from a tower in Riverdale; 70 percent of all local telephone conversations will be wide open to Mount Alto's Big Ear;

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—back in Nixon's administration, intelligence agencies objected to the assignment of Mount Alto to the Soviets, but were overruled (William Safire in the New York *Times*, September 22, 1985).

THE POINT of all this is that the embassy story is an education in diplomacy—not to mention counterintelligence. As a Soviet diplomat said some time ago: "We didn't occupy Mount Alto; you gave it to us." We did not have to. We could have located the Soviet embassy in a more controlled area, and we could have claimed our right to keep the Soviets out of their new Washington site until our complex was completed. Instead, we surrendered any leverage for expeditious completion of our facility by letting them use the bulk of their Washington complex.

A similar sequence of reports could just as easily apply to other agreements. Despite military disadvantages, we may abide by arms control agreements that the Soviet Union violates. We may negotiate new agreements or additions related to old agreements with which the Soviet Union fails to comply.

We have sometimes seemed to think that dealing with another nation is like dealing with our children. Our child has nothing to give us except happiness. His happiness makes us happy. If he unhappily nags us long enough we may give in to his desires despite our sure knowledge of what is best. When dealing with our child, we may feel remorse for doing what is right. In foreign relations we need not be remorseful for doing the right thing. We are not obligated to listen to ungrounded nagging.

We don't even have to be nasty about it. We don't need to invent incidents. We need only to insist calmly on normal reciprocal rights. Indeed, failure to follow the principle of reciprocity causes needless ill will and distracts us from important work. And if this principle is ignored when we are engaged in "trivial" diplomacy, what can we expect from important security agreements?

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Managing to Survive

Coral Bell

THE PREDICTION of imminent doom has been one of the great growth-industries of the nuclear age: the tutelary goddess of our time is surely Cassandra. The clock on the cover of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* has never in its forty years of publication retreated more than fifteen minutes or so from striking Armageddon. At the moment, in tribute to President Reagan, it is set at three minutes to destruction. Though I am convinced such estimates misconstrue the nature of the central balance (greatly exaggerating its fragility), I do not believe they are necessarily a matter for complaint, because a well-cultivated sense of danger is and has been an essential element in the mechanisms making for safety.

A sense of imminent doom would in most circumstances be rather difficult to sustain for so long a period as forty years, but in the present case the changes in technology over the period have acted in a helpful sorcerer's-apprentice role. Always, relentlessly, something new out of the laboratories, from the H-bomb in 1949 to "smart rocks" and "Excalibur" in 1985, at least as gleams in the eyes of the sages at Livermore and Los Alamos.

That is to say, technological change has thus far operated to reinforce deterrence by constantly increasing the assumed sanctions against central balance war. The "nuclear winter" theories currently propounded by some eminent scientists represent a culminating point of that psychological pressure. One may not be convinced by the arguments (and to this analyst they seem based on some implausible notions about targeting strategies), but one has to regard them as tending to increase restraints on the decision-makers who would be involved in the choices that might make for hostilities between the superpowers. And that is essentially a useful process, despite its operating somewhat asymmetrically as between Washington and Moscow.

But after forty years the question must surely arise, even in the mind of the most alarmist "peacenik": if the clock has always been so close to striking "H-hour," why has it never in fact struck? If the world has always been hovering so close to the brink, why has it never, in forty years of almost constant high tension, in a situation of irreconcilable conflict of interests and values, in fact fallen over that brink? How, in other words, have we survived the crises? For after all, the central fact about the history of the past forty years is that the superpowers have carefully and successfully avoided hostilities with each other. It is officially alleged by the UN that 21 million people have died in or as a result of military activity in those four decades, but hardly a Russian soldier has died at American hands, or vice-versa.

THE REASONS are clearly not to be found in the specifics that various progressive optimists in the past have assumed would or should prevent wars: international law, international organizations (especially the

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UN), arms control, regional and functional organizations, informed public opinion, ideological compatibility, economic interdependence. While some of those factors could from time to time be shown to have had influence on particular decision-makers engaged in particular instances of crisis management, those influences have been so marginal and occasional that none of them individually can be considered as a significant independent influence. Moreover, they have been present also in other episodes that *have* produced hostilities. So one cannot say that their influence has differentiated war-bearing from non-war-bearing crises.

If one had to put into a single sentence the recipe that the world's experience since 1945 seems to indicate is the mode by which direct hostilities between the central balance powers have been avoided, it would have to read: "prudent crisis management in a situation of alliance stability and mutual deterrence." That is to say, the traditional techniques of realpolitik, appropriately mutated for the nuclear age.

That judgment can be reinforced by contrasting the experience of the central balance powers with that of the rest of the world. There are at present three main varieties of potential war-bearing crisis endemic within the society of states: crises of domestic consensus, crises of regional balances, and crises of the central balance. The first group is much the most prolific of hostilities at the moment. Of the seven sets of current hostilities that can be called wars (Iran-Iraq, Afghanistan, Angola, Vietnam-Kampuchea, Chad, Nicaragua, El Salvador) and the ten other conflicts that can almost be so designated (those in Lebanon, Mozambique, South Africa, Northern Ireland, the Philippines, the Basque country, Eritrea, New Caledonia, East Timor, and Sri Lanka), it is clear that in all but three or four cases the political demand for which hostilities were precipitated was the demand to change *domestic* political circumstances. In other words, they are basically internal wars, though some have larger or smaller degrees of outside intervention. The three or four exceptions are Iran-Iraq (a regional balance war that rather surprisingly has not yet developed an internal war aspect), Afghanistan and Kampuchea (where the external invasion aspects have far outweighed the domestic origins), and perhaps Northern Ireland (which can be said to have originated in a campaign by the IRA to win back territory that, in its view, rightfully belongs in a United Ireland; thus the struggle, from the IRA's point of view, constitutes an irredentist war against a foreign government rather than an internal war—though in reality it obviously has strong internal war aspects).

The fact that there has been in general so large an internal war preponderance in the hostilities of the past forty years has been a perhaps almost inevitable consequence of the fragility of domestic consensus in many contemporary societies. And, unfortunately, the only working conventions of crisis management have been evolved, through precedent, in the sphere of international politics. That is, they are diplomatic conventions, rather than political or constitutional ones. Moreover, they are the conventions primarily of a particular segment of the society of states: roughly that segment which has taken over the traditions of the earlier European society of states. That particular sector (about forty out of a total of some 160 states) includes both Washington and Moscow among its capitals, but it does not include many of the Third World capitals, which have mostly tended to disdain the old system and its conventions, among which were alliances and crisis management. So none of the three factors that have operated to reduce the probability of hostilities in central balance crises have as yet played any part in crises of domestic consensus, or much part in crises of regional balances. On the whole it seems improbable that they will do so in the foreseeable future. But some chances of evolving modes of restraint of hostilities in those crises might become more discernible if we examine the modes by which restraint has been achieved in crises of the central balance.

I asserted earlier that there were three ingredients in the recipe: mutual deterrence, alliance stability, and prudent crisis management. I do not propose to say anything about deterrence, though it has been of course the

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bedrock of the system, because so much has already been written about it. I will only observe in passing that deterrence does not have to be nuclear, or based on offensive-strike capacity, or even directly military. One might argue that for much of the early 19th century, deterrence was achieved diplomatically, simply by a preponderance of power on the side of the status quo.

Alliance stability has been much less well explored than deterrence as a factor in the avoidance of central balance hostilities. Yet it has been crucial to the system, and it is important to establish this now, because the Western alliance structure is under serious attack by neutralists of various sorts on the left, and unilateralists on the right.

The most obvious reason why the two central balance alliance systems (NATO and the other Western alliances on one side, the Warsaw Pact on the other) operate to reduce the likelihood of hostilities is that they "signal" unmistakably to each of the superpower capitals the area its adversary regards as vital to its national interests, and thus impose a special caution, which in turn reduces the risk of the kind of miscalculations from which wars have so often arisen in the past. One can see the operation of this most clearly in the heavy restraint exercised by Washington policy-makers in every one of the recurrent intramural crises of the Warsaw Pact, from Dulles in the East German revolt of 1953 to Reagan in the Polish crisis of December 1981.

But there is another and perhaps even more fundamental reason, related to what I would call "the crises that never were." In the immediate post-war period, and as late as the mid-1950s, those who remembered how history went after World War I were expecting new war-bearing crises to arise, as they did then, from the defeated and dissatisfied powers breaking the post-war settlement, as Germany did Versailles. But in fact those crises have never happened, because the major defeated powers—Germany, Italy, and Japan—were firmly folded into the Western alliance system. And the minor powers of Eastern Europe were even more firmly folded into the Warsaw Pact. So the capacity and incentive for any of them to stir the waters of international politics were much reduced. These "crises that never were," if they had in fact occurred, would of course have been exceptionally dangerous ones, affecting zones both superpowers now construe as vital to themselves. An alliance structure as stable as that which has existed since the late 1940s or early 1950s might, conceivably, have managed to keep the peace even without the reinforcing factor of nuclear weapons, though probably at the cost, as far as the West is concerned, of many more conventional weapons.

The alliance systems have provided the necessary context of stability to enable a system of crisis management to evolve steadily through precedents, ever since the Azerbaijan crisis of 1946 and the Berlin crisis of 1948. Neither the left nor the far right have found this system easy to fit into their respective images of contemporary international reality: the left because it is incompatible with their favored picture of a world permanently on the nuclear brink; the far right because it carries an implication that dealings with the adversary have from time to time been found necessary, possible, and useful. But despite that double ideological unpopularity, the system seems to me undoubtedly to have remained almost as much in working order in the Reagan period as in the heyday of detente.

TO UNDERSTAND its capacity to persist through successive changes of diplomatic climate in the central balance, one has to examine several factors:

—first, the operation of a "learning curve" not apparently vitiated by either regular (Western) or irregular (Soviet) changes in decision-makers;

—second, the evolution of the age of surveillance;

—third, the drying up of quite a few of the traditional sources of central balance crises, including a process of "decoupling" the central balance from Third World crises;

—fourth, the development of a sort of "win a few, lose a few" attitude in both superpower capitals: a sense on both sides that they are playing a long contest, and should not over-

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react to the loss of one particular round;

—fifth, the demonstration that the central balance powers have considerable capacity to restrict horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Before looking at reasons for success, however, it seems necessary to offer criteria for judging what constitutes success. At first sight it might appear that the only criterion necessary, when we are considering serious adversary crises, is the avoidance of war. But that will not do, for it would require us to class as a success, for instance, the management of the Munich crisis of 1938. War was certainly avoided on that particular occasion, but only to be precipitated a year later on terms that were probably worse for the West. So if Munich can be accounted a success for any of the crisis-managers of that dismal occasion, it would have to be called a tactical success for Hitler.

It is clear we need a more complex set of criteria. I suggest one with three components. First, what was the impact of the crisis management on both the short and the longer-term probability of war between the adversary powers? Second, what was the impact, again both short and long term, on the power position of each of the countries involved? Third, what was the impact on the general interests of peace and justice in the society of states, including its contribution, if any, to the conventions of crisis management? With criteria so complex, a final judgment on a particular crisis may be possible only at a retrospect of some years. (Munich, for instance, looked like a success to most people for the first six months thereafter. Cuba was a success for the U.S. on the first and third criteria, but not on the second.)

However, when we are looking back over a longish span, as we can do now over the past forty years, there is yet another criterion we can use. It involves a phenomenon that may be called the "crisis-slide." If we look at the historical origins of World War I and World War II, we can see in each case a period of three years before the outbreaks (1911–14, and 1936–39) during which the crises came thick and fast, and two of the major powers of the central balance felt themselves progressively backed into corners from which their decision-makers believed they had no way out save war. In 1939 the decision-makers who believed themselves in that position were those in Britain and France. In 1914 they were those in Austria and Russia. In both cases it was the resulting choices of the decision-makers involved that precipitated the war.

One might see any individual crisis as a great boulder rolling down a mountainside: it may crush or damage everything and everyone in its path, but its effect will be limited and localized. Whereas when the boulders (or the crises) come thick and fast, they seem to compound each other's effects, until the whole mountainside, the whole society of states, slides away in an avalanche of ruin, which changes the general international landscape forever. That was, to my mind, the nature of the crisis-slides from Agadir to 1914 and from the Rhineland to 1939. And on that basis we can conclude, obviously, that no such crisis-slide has developed in the forty years we are looking at. That seems the decisive reason why the crisis-management of the period may on balance be described as successful, despite some painful misjudgments in particular episodes by both Washington and Moscow.

THE ARGUMENT that a "learning curve" may be shown in crisis-management (as in most other human activities) does not necessarily imply that the first major post-war crises (Azerbaijan 1946 or Berlin 1948) were ill-managed. On the contrary, the world in that period was still largely run by decision-makers who had gone through the early stages of their own learning curves in the disastrous inter-war years, and still remembered its lessons. As that generation passed from power, their successors were sometimes less adroit. The historical record, however, shows most of the approaches to the nuclear brink to be in the early decades of our forty-year retrospect. The crises of 1950–51 (Korea) and 1954 (Vietnam), for which some of the diplomatic documents are now available, were marked by what these days seems an almost frivolously casual approach to the notion of using nuclear weapons. Berlin was

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a potential flashpoint for central war during more or less the whole thirteen years from 1948 to 1961. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was undoubtedly the closest approach to the nuclear brink of the entire period. But the last of these events is 23 years ago now, and the superpowers have not, to my mind, been on any equally dangerous collision course in the years since. So the most dangerous corners in our post-war journey so far appear to have been those in its first half. That seems evidence that decision-making elites in Washington and Moscow have on the whole moved up a learning curve as the years have gone by. Whenever there is a succession crisis in Moscow, or a new president in Washington, there is of course always a chance that the new decision-maker and his entourage of policy-makers will fall off the learning curve—that is, prove reckless, imprudent, insensitive, or resistant to the necessary modes of thinking about international politics. Khrushchev probably was imprudent by the standards of Soviet decision-makers either earlier or later than himself. Reagan in his first three years, if one judged only by his rhetoric, might have been judged resistant to any but a moralistic approach to international politics. Yet the system has undoubtedly survived.

The second most important system-preserving development in our forty years of central balance crises has been the staggering improvement in techniques of surveillance. Of course the great powers have always watched each other like hawks, but until the last two decades their means of doing so were limited and fallible: mostly the ordinary human spy, whose deficiencies are well known. The immense elaboration of contemporary modes of watching began only with the U-2 and RB47 overflights in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Moreover, the level of information-gathering now routinely practiced by the superpowers, through satellites and such, would not even have been useful until the dawning of the computer age, for no merely human intelligence community, no matter how large, could have dealt with the daily Niagara of information that the satellites produce. Hardly a gun-emplacement can be moved ten feet nowadays without the observation being fed into the other side's memory banks. For each of the superpowers, the adversary's disposition of its resources (save submerged submarines) is transparent in a way unique in strategic history.

And, most encouragingly, the policy-makers in Washington and Moscow have had wit enough to see that this vast, invisible net of surveillance, in which each of them is now inescapably caught, may be an asset rather than a disadvantage. It can be used for conveying signals more convincing than diplomatic words.

The 1973 Middle East crisis provided a particularly striking example of the use of signaling as the primary instrument of crisis management, and the subtleties that can be conveyed by each power through the other side's surveillance system: not only the U.S. declaration of "Defcon 3," but also, on the Soviet side, the launch of satellites, the removal of dependents, the redeployment of naval units, the advancement of airborne divisions to alert status, and the "standing-down" of air forces.

(Considering the importance of surveillance systems for this kind of "voluntary-involuntary" communication, and particularly its vital role in monitoring arms control agreements, those who protest against its development—as for instance in Australia by the up-grading of facilities at Pine Gap—are not really doing much for the chances of peace, arms control, or crisis stability. Providing the real estate for Pine Gap is undoubtedly Australia's largest single contribution to maintaining the stability of the central balance, on which all else depends.)

THEN, third, there has been the phenomenon that I have described as the drying up of some traditional sources of central balance crises. I stress *only* of central balance crises: crises of domestic consensus and crises of regional balances are still in full spate, and it is often assumed by journalists that these will readily translate themselves (as has frequently enough happened in the past) into central balance crises.

As prime evidence of the reduced tendency for that to happen I would cite the Iran-Iraq war. Who would have thought, back in 1979, that a full-scale conventional war in the Gulf, at

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about the technological level of World War I, could rage for five years, complete with attacks on oil tankers and oil installations, without involving the superpowers? Yet even during the first Reagan term, when Moscow and Washington (as far as the public record went) were hardly talking to each other at all, there appears to have subsisted between them a well-signaled tacit understanding, roughly on the lines of "I'll limit my intervention if you'll limit yours." One might call it crisis management by tacit "decoupling."

What is more, the old expectation that crises in the vicinity of oil-bearing real estate mean a ruinous rise in oil prices has also been disproved. Despite the war, the reduction of oil deliveries from Iran and Iraq, and the threat to tankers plying the Gulf, OPEC has not only been unable to raise its prices, it has not even been able to maintain them in real terms. Indeed, the organization itself seems to be falling apart under the strain of the attempt. In the mid-1970s OPEC was able to send the West into crisis by raising its little finger: now its capacities along that line seem insignificant. Again, that is partly the learning curve at work. The decline in importance of the Gulf region (and hence the decline in the power of OPEC) has not only been a matter of new areas like the North Sea coming on stream. It has also been a matter of the West's learning to anticipate oil crises. To use fuels less wastefully, to switch dependence away from the most politically vulnerable areas (the U.S. now gets only about 3 percent of its oil supplies from the Gulf) and to hold much larger amounts in storage (preferably ninety days) for short-term shocks are all techniques of crisis management in this field.

The potential lesson provided by the superpowers successfully decoupling their relationship from the Iran-Iraq war will perhaps prove to be pervasive. After all, since they have found they can live with staying out of a major crisis in an area assumed to be as vital to both of them as the Gulf, what arguments will policy-makers in either Washington or Moscow find for justifying confrontations in areas clearly *less* vital to either? With any luck, both powers will now begin to show a degree of wariness, an unspoken conviction that staking much on efforts to influence the diplomatic futures of Third World countries is a chancy enterprise, the game often not worth the candle.

In the early decades of the present central balance, the 1950s and 1960s decision-makers in both Washington and Moscow tended toward a kind of competitive paternalism in the Third World. Both political elites seemed to believe that the export of their respective value systems and economic structures was not only natural but important. Allies and proteges in the Third World were assumed to be assets—economically, strategically, and psychologically. Recruiting them to one's own side was seen as an accomplishment and a matter for pride; their recruitment by the other side was seen as a disaster, even an irreversible disaster. The peak period of that competitive paternalism was probably the early 1960s. The days of the Congo crisis, when Washington and Moscow appeared on a collision course over that ill-fortuned patch of jungle, and the United Nations ruined itself financially and diplomatically in an effort to keep things under control, are almost forgotten now, save by specialists. No equivalent, to my mind, would now be likely, since that kind of missionary zeal departed with superpower experience of the fickleness of many Third World elites. (When you buy them, they do not stay bought.) The expense of supporting such regimes is considerable, (Cuba, Vietnam, and Afghanistan put together, for instance, cost the Soviet taxpayer plenty, and Western investment in the form of Third World bank loans may not only end in capital losses to the tune of about $350 billion, but political resentments as well).

Moreover, both Western and Soviet policy-makers have had to realize that they are unlikely to be able to transfer either their political and economic institutions or their social values to Third World countries. The societies concerned have values of their own. Some of them, those adhering to Islam, offer a sharp challenge to both Western and Soviet value systems, and historically might be regarded as more alien to both superpowers than the U.S. and the Soviet Union are to each other. So all in all one may

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see a kind of disenchantment with the Third World setting in, psychologically, strategically, and economically, producing a resigned recognition that these countries must make their own destinies. That mood may have its dark side (the tendency to let such areas stew in their own juices), but it probably means that the Third World is less likely to become a source of central balance crises than once seemed likely, even though it continues to proliferate local crises.

China likes to be regarded as part of the Third World, but it is undoubtedly also a central balance power, and the drying up of sources of crisis that I am arguing for has applied particularly well to U.S.-China relations. It is almost difficult to believe nowadays that the threat of war between those two powers was strong and constant for almost three decades, from the final crisis of the Chinese civil war in the mid-1940s, through Korea and Vietnam, right up to the rapprochement of the early 1970s. Who would have expected a right-wing Republican president, who used to be regarded as a dedicated friend of Taiwan, to be beamingly prepared to sell high-tech naval equipment to Beijing?

IN FACT, one might use the history of the American conflict with China as evidence for the most optimistic of my hypotheses, namely that if the endemic crises of a relationship are managed successfully from year to year over a reasonable period, the relationship itself tends to lose its head of steam—like a pressure-cooker whose safety value is constantly being opened—so that in time, policy-makers begin to ask why the conflict ever seemed to warrant contemplation of war. Something similar happened, centuries ago, in the long conflict between Catholic and Protestant, and the even longer conflict between Christian and Muslim. Those historical comparisons encourage what would otherwise be irrational optimism as to the longer-term future of the conflict between the Soviet Union and the U.S.: always with the proviso that in the shorter term the crises continue to be successfully managed.

Even that old stand-by of the writers of political-science fiction, accidental or inadvertent war (i.e., war without a decision by the authorized decision-makers of either of the two superpowers) has become much less likely as the nuclear age has worn on than it was during the first two decades, when there were indeed some close calls. The paranoid submarine captains or bomber crews have been put out of potential action mostly by technical developments, such as the "permissive action link." And also, there was the agreement signed at the height of detente, in 1971, on measures to reduce accidental and unauthorized use, and a tradition going back to Kennedy's time to convey U.S. secrets in this field to the Russians.

Another category of crisis that should, with luck, be absent from our future conspectus, and which provided some of the bloodiest wars of the past forty years, is the crisis of a colonial relationship. With the winding down of the European overseas empires, it is difficult to see any major hostilities of this sort re-emerging. Britain has prudently moved to crisis avoidance diplomacy on the last substantial fragments of empire, Hong Kong and Gibraltar, after the painful experience of the Falklands. One might of course see the old czarist empire, now the Soviet Union, as due to follow the other European empires through a process of dismantling, with the rise of local nationalist forces. If that does happen, it will produce some very dangerous crises. But contiguous empires seem to follow different laws of development from overseas empires, so I would regard it as unlikely, at least for this century.

There also remain of course the informal empires: spheres of influence and economic dominance for one or the other of the superpowers, as for instance the United States's contested ascendancy in Central America. But even here it seems to me that *central balance* crises, as against local crises, are less likely than they were. To transform Nicaragua, for instance, into a potentially war-bearing confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, we would have to suppose Nicaragua to be so important to Moscow that it would allow itself to be drawn into the risks of a confrontation with the U.S. along the lines of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. On all the evidence, that is very

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unlikely. One might go so far as to say that because Cuba 1962 *did* happen, Nicaragua 1986 will *not*. That is another example of the learning curve's useful operation. The trauma of Cuba 1962 is still very much present to the Russians, who still class it, I think rightly, as the most dangerous crisis of the nuclear age.

Moreover, the issue of involvement with shaky Third World regimes is the one in which the learning curve ought to be the most effective, because it is here that the superpowers' experience has been the most painful. Vietnam was an immensely traumatic demonstration to the U.S. of the dangers of committing American power and prestige to a right-wing Third World nationalist regime for the sake of a patch of real estate alleged at the time to be strategically vital, but in due course found to be no such thing. Afghanistan is perhaps teaching a similar lesson to Moscow policy-makers about the costs of supporting a left-wing regime—though we must not expect so much trauma among the Soviet population or so visible a revulsion among the policy-makers. What we can perhaps hope will emerge is a visible degree of reassessment, by both the superpowers, of what if any areas of the Third World are important enough to their own interests—strategic or political or economic—to warrant combat intervention to influence diplomatic futures. And to my mind, the answer for both superpowers will be: very few, if any.

ALL OF THIS is connected with the growth of what I have called a "win a few, lose a few" attitude in both superpower capitals. Both in effect have swallowed defeats, and moved on to the next round. Washington swallowed a large, bitter, anguishing defeat in Vietnam, and more recently a smaller one in Lebanon. Moscow has swallowed quite a few: taking its troops out of Azerbaijan in 1946, backing down on the Berlin blockade in 1948, accepting the Cuba quarantine in 1962, having its troops thrown out of Egypt by Sadat in 1970, being effectively excluded after 1973 from most of the Middle Eastern negotiations. More recently it has lost the battle to prevent Cruise and Pershing deployments in Western Europe. It is not at all surprising that the Kremlin should accept such episodes with a shrug and pretend they never happened. Marxist doctrine holds that there will be many setbacks before the inevitable final triumph, so defeat in one round just means preparing yourself for the next. The question of losing face with the electorate does not arise in such a society.

Finally, in this set of factors enabling the central balance powers to avoid hostilities despite endemic crises, there has been an underrated level of success in the restriction of nuclear proliferation. Even sober expert opinion in the 1950s expected that by the 1980s there would be thirty or forty nuclear powers. But in fact the number of full members of the nuclear club has been successfully kept to five, and there has been no certain new entry since China in 1964, 22 years ago. There are of course the rumors that Israel has a stockpile of thirty or so "bombs in the basement" and that South Africa is about to follow the same path; India could probably test an actual weapon within eighteen months if it chose, and Pakistan is certainly trying. Nevertheless, in terms of true nuclear strike capacity (proven workable vehicles and a fair stock of warheads) there are still only two major nuclear powers, the U.S. and the USSR, and three minor ones, Britain, France, and China.

That very real achievement of non-proliferation, forty years into the nuclear age, is an eloquent testimony to the capacity of the central balance powers to collude when they have a common interest vis-a-vis the rest of the world, as they do on this particular issue. For it has not been the formal obligations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty that have been effective, so much as the cartel of the Nuclear Supplier's Group (or London Club) plus, again, the alliance factor. Most countries of the Warsaw Pact, along with NATO and its fellow travelers, are technologically capable of building nuclear weapons, and would have incentives to do so were they not under the nuclear umbrellas of their respective superpowers, and subject to the pressures of those superpowers to refrain. Thus alliance stability has been a factor in the curb on proliferation, among its other virtues. The restriction on numbers of nuclear powers has meant that

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the previously fashionable nightmare of a minor nuclear power willfully triggering a major nuclear war between the superpowers has receded into fantasy. A minor power that looked to be trying any such technique would probably find itself in danger from both superpowers.

Some of the more scholarly members of the peace movement might concede that the system as described has worked thus far to prevent central balance war. But they would claim that it cannot continue to do so, and point in particular to President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative as a development that may bring the whole structure down in ruins, by undermining its foundation in mutual deterrence. That, however, seems to assume a wholly implausible level of success from SDI—something in the nature of a genuine invulnerability for the North American continent. Moreover, North America *was* almost invulnerable to Soviet nuclear strike for twenty years or more before the late 1960s, and deterrence worked nevertheless, because factors apart from the vulnerability of American cities and missile sites are involved. If the level of success of the SDI research—as is more probable—points at best to an increased ability to blunt a first strike, that might actually *improve* stability, since the temptation to strike first is the greatest destabilizing factor in any crisis. And the prospective system, like the prospective ABM system of the late 1960s, might then become merely another bargaining chip—though that possibility is of course ardently denied by official Washington spokesmen at present.

The first Reagan term proved, in reality, to be so different in so many ways from the apparent prospects of 1979–80 that the true believers of the right would perhaps not be greatly surprised at such an outcome. After all, even such visible structures as SALT I and SALT II are still extant five years into the Reagan epoch, and arrangements less in the public eye have actually been strengthened. For example, the "hot line" between Washington and Moscow, which was established after the Cuban Missile Crisis and used in the crises of 1967 (Middle East), 1971 (South Asia), 1973 (Middle East), and 1979 (Afghanistan) was reportedly also used in the 1982 crisis over the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and has certainly been improved during the Reagan period, by the 1984 agreement for its transmutation into an instant facsimile system. The 1971 and 1973 agreements—from the peak of the detente period—on the avoidance of nuclear confrontations have remained in force. The very effective agreement on the avoidance of incidents at sea (known to those concerned with it as INCSEA) has continued to keep accidents that might once have precipitated major hostilities (like the U.S. carrier *Kittyhawk's* cutting in half a Soviet submarine that was shadowing it) so well under wraps that they hardly even reach the headlines.

All of this seems further evidence for the thesis suggested earlier, that the system has been institutionalized in the two policy-making elites, and thus is not much affected by the succession of individual policy-makers. The assumed sanctions against nuclear war are so heavy that even a decision-maker profoundly distrustful of the values and motives of the adversary, like Ronald Reagan, is constrained by it to a degree not predictable from his oratory in opposition.

ONE MUST of course see the four decades since 1945 not only as a period of crisis management (quite successful by the criteria suggested earlier) but as a period of ideological conflict, and as a period of contests for power. On the level of ideological conflict, the West seems to me to have done rather well: the ideologies of the left look a great deal less plausible to most people in 1985 than they did in 1945.

On the "power-contest" aspect of this patch of history, however, one has to class it as at best "advantages even," a drawn series. The West has not lost any truly vital position since 1945: the central lines are much as they were when the guns fell silent. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has done no retreating (except from Austria in 1955) and the decision-makers in Moscow can claim steady gains, in general military clout vis-a-vis the West, over the decades. Moreover, the Soviet Union has also

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increased its level of influence, though with various setbacks, in the peripheral theaters of contest in the Third World. Its situations in Cuba and Vietnam and the Horn of Africa may well be construed in Moscow as a kind of piling-up of runs on some global long-term scoreboard. Nevertheless, on balance neither the successive sets of decision-makers in Moscow, nor those in Washington, have had any reason thus far for feeling backed into a corner, a feeling that might generate the degree of desperation required for war in the central balance.

In the future, the maintenance of that sense of a relatively even contest, with neither side losing dramatically, may have to be regarded as a prerequisite of successful crisis management. It has in fact already dominated many crises from Berlin in 1948 ("Do not try to win too much, for the other side cannot afford to lose too much") to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 ("Build golden bridges behind the adversary to facilitate his retreat"). These are really formulations of the basic assumption of the policy-makers in Washington and Moscow about their dealings with each other: always remember that the other side's level of anxiety may equate with your own level of danger.

In some of his last great speeches, 1953–55, Winston Churchill was much preoccupied with this connection between the sense of jeopardy and the prospect of survival. He put his tentative hopes into the phrase that "safety might prove the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation." Considering that that was said more than thirty years ago, it seems to represent an almost mystical insight into the situation of the world in the late nuclear age. The system as it works at the moment is certainly "the sturdy child of terror": such safety as it provides lives in a symbiotic relationship with an acute sense of jeopardy. But it *has* proved sturdy: it has lasted about forty years now. The 19th-century system of conventions of crisis-management, which was its direct ancestor, operated to limit or avoid hostilities in central balance crises for an entire century before 1914. The present system might do as well, if the valuable and essential sense of jeopardy is not lost.

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South Africa: the Case for Disengagement

Robert B. Shepard

THE DEBATE in this country over South Africa is one that pits the Reagan administration and supporters of its policy of "constructive engagement" against critics who urge that the United States ought to promote change in South Africa through the imposition of economic sanctions. One side claims that the life of a key Western state is at stake; the other that a basic American commitment to justice is on the line. Both sides have vocal and powerful constituencies and, as both seek to reorder South Africa's domestic life at little expense to the United States, both have a certain amount of political appeal. But there is a serious flaw in the strategies presented by both sides. Because both have been formulated more with an eye to winning the public debate in the United States than to gaining particular goals in South Africa, neither has taken very seriously either the prevailing conditions in South Africa or American interests and capabilities.

I

DURING THE FIRST TERM of the Reagan administration, criticism of constructive engagement came only from black leaders and a predictable handful of liberals interested in African affairs. But in August 1984, widespread protests erupted across South Africa, precipitated by the introduction of a new constitution granting limited parliamentary representation to South Africa's colored and Asian communities, but none to the black majority. The protests continued well beyond the elections to the new parliament, held on August 22 and 28 and heavily boycotted (turnout was under 30 percent), and escalated appreciably after the South African government responded with a massive crack-down in October. On November 21, daily picketing of the South African embassy in Washington began; within weeks constructive engagement became the target of a barrage of criticism, much of it originating from the president's own party. By December the question of South Africa rose to a high position on the foreign policy agenda and the Reagan South African policy became the subject of an extensive debate.

The principal goal of the Reagan administration's South African policy has been to keep South Africa an integral part of the West. Constructive engagement, conceived by President Reagan's assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Chester A. Crocker, on the eve of the Reagan presidency, was a strategy designed to achieve this end. It was based on the assumption that if what appeared to be a newly emergent moderate wing of the dominant Nationalist Party, led by Prime Minister (now President) P. W. Botha, was given enough time

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and allowed some breathing room, it would be able to begin to dismantle apartheid and, in so doing, preclude the possibility of domestic insurrection and the accompanying threat of Soviet intervention. Crocker believed Botha, who took office in 1978, to be the first Nationalist leader not beholden to the extreme ideological perspective that had been the trademark of every previous South African leader since the institution of apartheid; as he saw it, the Botha government was composed of a modernizing elite that was "flexible, and determined," and intent on leading South Africa away from "the dead end of Verwoerdian ideology."[1] Botha and his cabinet were seen to be pragmatists, interested in ending South Africa's isolation from the global economy and breaking down the artificial barriers to capitalism that apartheid had created.

In Crocker's view, Botha's arrival seemed to present a unique opportunity to endorse a promising new government that would make South Africa more just and more stable, while retaining its affiliation with the West. If the United States avoided the incessant condemnations of the South African government that marked the Carter administration's tenure, and instead constructively engaged the Botha government, South Africans would cease to view liberalization as a retreat before the onslaught of world criticism and get on with the business of reforming their system.

While the ultimate focus of constructive engagement was on South Africa, the central element in the implementation of the policy was to interpose the United States as a mediator in the search for a solution to the problem of Namibian independence. There was a good bit of political and strategic sense behind this decision. Since Zimbabwe achieved independence in 1979, black Africa had come to view Namibia as the continent's sole remaining colony, and spoke of the issue in near religious terms. But because South Africa exercised direct military control over Namibia, its independence could only be secured through Pretoria; and the United States alone was in a position to influence South Africa. Working toward Namibian independence would make a virtue of Washington's new, close relationship with Pretoria: it would divert attention from the more stubborn issue of South African reform; and while the world watched the United States work for the liberation of Namibia, Botha could move ahead with his domestic reforms outside of the glare of the international spotlight.

There was a logic to constructive engagement, a logic that its critics have staunchly refused to acknowledge. The leaders of black Africa condemned constructive engagement even before the administration took office, claiming that Crocker's neatly conceived plans were merely a justification for a policy born of little more than President Reagan's deep belief that South Africa, and the United States, would be better off if South Africa's government continued to be anti-communist, Western-oriented, and white. Reagan, they believed, was a conservative president, Botha was the leader of a conservative state, and constructive engagement was a smoke screen designed to cover what was at heart a covenant between ideological soul mates.

DESPITE considerable effort on the administration's part, constructive engagement has failed to accomplish any of its principal objectives. The American position vis-a-vis southern Africa has not been improved in any perceptible way and, given the events of the past year within South Africa, is arguably worse. South Africa is no closer to granting Namibia independence than it was in 1981. Crocker's rather extraordinary efforts to solve the problem now look somewhat naive for taking Botha's offer to cooperate seriously. Botha's domestic reforms have been very marginal, at best, and he has not argued the case for reform with anything like the vigor Crocker suggested he might. South Africa today is not witnessing a closing of the gap between blacks and whites, but instead, an ever increasing polarization.

The reason for the failure of constructive engagement has been its complete dependence

[1]Chester A. Crocker, "South Africa: Strategy for Change," *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1980–1).

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on the behavior of President Botha. Constructive engagement was never construed to be a solution in itself, but rather a decision to entrust Botha to deliver on his supposed ambition to reform South Africa. It was, in effect, a bet that one man had a vision and that his nation, recognizing that his was the wise route, would support him. Whether Botha did in fact have such a vision but was thwarted by domestic politics, or whether his vision never truly existed, is debatable. Botha has turned out to be a pragmatist; but whereas Crocker assumed pragmatism would point him in the direction of liberalization, Botha's major concerns, instead, have been with maintaining his own place in his party, his party's preeminence in the white community, the white community's preeminence in South Africa, and South Africa's preeminence in southern Africa. At times, the pursuit of these goals has led him to positions favored by the United States; but more often it has not, and in these instances Botha has not hesitated to go his own way.

Why the Reagan administration clings to constructive engagement is increasingly difficult to understand. What was intended to be a showpiece has now become an encumbrance, defended uncomfortably, and with no small amount of embarrassment. The administration, with little to show for its efforts, continues to make its now tired argument that South Africa needs only a little more time and more toleration. It certainly had an opportunity to disown the policy when President Botha, in his speech of August 15, 1985, declared that South Africa would never change its underlying policy and would never give in to foreign pressure. But Reagan has clung to constructive engagement, claiming it has "resulted in some very substantial changes," and asserting that "turning our backs and walking away would leave us with no persuasive power whatsoever." True, some changes have occurred, but it remains difficult to find any of genuine substance. And as the saga of the Namibian negotiations has shown, it is difficult to determine what powers of persuasion the United States has that might be lost.

If constructive engagement has failed us, what then? Those who have most vigorously opposed constructive engagement say that the United States should impose various economic sanctions on South Africa until it desists from its repressive, discriminatory domestic practices. The executive order signed by President Reagan (which effectively pre-empted the sanctions bills passed by the House and Senate), bans the import of krugerrands, the sale of computers to the South African police and military, and the sale of nuclear technology. In the judgment of all, it is essentially feckless; indeed, President Reagan made it plain that he signed the order only because it would not injure South Africa's economy.

But the argument still remains that if truly strong sanctions were approved, Pretoria would be forced to reconsider its domestic policies and perforce move in the direction of liberalization. Congressman Howard Wolpe, the influential chairman of the House subcommittee on African affairs and a principal sponsor of the recent House sanctions bill, provides a succinct summary of this view. Supporters of sanctions, said Wolpe, have "the profound belief that this is the only way" to change the ways of South Africa and "avert some of that bloodshed" we see down the road. "There is a bipartisan consensus that 'constructive engagement' has had enormously destructive consequences." Recognizing the weakness of constructive engagement, Mr. Wolpe tells us two very revealing things: first, that there is but one way we can influence the behavior of South Africa; and second, that although we have but one tool, that tool can successfully move the domestic conflict in South Africa toward the peaceful resolution the United States would prefer.

Wolpe's first assumption is largely correct—economic sanctions are the only means available to us if the use of force is rejected, but something stronger than exhortation is desired. Yet this is also an admission that sanctions have become the weapon of choice not necessarily because they are effective, but because alternative means for influencing Pretoria either do not exist, or are costly or risky to utilize. Compared to other alternatives, economic sanctions are inexpensive: they entail neither direct expenditure, nor any sort of commitment of American

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resources, or armed forces of any sort. Because they promise to deliver results on the cheap, they suit the mood of contemporary America quite well. Herein lies the reason sanctions have become the favorite option of the administration's opponents.

BUT WHAT RESULTS can they be expected to bring? Will they force a fearful South Africa to leap headlong into the business of reform and the peaceful resolution of the conflict, or will they trigger a white reaction that will move the country to an even more extreme position than it now holds?

A consideration of South African politics suggests they might do both. Big business and wealthier South Africans—the groups most affected by sanctions—would surely be driven toward supporting reform. But this group, composed of the English speakers, the major industrialists, and the more wealthy Afrikaners, is already in the forefront of the reform movement, and has been for the past twenty years. Political power in South Africa, however, lies not in their hands but in the hands of the more jingoistic, more nationalist, and more staunchly independent Afrikaner community. If the 37 year history of apartheid is any guide, foreign pressure will only harden them in their ways. If there is a lesson to be learned from the historical behavior of this body politic, it is that when dealt with leniently, the Afrikaners have taken advantage of the opportunity to further their interests, as has been the case under constructive engagement. And when they have been threatened, they have reacted similarly, doggedly defending their perceived interests.

That sanctions may target the wrong groups and polarize the country is not an argument against their use. After all, it is the Afrikaners who wield political power and even if sanctions fail to reform them, they can still hurt them, while simultaneously encouraging South Africa's blacks. This, to be sure, seems the underlying intention of many, if not most proponents of sanctions. Senator Clairborne Pell, after passage of the Senate sanctions bill, called the vote "a long overdue message of support for South African blacks." More than anything else, the debate on sanctions has become a surrogate for the larger issue of which side in South Africa we ought to support. One need not be a political sophisticate to recognize that those who have spoken out most loudly against apartheid are the staunchest advocates of sanctions, and that those who profess faith in the ability of the current South African government to reform its own affairs—and the South African government itself—are the most adamantly opposed. TransAfrica, the group that has sponsored the daily picketing of the South African embassy, would surely not oppose sanctions even if it were clear that blacks would be the most harmed. Nor would President Reagan support their imposition if it meant that South Africans could purchase foreign businesses at firesale prices and in the process bolster their political standing and South Africa's economy. For ultimately the debate over sanctions is not a debate over how we might fine-tune South Africa's politics, but a veiled debate over how the United States ought to position itself with respect to the two sides within South Africa.

As such, the employment of moderate sanctions may not be a bad thing, if only to neutralize the effects of constructive engagement. Nevertheless, it is ill-suited to achieving the effects its proponents allege they desire. Moderate sanctions alone can easily be foiled by South Africa, which buys its arms from West European arms dealers and Israel, oil from Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other Persian Gulf suppliers, labor and food from its black African neighbors, and high technology from Europe and the Far East. Real economic harm is something only South Africa can do to itself, by demonstrating to international capital that it is a dangerous place in which to do business. Capital dislikes nothing so much as uncertainty, and it is South Africa's seeming inability to control its own house that has been chiefly responsible for its current state of economic distress. Those South African bankers who have argued that capital has been withheld because of politics are only partially correct; it was not the Western banks that declared South Africa to be in a state of emergency, but President Botha.

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II

OUR CURRENT DEBATE is thus really a debate over whether we should align ourselves with the side of justice and an uncertain future, or the current order with its familiar assets and liabilities. But because the issues involved so closely mirror problems that have haunted the United States throughout its own history, the debate on South Africa has taken on an emotional intensity that sets it quite apart from other problems on the foreign policy agenda.

Some have argued that the case of South Africa is hardly an exceptional one, but merely another case of one African tribe oppressing the other tribes in its territory. Paul Johnson, writing in *Commentary* (September 1985), says of South Africa that in "many fundamental respects it is a typical African country. The problems which confront its government, and the way it responds to them are typical too." When viewed as such, Johnson claims, South Africa is rather a superior model of a Third World state: "The bloody cost of social control and engineering in black Africa goes largely unreported. South Africa, by contrast, has a large, varied, and in many ways excellent press, so we know exactly what goes on there." On this view, South Africa's repressive ways have caught the attention of the world not because they are uniquely evil, but because its government is uniquely committed to permitting the outside world to scrutinize its affairs.

There is no doubt some truth to this, but it is an incomplete view. In no other state does one ethnic or racial group so systematically exclude all the others from political participation; moreover, in no other state is it official government policy to deny basic rights according to race. And for Americans, it is the issue of racism, far beyond any other, that makes the case of South Africa exceptional.

For racism is the dark underside of American history. It is a malady that has infected the United States throughout every decade of its history and has still not completely disappeared. In South Africa we see an image of our own history, and our debate over how to deal with it has come to be seen through the lens of our own experiences. To many, the battles fought in the streets of Sharpeville, Soweto, and Capetown are new chapters in a book begun in Little Rock and Selma. Righteous action, it is felt, can bring a sort of national redemption; it can wash away the sins of our own past and show the world, but most importantly ourselves, that the values of the civil rights movement now live at the core of the American political tradition. This is why the South African question has a significance for the United States that rivalries between Hutus and Tutsis, Hindus and Moslems, and Greeks and Turks do not. Those who argue that South Africa is but one of many places with rampant injustice and oppression miss the crucial point. Injustice and oppression do indeed thrive, in Uganda, Assam, Cambodia, and numerous other states, but in South Africa there is the recognizable pattern of whites suppressing blacks. What we have is not a new debate, but a continuation of a debate that already exists, one that has, in fact, existed since the founding of the United States and has been the most persistent and sensitive debate in our history. Principles, viewpoints, and constituencies are already in place. Our debate over South Africa is therefore not merely a debate over foreign policy, but an extension of domestic politics.

That the South African question has come to be cast in the mold of the civil rights question has injured the administration's case and strengthened the argument of its critics far more than has the failure of constructive engagement, of which public knowledge is limited. As a result, the administration has all but conceded its policy's lack of probity, arguing instead that South Africa's strategic significance cannot permit us to allow it to fall outside the ambit of the West. Despite its avowed contempt for apartheid and its desire to see the institution of a broad-based democracy, the administration warns us, the regrettable truth is that security interests compel us to continue the constructive engagement of the often detestable, but nonetheless pro-Western government now in power. Opponents of the administration similarly caution us that vital security and economic interests

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Table
South Africa and Four Strategic Minerals[1]

	South Africa percentage of world production (1984)	*South Africa percentage of world reserves*	*Percentage of U.S. reliance on South Africa (average, 1980–83)*	*Percentage of U.S. reliance on imports (average, 1982–84)*
Chromium	27	83.6	55	82
Manganese	11	70.6	39	99
Platinum Group[2]	42	80.8	49	91
Vanadium	30	47.1	44	41

[1]These data are from "Report of Interagency Materials and Minerals Field Study to the Republic of South Africa," U.S. Department of Commerce (June 11, 1985).

[2]The group consists of platinum, palladium, rhodium, ruthenium, iridium, and osmium.

are at stake; but whereas the administration insists that South Africa's value compels us to deal with the current government, liberals suggest that it is the very existence of this deplorable regime, and our perceived close relationship with it, that is the greatest threat to the United States. Force the death of the regime, the argument goes, and the regime's opponents will no longer have reason to turn to Moscow; move toward the side of change, and the forces of change will gladly move toward us.

BOTH SIDES, then, argue that American interests in South Africa are sufficiently important to make the debate more than a trifling affair; otherwise, it would hardly be worth their efforts to sustain their respective positions. But when we examine what exactly is at stake for the United States, we find a set of economic and strategic interests that, while hardly negligible, are hardly commensurate with the level of debate at home.

The major importance South Africa holds for the United States, and indeed the world, stems from its possession of a rich assortment of minerals, concentrated as nowhere else on the planet. Approximately 47 percent of all South Africa's exports, accounting for $8.2 billion of South Africa's $17.3 billion total exports in 1984, are derived from the export of gold bullion, and if krugerrand sales are added to this the total exceeds 50 percent. On top of this another 15 percent of its exports come from the sale of a large variety of other minerals. Four of these, chromium, manganese, the platinum group metals, and vanadium, are among the twenty-seven classified by the United States as strategic minerals. The current Western dependency on South Africa for these minerals is considerable; moreover, because South Africa has an enormous percentage of the world's reserves of these minerals, the degree of dependence is likely to grow substantially in the future (see Table).

The most vital of these four is chromium, which is essential for the production of corrosion-free steel and is necessary in the construction of military aircraft, ships, and tanks. While chromium is replaceable in some cases, there are no substitutes for it in the making of superalloys used in aircraft and nuclear-power systems. Because chromium is found only in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and the Soviet Union, the U.S. National Materials Advisory Board determined in 1978 that the United States was even more vulnerable to a chromium embargo than it was to an embargo of petroleum. The likelihood of this occurring now or in the future is remote; nevertheless, it is clearly preferable that an uninterrupted flow of South African chromium be maintained.

Manganese, used for similar purposes as chromium, cannot be replaced by other metals, but South Africa can be replaced by other sources, notably Australia and Gabon, at least for several years. In addition, there appear to be

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rich deposits of manganese nodules on the seabed, which may be tapped in years to come. The platinum group metals are used chiefly in the United States for making catalytic converters, and to a lesser extent, medical and dental equipment, and jewelry. Substitutes for platinum are available, though their use may entail higher costs and lesser quality. A curtailment of platinum imports can be survived, though it would not be welcomed. Vanadium is required for the manufacture of high strength, lightweight alloys used most significantly in the construction of aircraft frames and oil and gas pipelines. As nearly 60 percent of the vanadium used in the United States is mined here, reliance on South African vanadium is limited. Moreover, substitutes for vanadium are available and American supplies are probably sufficient to cover the instances in which substitutes cannot be used.

Only one scenario holds extreme danger for the United States—that in which the Soviet Union, South Africa, and Zimbabwe conspire to withhold chromium from the West—and such a threat can be dealt with through an effective stockpiling program. Embargoes of the other minerals can likely be circumvented, though the costs may be sizable and their replacement by other metals may be more problematic than we suppose. Factories would have to be retooled and techniques devised to use alternatives. New technologies could conceivably be developed to relieve the burdens, but this cannot be counted on. Conflicts with our European and Japanese allies may arise over access to remaining supplies. Thus, while a temporary stoppage of the flow of minerals would neither jeopardize American security nor inflict prohibitive injury on American industry, continued access to the minerals is a clear priority.

SOUTH AFRICA'S strategic value to the United States is of less consequence than its economic value. Although the South African government and a good number of its American supporters assert that its position along the shipping lane connecting the Persian Gulf and the West endows it with a vital significance, new sources of oil and new means for transporting oil have substantially diminished the importance of the Cape Route in recent years. Since Mexican oil has come on line, American supplies of oil come almost entirely from Western Hemisphere sources, specifically Venezuela, Mexico, Canada, and Alaska. What importance the Cape Route holds for the United States today stems almost entirely from our obligations to NATO and the economic health of Western Europe.

But even in this regard control of the Cape is of questionable value for either the protection or interdiction of sea traffic, for the passage around the Cape is hardly a choke point, but rather a navigable 1,000 mile span of ocean. Should the Soviets decide to disrupt Western shipping, it would be far more easy to do so in the Persian Gulf, where traffic is dense and targets plentiful. A local decision to tamper with shipping, a rather preposterous possibility, would—or at least should—provoke an American response that would make the offender's action regrettable. Even if for some unforeseen reason traffic around the Cape should be hindered, rerouting oil to the West would be annoying though not difficult. The pipeline carrying Iraqi oil through to Turkey already carries 1.2 million barrels per day and is due to be enlarged. Saudi Arabia's oil could be diverted through its new pipeline to its western port of Yanbu, where it could be shipped through the Suez Canal, now capable of handling tankers of up to 200,000 tons. Larger tankers can be run to either end of the canal while smaller tankers shuttle oil back and forth through it.

The use of South Africa's port of Simonstown, just south of Capetown, would therefore provide no major advantage for either superpower. A South African base would be of marginal utility to the United States. The major American base in the Indian Ocean region, Diego Garcia, is the same distance to the Persian Gulf as is South Africa, and it is invulnerable to domestic disorder. In addition, the United States utilizes naval facilities at Berbera (Somalia), Mombasa (Kenya), and Oman, all of which are closer to the Persian Gulf than South

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Africa is. The United States Navy has not used Simonstown since 1967, and while the basis for this non-use has been political, the very fact that two decades of abstention have not been costly indicates that the port is not vitally important. The Soviet Union, whose closest base is at Aden (South Yemen), could make use of Simonstown as a base to refuel and repair Soviet surface ships and nuclear submarines in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. But similar facilities, it would appear, are already available to them in Maputo (Mozambique) and the Soviets have elected not to develop them.

What is at stake, then, for the United States are economic and strategic interests of moderate, but not critical, value. There are few benefits the United States can gain beyond those already obtained, thus making an improvement of the current relationship unprofitable. And majority rule, even if it results in the installation of a government unadmiring of the United States, would not seriously jeopardize any major American interests. Barring a monumental shift in global trading patterns, it is reasonable to expect that American and South African economic interests will remain complementary over the long term—the United States will remain dependent on South Africa for minerals and South Africa will remain dependent on the United States as a market and as a source of technology. No matter the contempt a future South African government may hold for the United States, the catalytic converter market in the Eastern bloc will not pay South Africa's bills. Soviet influence might increase, but because there is little the Soviets can exploit to any great advantage, here again the United States would not be seriously threatened.

III

SOME TIME in the next two decades South Africa will probably witness a large-scale, if not complete transfer of power to its black majority; only the staunchest believers in apartheid deny this. Demographics alone suggest that however powerful South Africa's 5 million whites are today, they will not be able to exclude the country's 25 million non-whites from full political participation forever. The relevant question about South Africa is not whether change will come, but when and how it will come.

It is difficult to predict how long South Africa's whites will successfully resist majority rule. Whether their legendary resilience, born in the era of soldier-farmers with much pride and little wealth, still exists in a population that is now urban and relatively comfortable, remains to be seen. So far, the demonstrations and protests in the townships and homelands have barely affected the white population. But years of economic adversity, coupled with the threat of domestic disorder, may well convince more than a few whites that their most rational course of action is not resistance, but emigration. An unusually high percentage of the white population—nearly 10 percent—already holds foreign passports. English speakers and wealthier Afrikaners would have no difficulty assimilating themselves into Commonwealth states. The greater body of Afrikanerdom would probably stay behind and fight, though their determination and capacity to do so are unknown. The history Afrikaners retell is of the Great Trek, the wars with the black nations, and their heroic resistance during the Boer war. But it is worth remembering that it was a minority of the Afrikaner population that actually participated in these events; the great majority of Afrikaners experienced these triumphs vicariously.

It is equally difficult to predict the future course of black political protest with precision, though trends that have evolved over the past two decades suggest decisively that dissent will become much louder, more daring, more widespread, and more radical. The demonstrations that followed the Sharpeville massacre were quelled in a matter of weeks; the Soweto riots triggered dissent on a much broader and more violent scale and took months to subdue; and the current dissension has been ongoing for nearly a year and seems quite capable of continuing indefinitely. Each generation has been markedly more radical and accepting of violence than the previous one, and this trend can only be expected to continue.

Still, the difficulty blacks will face in over-

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throwing the current system should not be underestimated. Because South Africa's system of homelands and townships effectively keeps non-whites imprisoned and apart from white areas of the country, black protest is bound for many years to inflict substantial damage on blacks while doing little harm to the white establishment. That South Africa is a state divided by race also simplifies the whites' ability to control an insurgency, for race is an indelible stamp of identification that makes it impossible for would-be rebels to work anonymously in areas of white control. Nor is it possible for blacks to receive substantial military aid from the outside. All the militarily and economically weak states that abut South Africa—Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, and Swaziland—have already been invaded by South African forces for having permitted Pretoria's enemies refuge; they have consequently forsworn use of their land as a staging area for actions against South Africa. Thus, while black resistance will undoubtedly expand, how it will actually confront white power remains virtually impossible to predict.

These uncertainties, resistant as they are to outside control, make the formulation of an American policy terribly difficult. What is more certain is that the policies currently proposed in the United States will do little either to prevent or to hasten South Africa's journey to its apparently inevitable fate. Constructive engagement has been tried for nearly five years and it has failed to deliver on any of its promises. Its basic assumption—that white moderates would come to the fore, end apartheid, upgrade the lives of South Africa's blacks, and lay the groundwork for a multinational society—has been betrayed by a government that has instead embarrassed American efforts to secure Namibian independence and has declared unabashedly that real change will never be seen. When we turn to the liberal solution we find a similar absence of realistic expectations. The preferred solution of the liberals, the imposition of economic sanctions, offers only a cheap, blunt tool with which to do long-distance social engineering. Real sanctions, if ever imposed, can damage the South African economy, but their ability to bring about the goals their proponents desire is uncertain. At best they could budge South Africa toward moderate reform; at worst, they could engender a hostile response that would bring to power either the ideological right, or even the South African military.

IF THE UNITED STATES truly wanted to change the course of events in South Africa, it would have to turn to far more extreme solutions than those offered today. A policy of this sort would require a major commitment of resources, attention, public support, and, perhaps, American blood. But as we have learned in Vietnam, even a commitment on this level holds no guarantee of success. Nevertheless, it is worth assessing what the possible effects of active intervention might be.

The United States could, as some have argued, support the current government. Despite all the problems we have encountered in our relationship with it, a case could be made that its existence would ensure that essential American strategic and economic interests will remain secure. South African power would effectively exclude Soviet interference in southern Africa, as it has for the past two decades; access to strategic minerals would be assured; and market interests in South Africa would remain secure while American corporations could continue to take handsome profits out of South Africa. Why not stay the course? Black Africa clearly would look with disdain on this policy, but in its current state of disarray and economic woe it will be unable to do any damage to the United States. World opinion as a whole would also frown on such a policy, but in our relationships with our major allies and trading partners, bilateral and other considerations would take precedence, and the South African question would be kept low on the agenda.

It must be assumed that eventually time will run out on South Africa, but the staying power of minority regimes should not be underestimated. The United States cannot keep white rule alive forever, but its political and military support might help to prolong it. American support of the shah, for example, helped keep

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him in power for a quarter of a century, and in that time American interests in southwest Asia were more than adequately served.

The downside to this policy is obvious: when change comes, the new black leaders would view the United States as their historical enemy and would make anti-Americanism a point of faith. Those most inimical to the United States would stand a better chance of rising to leadership positions. Soviet influence in southern Africa would become a fact of life. American investments would doubtless be expropriated and while economic interest would probably guarantee access to resources, the possibility of selective embargoes would constantly be with us. Furthermore, the sensitive nature of the South African question for the United States would likely provoke dissension and divisiveness far out of proportion to the real stakes involved. Black Americans in particular, and a large portion of the greater community, would find it repugnant. Whatever benefits are gained from such a policy would be easily exceeded by the domestic political costs alone.

An opposite approach would be to concentrate solely on America's long term interests and support rapid change. Such a policy would entail terminating our relationship with the current regime, implementing broad sanctions, and supporting the African National Congress (ANC), the group favored by the majority of South Africa's blacks. While sanctions of the sort currently discussed would have but a minimal effect on South Africa, a total trade embargo, strictly enforced by the entire international community and enforced by a naval blockade and a denial of landing rights by all other states, could suffocate the current government and bring dramatic change swiftly, perhaps in a matter of months.

The benefits of this option could be numerous. The new ANC government would be well disposed to the United States, and those of moderate politics would be given a giant boost while Marxists in the organization would be stunted. A generally positive image of the West would likely make South Africa more open to Western, democratic ideas and American economic interests. The ANC's foreign policy would be of the Third World sort that irks but rarely injures the United States. The Soviet Union would be pre-empted from any significant role in southern Africa and access to strategic resources would be assured. And the major issue that has stood in the way of easy American relations with Africa would disappear.

It is not difficult to find dangers with this option. Rigorous enforcement of sanctions would be terribly expensive, necessitating global policing of all states capable of delivering goods to South Africa. Our West European allies and Japan, all of whom have large business interests in South Africa, would probably refuse to cooperate in such a venture, which would render it useless at the outset. Key minerals would be lost during the period of the embargo. What the future order, or lack thereof, would resemble is beyond conjecture. While some in the United States would unquestionably welcome this policy, it is incredible to imagine the American public approving a policy that aims to place power in the hands of left-wing black nationalists. If South Africa were to become a one party state, as it probably would, a strong domestic backlash might ensue. From the perspective of the realpolitik concerned solely with America's long term relationship with South Africa, this option does have its merits, but the risks and the costs that would have to be undertaken plainly exceed whatever advantages it might bring us.

WHAT THEN should the United States do? Neither constructive engagement nor the employment of sanctions offers a solution that will improve South Africa or benefit the United States. Direct involvement might, but it might not, and it is wholly unpalatable to an America that has little enthusiasm for the employment of force or the expenditure of much effort or money. Nor is there a viable middle party, a Duarte, for instance, which the United States can help to turn into a future government. Moderates abound: Bishop Tutu, the United Democratic Front's Ntatho Motlana, the Progressive Federalist Party, members of the South African business commu-

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nity, and even the more moderate members of the ANC. Although these actors range from the moderate right to the moderate left and hold very different, often conflicting views about what South Africa's future should look like, they share a strong desire to resolve their country's problems peaceably. Combined, they may well represent a majority of South Africans. But as is so often the case in a polarized political arena, the political structure of the South African conflict is such that these players have no real power and very little say.

We thus confront an intractable dilemma. All the solutions before us propose using American power to manipulate South African society in some form, but in the final analysis all are either futile, unrealistic, extremely risky, or expensive. What then is left?

The point of departure in formulating an American policy must be the acceptance of the following realities. First, we must accept that collapse of the current South African system is inevitable; whether this will come in five, or ten, or twenty years is impossible to divine. Second, the strong probability is that when the current system collapses, it will be replaced by the ANC. Unpalatable as this may be to many, the trends suggest that this is the most likely outcome. Other possibilities exist: it is possible that other organizations will replace the ANC as the representative of the black community, (though to do so they would have to embrace many of the central tenets of the ANC). It is even conceivable that a protracted conflict will result in partition, and the creation of a white homeland. The division of South Africa into two separate countries may well be the only way to resolve a situation in which the minimal demands of each side are wholly unacceptable to the other. While many whites and blacks alike would certainly oppose such a solution, it is worth remembering that partition proved to be the only answer in three similar instances, namely, the creation of Israel, Pakistan, and Northern Ireland. At present, however, the likelihood of these occurring remains small. Third, the achievement of democracy through the current apartheid system is impossible; constructive engagement seeks to achieve what are, in fact, two mutually exclusive ends. Fourth, the United States's ability to direct the course of South African history is extremely circumscribed. Neither constructive engagement nor the imposition of sanctions is going to change South Africa's future drastically. Finally, there is no reason to believe that the problem will ever roll to some final resting place. Instead, it could endure indefinitely, like the conflicts between the Arabs and Israelis or the Catholics and Protestants of Northern Ireland.

Given these realities, American policy must be prepared to accept a future full of uncertainty, but one that holds the strong chance of majority rule. What is required is a strategy that can continue to secure our interests in the short term while leaving us in a sufficiently flexible position to continue our relationship with South Africa in the longer term.

One strategy has been almost completely ignored through the current debate, but seems particularly well-suited to achieving these goals. This is a policy of disengagement. Such a policy would recognize both the limitations on American capabilities and the modest extent of our interests. We would take the position that we will deal with anyone who governs South Africa. We would deal with the current government so long as it is in power, but distance ourselves from it and do business with it on a minimal basis. All support for it—political, economic, and rhetorical—would be terminated. We would not stand in the way of change when it comes, and we would be prepared to deal with those who accede to power.

Such a policy will surely find no favor with those who believe South Africa to be a perfect place for the United States either to demonstrate resolve or to champion justice. But these responses fail to take into account the broader interests of the United States. To support a minority-based government, with a questionable future, whose values are inconsistent with those that distinguish the Free World, in an area where peripheral interests are at stake, is plain bad strategy. Undertaking the support of South Africa will not showcase our resolve and credibility; it will only tie us to a losing cause whose beliefs we do not even share.

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Some will argue that a failure to assist the whites may show us to be less credible in the eyes of other embattled states friendly to the United States, like Israel and El Salvador. Such a comparison is obtuse. Israel and El Salvador are majority-ruled, democratic states that face grave external threats to their very existence. The South African government, by contrast, is a non-democratic regime whose only threat comes from its own citizens.

Disengagement will be equally offensive to those who would like the United States to support the ANC, as well as to liberals who believe the purpose of our foreign policy ought not be the mere pursuit of narrow interests, but also the promotion of liberal values. But here again we must be careful in assessing who exactly we would be supporting. The ANC, at present, is a tiny organization with massive numbers of supporters; it is, for all practical purposes, better viewed as a concept, or a religion, than a political organization. While its current leaders claim to be pledged to democratic principles, there is no reason to believe these will be upheld in the future. Other similar parties, such as Angola's MPLA or Mozambique's FRELIMO, swiftly abandoned any notions of democracy, or indeed humanity, after independence, and have instead shown themselves to be nasty, brutish, and dictatorial. Should this be the case in South Africa—and there is at least some reason to believe it might—American interests would not suffer, but it would certainly not be a government we would want to embrace. As the United States has little ability to mold the ANC, the only wise policy is to wait and see what the future brings and defer until then a decision on what our relationship with black South Africa will be.

FINALLY, disengagement will disturb those who think that as a great power, the United States must be a maker of history, not just a bystander. It is inimical to the streak in our political culture that believes that for every problem there is some solution, and that if none is obvious, we must summon more aggressively our cleverness and ingenuity. Americans on both sides of the political spectrum are instinctively apt to agree with Secretary of State Shultz: "The United States of America is not just an onlooker. . . . We are participants and we are engaged." But it precisely because we are a great power that we have the option to disengage. Disengagement is not a moral stance, nor an explicit decision to ignore what will happen; rather, it is a strategy, one of several the United States can follow to protect its interests. Given the other possibilities, it appears to be the one that can best do so. Nor should it be viewed as an abnegation of moral duty; rather, it is a statement that because our own interests are relatively modest, we will accept self-determination as the guiding principle of our policy.

To view South Africa as a square on a global chessboard, a stop on a freedom march, or a stage on which we can demonstrate resolution or atone for the sins of our own past is to obscure the realities of a terribly complex and extraordinary situation. The strategies proposed by both sides in the current debate are unlikely to bring about the results they purport to aim for. Neither will prolong nor shorten the life of white South Africa. Insofar as both seek to avoid direct intervention, both, in a sense, can be seen as variations on the theme of detachment; but because both in the end seek to tie the United States to one side or the other, both run the risk of tying the United States to a position we could easily come to regret. Disengagement, by contrast, would accept the vagaries of the situation and position the United States to accommodate anyone who governs South Africa. Moreover, it accepts a fact few in the current debate care to acknowledge: that whether we like it or not, South Africa's future is going to be determined by South Africans.

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Comments

EDITORS' NOTE: We have asked five people for responses to Robert B. Shepard's proposal for American disengagement from South Africa. Their comments follow, in alphabetical order.

Lawrence S. Eagleburger

MORE OFTEN than not the foreign policy choices available to the United States resemble the condemned man's choice of means of execution—by hanging or firing squad. The outcome may not be quite so final, but the alternatives are often almost as unpalatable. So it is with South Africa.

Mr. Shepard's superb article does an effective job of disposing of both constructive engagement and sanctions as realistic or effective means of dealing with our South African conundrum, and then moves on to propose a revolutionary alternative: disengagement. Or, put another way (being only slightly unfair to Mr. Shepard), if you can't beat 'em and you can't join 'em, ignore them. And then, when the dust settles, neutrality will be rewarded and "we will deal with anyone who accedes to power."

There are a good many reasons why I doubt that disengagement is a viable alternative policy, but one stands above all others: the body politic in this country will simply not accept it. It is Mr. Shepard himself who tells us so in his insightful analysis of why the problem of South Africa is more than a "debate over foreign policy." It is, as he tells us, "an extension of domestic politics," and as such intimately tied to our own history, our sense of guilt, and our efforts to achieve redemption. Under such circumstances it is hard to see how any administration could follow the hands-off policy Mr. Shepard recommends, even if South Africa were as strategically insignificant as he makes it out to be—which I doubt.

If this is true, then we are driven back to the two paths (or some as yet undiscovered alternative) Mr. Shepard so dislikes: constructive engagement or sanctions. With regard to the latter, Mr. Shepard does such an effective job of describing the many limitations of sanctions that I can neither add to, nor subtract from, his argument. While I can sympathize with the frustrations of those who advocate them, I see little reason to believe that sanctions—at least of the kind that can reasonably be expected to be imposed—will do much more than harm those we seek to change. Sanctions may make us feel good, but foreign policy should be more than psychotherapy.

Which leaves us with constructive engagement, unpalatable as that may seem to be.

While I will by no means claim that constructive engagement has been a roaring success, neither do I believe it to be the failure that Mr. Shepard (and he has lots of company) perceives. Constructive engagement rested (and still rests) on the premise that there was—and is—a mood for change, a mood for reform, in South Africa, and that the United States should be on the side of, and working to support, the reformers.

This may seem naive to many, but the reform cupboard is not so bare as they would claim. A few examples:

—four years ago there were no blacks in the trade union movement, but today, the membership is more than 50 percent black and growing;

—there has been a four-fold increase in the past several years in expenditures on black education. While much more must be done, this is an impressive start;

—there is now a commitment to repeal the despicable anti-miscegenation laws—laws

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which, in fact, are no longer enforced;
—there is now a commitment to open central business districts to black enterprises;
—there is now a commitment to end influx controls, including repeal of the pass laws;
—and, with the introduction of the new, although admittedly flawed, constitution, an end was put to the concept that power must rest solely in the hands of whites. Further, as the result of party caucuses held in August and September, the principle that power must be shared with blacks has been accepted. And the sharing of power will be in the context of a *unified* South Africa on the basis of a *universal* franchise.

Admittedly, much of what I describe as progress is but a general commitment that will only take on real substance when the means of implementation have been agreed upon. Yet I doubt that four or five years ago many would have thought even this much was possible.

I am not so foolish as to argue that constructive engagement is solely responsible for the changes—halting and insufficient as they may be—that have taken place over the past few years. But I do believe that they are of more than a little significance and that constructive engagement had something to do with creating the mood in South Africa that made them possible.

Mr. Shepard argues that "constructive engagement has failed to accomplish any of its principal objectives." I would contend that there has been more performance than he perceives, and more performance than any other policy has produced or will produce. And I would also argue that deeply felt convictions—hideous though they may be—that have been held for generations are seldom changed in five years.

I have to confess that as I write these words I am pessimistic about the future of constructive engagement (at a minimum, the policy needs a new name). It requires a patience and willingness to accept half-a-loaf that may no longer exist either here or among blacks in South Africa. If so, then we are probably condemned to a policy of sanctions that will do enough to make things worse without, as Mr. Shepard so clearly foresees, the will to follow our initial steps to their logical conclusion. And in the process we will have helped few and perhaps harmed many.

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Newt Gingrich

ROBERT B. SHEPARD's analysis of South Africa and American policy illustrates its lack of a larger historical vision in its closing sentence: "whether we like it or not, South Africa's future is going to be determined by South Africans."

Early on, Shepard displays a pretty solid grasp of South African realities. But it is unhistorical for him to suggest that a region that has been influenced again and again by outsiders will not now be so affected. For example, the Dutch arrived and the region became the Boer nation. The Zulu came in from the north. Again and again, it has been outsiders who have had a significant influence on South Africa.

Similarly, there are many in Ethiopia, Angola, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and Cambodia who could tell Mr. Shepard that in a world that has a Soviet empire, American disengagement, as he suggests, could all too easily become Soviet enslavement.

It would be easier to turn our back on South Africa politically and economically—just buy the necessary minerals, and avoid any further involvement. In the long run, that position maximizes the likelihood of a pro-Soviet dictatorship in South Africa. That is, as Mr. Shepard notes, impossible. We are not willing to exert military force in South Africa, nor should we. We are not willing to exert the kind of absolute, total boycott that might cripple the South African government, nor should we. Our ability to foster chaos in Iran led not to progress, but to Khomeini. Therefore, there is every reason for us to be cautious about what may turn out to be destructive policies.

Our goal should be to develop democracy, a free enterprise system, and a pro-Western stance among the peoples of South Africa. That means our policy should be built around three

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groups: white moderates, black moderates, and the Asians/coloreds. The questions we should be trying to answer are the following: How do we encourage white moderates to believe there is a future in which they can live with blacks, Asians, and coloreds? How do we convince black moderates there is a future in which they have real allies in the West who are willing to help them develop the leadership, the systems, and the approaches that would lead to a truly free South Africa? And, how do we help the Asians and coloreds live through a very difficult and frightening period, in which they see a real danger that one set of oppressors, the whites, will be replaced by a new set of oppressors, the blacks? They will continue to be politically the loneliest of the South African racial groups.

Therefore, far from disengagement, or *constructive* engagement as it has been called, we must develop *active* engagement, in which we are positively and actively engaged in building democracy. We should actively strive to encourage white South Africans to cooperate with blacks. We should encourage blacks to find ways to have their young grow up to be true leaders—in a democratic sense. We should do everything we can to facilitate, encourage, and be involved in the growth of democracy in South Africa.

That is why both economic sanctions and disengagement are wrong and what is needed is a policy of active engagement.

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Nathan Glazer

I AM persuaded by the case Mr. Shepard makes for disengagement, which is not surprising. My first thought on many issues of foreign policy is to ask if there is a vital American interest involved. My second is to ask what we can do about it. Admittedly, the example of Vietnam, where in retrospect neither the most vital American interests were involved (though we all would have been much happier if an independent South Vietnam could have been maintained), and which exceeded our capacities, military and political (or military as limited by political realities), to control, leads one to take a biased view on these matters: if our defeat in Vietnam, complete as it was, did not decisively change the balance of power, what would, and what should therefore engage us?

I am convinced, not South Africa. It has even less claim upon us than Vietnam. We do not know what kind of government and constitution might emerge in South Africa. I am not optimistic, as who can be, but the size and importance of the white community places it in a different position from any other non-black community in Africa. The massacre or driving out of the whites may be the most likely scenario. Yet they play such a key role in the economy, are so numerous, and so important for the economy, that one can hope for a different outcome, in which the races share power. While Afrikaner intransigence is leading to an ugly situation, the common excesses of racial and ethnic conflict are still not evident. South Africa is far from the situation of Lebanon, to take one extreme. It is not impossible that a multi-racial regime might be created there.

Shepard's analysis of the strategic problems, in terms of access to critical raw materials and safety of sea lanes, seems completely convincing to me, even assuming, in the worst case, that the Soviet Union should be able to develop the degree of influence it has in, say, Ethiopia. And I have the feeling that is rather more influence than it could reasonably expect, in a society so much more developed and powerful than any in black Africa, and whose leaders, whatever they would be, would act with self-confidence in the powers of their economy, army, state. What would encourage them to become a satellite or even an ally of the Soviet Union?

One thing that would encourage them, of course, would be our involvement as their enemies. However we interpret "constructive engagement," or some variant, to African blacks (and American blacks and liberals, too), it will be interpreted as support for a racist regime. Why should not our policy be a benign concern expressed for the development of democracy and racial equality in South Africa, combined with the honest assertion that it is not really our responsibility, nor within our power, to bring this about?

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I like the proposal. The political problems in the way of carrying it out would be horrendous. Can a nation that acts like the world's busybody, and where Congress requires us to report on human rights in every nation on the globe, thus creating endless difficulties and embarrassments for our diplomats, learn simply to keep still? The UN creates another problem in maintaining disengagement. There will be many unpleasant alternatives presented in voting, even if we look with sympathy on the emergence of a democratic state in which each individual has the same civil and political rights as any other. It will be difficult to maintain this kind of position in the face of segments of American public opinion that want us to do more to support the white regime, or to bring into power a black regime. But I think the proposal for disengagement is the most sensible one on the table, if only politics permits it.

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Burton Yale Pines

DISENGAGEMENT, says Robert B. Shepard, is Washington's way out of the U.S. policy dilemma in South Africa. This curious prescription can rest only on a disengagement from reality. Does Shepard really think that the U.S. can "disengage" from such a key geopolitical development as the disposition of South Africa? The U.S. tried such disengagement from critical regional events in the 1970s and is still paying dearly for it. And does he really believe that if events are allowed to take their course, as he suggests, that the new regime in Pretoria will be any better than the current rulers? Surely the record of the past quarter-century in Africa teaches that revolutions rarely produce governments by majorities or moderates. The depressing truth is that majorities are denied effective political power today in a majority of black African states.

What is almost certain to emerge in South Africa, if the U.S. disengages, is not a nation dominated by a Chief Buthelezi or a Bishop Tutu any more than Zimbabwe is today dominated by a Joshua Nkomo or than Angola is governed by the tripartite coalition originally envisioned by the OAU. Pretoria will be ruled, as so many African states are, by a radical (probably Leninist) minority under which a majority of blacks (and nearly all whites) will be worse off than they are today.

Rather than disengagement, Washington should be deepening its involvement in South Africa to undermine apartheid and encourage the creation of a free, democratic state that respects the rights of all its citizens. The U.S. should broaden constructive engagement, which is just a vehicle for wielding diplomatic influence. To it, the Reagan administration should add economic engagement. Washington should take steps to spur in South Africa the forces of economic change that already have begun to corrode apartheid.

Specifically, the U.S. should: first, encourage more (not less) American investment in South Africa, because it has been the U.S. firms that have trained black workers and promoted them into supervisory positions providing the core of a broad-based black middle class; second, offer grants, perhaps through the National Endowment for Democracy, to train black South African trade union officials, because the growth of black unions, mainly at U.S. companies, has begun to challenge the power of the hard-line, pro-apartheid white unions; third, provide counterpart funds for U.S. firms to expand and accelerate the training of black workers in modern industrial skills and technologies; fourth, foster black entrepreneurs and black-owned businesses, perhaps through matching grants to U.S. firms that offer programs for training small businessmen (as IBM already does), to speed the shift of economic power to the non-white communities; and fifth, provide technical assistance and other support for the Botha government's fledgling efforts to transfer a number of government-owned industries to the private sector, thus reducing the power of the strongly pro-apartheid Afrikaner bureaucrats.

"Disengagement" would abandon the majority of South African blacks, leaving them at the mercy of a minority—either white or radical black. The only responsible policy for the United States is constructive economic engage-

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ment alongside diplomatic engagement.

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Diana Schaub

JUSTICE versus expediency: that is how Robert Shepard characterizes the appeals made by the two sides in the current debate. The supporters of sanctions, motivated by solicitude for South Africa's blacks, are on the side of justice. The administration, which according to Shepard "has all but conceded its policy's lack of probity," now rests the case for constructive engagement on strategic necessity.

By casting the debate as a simple dichotomy of moral duty versus interests, Shepard misrepresents both positions and makes the policy choices more stark than they really are. Defenders of constructive engagement have not, or at least need not have, forfeited moral superiority to those favoring disinvestment or sanctions. Behind constructive engagement is the thought that justice is not furthered by steps that polarize factions within a society. Justice is better sought through comity than through conflict. U.S. withdrawal, whether at the prompting of a too fastidious conscience (disinvestment) or as a result of a revised, morally indifferent calculus of interests (Shepard's disengagement), would, I believe, exacerbate the divisions in South Africa. The current, arguably reformist government would be replaced by a more brutal, ultra-right government that would eventually be brought down by a violent revolution. However popular that revolution, the promise of freedom and democracy would soon be traduced by the Soviet-sponsored vanguard of the revolution—the ANC. U.S. involvement with a view toward securing the rights of South Africa's disenfranchised blacks—constructive engagement—is thus both principled and prudent.

Shepard, not the administration, has forsworn concern for moral principle. He states outright that "disengagement is not a moral stance"; but somehow he does not think it is "an abnegation of moral duty" either. He has not convinced me that moral neutrality is anything other than moral negligence. Shepard's moral neutrality leads him to recommend political neutrality. The U.S. should be indifferent to the character of the South African regime, present and future. We buy our minerals and keep our mouths shut. For all its supposed hardheadedness, this is a naive prescription. An ANC-led successor regime might well be more than "unadmiring" of the United States; it might be unremittingly hostile. And it will have more than a vote in the UN with which to oppose us; it will have critical minerals. Shepard is similarly pollyannaish in his assessment of Soviet intentions in South Africa—the prospect of a chromium monopoly must have the Kremlin agleam.

Shepard presents disengagement as the counsel of realpolitik. It seems the heirs of Machiavelli have forgotten how to master "Fortuna," as Machiavelli taught; they now uxoriously accommodate themselves to her instead. Post-Vietnam realpolitik has exchanged voluntarism for fatalism. Shepard's "realities" are the inevitability of revolution, the impossibility of reform, and the impotence of the United States. All that is left for us to do is position ourselves so that the unavoidable fall does not bring too many bumps and bruises—hardheaded indeed.

Disengagement is a policy characterized by an absence of moral judgment, and a prudential judgment led astray by both naivete and fatalism. Rather than withdrawing, we should strive, through our diplomacy and our economic presence, to prevent the hardening of racial division, to encourage flexibility in the government, and to defuse the desperation of blacks. What Lincoln said of slavery in this country, we must say of apartheid in South Africa: "We desire to see it placed where the public mind will rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction." As it turned out, that course meant four years of civil war. Unless apartheid is steadily and willingly dismantled, South Africa's course may be the same, but for South Africa there is little likelihood of a just and lasting peace at the end.

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The Dilemmas of the Horn

Paul B. Henze

THE FOREIGNER in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, quickly learns to identify himself as an American or European to avoid being taken as a Russian. Ethiopians scorn Russians, fail to wait on them in shops, contrive situations to embarrass them in public. A young Ethiopian, in good English, ridicules the slogans on the gaudy arch over the road that leads into Revolution Square in the capital: "The Victory of Socialism is inevitable!" and "Forward with Comrade Mengistu Haile Mariam!" A shopwoman comments: "They call us blacks; they don't trust us; they don't even hire Ethiopians as servants in their houses. They live like peasants. All they want to do is buy things to take back to Moscow and sell on the black market." She is bitter. She ekes out a living selling embroidered garments to visitors. She asks for dollars in payment, to send to her son studying business administration at a college in California.

Bookshops, all government-run, are crammed with Amharic translations of Marx and Lenin and Russian classics. But they also have racks of Western works on computer programming, management, agriculture, technological development, medicine. The Marxist volumes gather dust, though they sell for a pittance. The Western books are dog-eared from browsers thumbing through them. They are too expensive for most Ethiopians to buy. "The Russians themselves have been the best cure for the silly socialism that used to be fashionable here fifteen years ago," a middle-aged Addis Ababa University professor says. "Once we are rid of this disastrous system, nobody will want to talk about socialism in Ethiopia for the next 50 years. But what a price we have paid! And the way out is not clear. I can't understand why some of our army officers don't push out Mengistu."

Addis Ababa, the "New Flower" that will observe its 100th birthday in 1986, now reflects not only the crisis into which the country has been plunged during 11 years of revolutionary Marxism, but the crisis of the entire region. Ethiopia has become a dramatic example of the inapplicability of Marxism to the developing world. All the country's problems have been exacerbated by the turn to Moscow. It is at odds with most of its neighbors. Mengistu has never established authority over many of the outlying regions. Why did such a proud old people fall victim to such compounded disasters? How can a country that still evokes so much Western compassion be helped to rescue itself from what John Gray, in a remarkable *Times Literary Supplement* essay, calls a "System of Ruins"? What can or should the United States do? Where does the American national interest lie?

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II

WHEN it became clear, more than a year ago, that famine in Ethiopia was reaching epic proportions, the American

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response was quick and unequivocal. Individuals, private organizations, and the U.S. government all rushed to send aid. Ethiopia's military rulers had first tried to cover up the crisis, while they were spending $100 million to celebrate the 10th anniversary of their revolution and establishment of a Marxist-Leninist party. Then they tried to blame the famine on the slowness of the West to take notice and provide assistance. They got little support even from perennial Western apologists for Third World radicals. Mengistu and his Derg colleagues, unlike the Angolan MPLA and the Sandinistas, have never managed to attract a claque of enthusiasts abroad.[1]

Embarrassing as the famine was to him, Mengistu had no alternative to accepting the grain and medical supplies that began to pour in and the thousands of technicians, officials, congressmen, and journalists who came to participate and oversee operations. The response from America's allies was equally spontaneous and generous. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was content at first to look the other way; the Soviets then provided planes to help the Derg carry out its dubious resettlement program. Hundreds of thousands of northern famine victims took their fate into their own hands and trekked across the Sudan border.

Drought compounded but did not cause the famine in Ethiopia. Kenya experienced more widespread drought than Ethiopia in 1984, sought help in time, and utilized it effectively. In Ethiopia the regime had been trying to starve out rebellious northern provinces that have never accepted its authority. Even more basic is the fact that, as in the Soviet Union itself, Moscow-style socialism has been disastrous for Ethiopian agriculture, the only source of wealth in the country. Investment has gone to state farms and has been poorly used. Private farmers have been pressured to collectivize. They have little incentive to produce for sale, as prices have been held down and there are few consumer goods to buy. Some of the most productive regions of Ethiopia have been unaffected by drought, but agriculture has stagnated everywhere.[2]

Up to a quarter of the Ethiopian population is being kept alive by Western charity. During Fiscal Year 1985, U.S. government programs alone had approved delivery of 450,000 metric tons of food worth nearly $300 million for FY1985. Well over $100 million has been collected by private American organizations. All West European countries, Canada, Japan, and Australia have been sending both official and private help. At a conservative estimate, the value of emergency relief delivered to Ethiopia in 1985 was $1 billion.

In addition, the United States alone committed nearly $200 million worth of food to Sudan during FY1985. Even though rains were good during the summer of 1985 and refugees have been returning from Sudan to the Tigrean highlands, there is no end in sight to needs; 1986 requirements may be even greater. Nevertheless, Ethiopia's Marxist leaders have refused to change basic agricultural policies and persist in trying to reduce rebellious populations by force.

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[1]There are individual exceptions, of course. The most sophisticated and subtly pro-Soviet interpretation of the Ethiopian revolution is the book of that name by Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux. A cruder apologia for Mengistu's regime—almost a glorification of it, in fact—has recently appeared: Peter Schwab's *Ethiopia—Politics, Economics and Society*.

[2]Agriculture accounted for half of Ethiopia's GDP in 1983 and 90 percent of its exports. According to World Bank data, per capita agricultural output in 1981 was only 85 percent of the 1970 level. A census conducted by the Ethiopian government in 1984 (the accuracy of which is in some degree questionable because census-takers did not have access to the rebel-held areas of the country) concluded that the population was approximately 30 percent higher than previously estimated, i.e. over 42 million. If this figure is accepted, per capita agricultural production would be substantially lower than is generally reported. Ethiopia's per capita GNP may well be the lowest in the world.

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LONGSTANDING congressional restrictions on developmental aid have been relaxed, but it will be difficult to justify assistance for state farms and agricultural schemes that discriminate against private farmers. Ethiopia's economic problems go deeper than agriculture. There has been no industrial growth since the revolution. The country's resources are strained by internal rebellions and quarrels with neighbors. Marxist students used to berate Haile Selassie for spending disproportionate resources on his armed forces. They never totaled more than 45,000 men. Ethiopia today has the largest military establishment in Africa, almost 300,000 men carrying Soviet-supplied arms. The Soviets have provided nearly $4 billion in military aid since 1977, but all costs for operating this swollen military machine have had to be squeezed out of the country's own meager resources. Exports have fallen drastically and the country's foreign exchange reserves are close to exhausted. The worst of it is that all the weaponry has brought neither internal security nor external peace.

The war with Somalia has never really ended. Ethiopian-Sudanese relations have deteriorated steadily since 1976. This is peculiarly ironic because there is not a square mile of territory in dispute along the entire 1,300-mile border between the two countries. Their quarrels are entirely a function of foreign interference in internal rebellions and unwise policies for dealing with them.

While Mengistu and his small band of pro-Soviet supporters mouth communist dogma with a sophomoric banality that makes even Bulgarians blush, no one in Ethiopia shows serious evidence of believing in Marxism-Leninism as anything other than a formula for holding onto power—ruling in the name of the "broad masses" while denying them any say in the processes of government. Obsequiousness toward Moscow has produced no significant economic aid. For development assistance Ethiopia has remained dependent on European donors and international lending agencies. The World Bank's voluminous studies document the fact that, abstractly speaking, Ethiopia has better prospects for successful development and modernization than much of Africa. But how to get the country turned around, extricated from the vicious circle of internal unrest and quarrels with its neighbors and on an upward path of development? Can the Derg be persuaded to change policy? Can it change course and survive? Some Ethiopians hope that China's sharp turn toward economic rationality could serve as an example for Mengistu. Some believe the Soviet Union is secretly supporting the Eritrean and Tigrean Liberation Fronts—which profess Marxism as strongly as the Derg itself—in order to keep the country in ferment and thus exercise more leverage on it.

The dilemma of American emergency relief—which the Congress is likely to go right on approving in amounts even larger than the administration requests—is that it keeps millions of Ethiopians alive but contributes nothing toward improving their prospects. It may, in fact, be having the unintended effect of prolonging a failed regime's hold on power. The dilemma for Ethiopians is that they naturally look to America, not to Russia, as the model for a modern society. When they flee the Derg's rule, Ethiopians come most often to America. There is probably a larger concentration of Ethiopians settled in Washington, D.C. today than anywhere outside the borders of their own country, and more good Ethiopian restaurants in the U.S. capital than in Addis Ababa.

III

ETHIOPIANS are history-conscious. Their history has made them wary of all outsiders. When Anatoly Gromyko—head of the Soviet delegation to the Eighth International Ethiopian Studies Conference in Addis Ababa in November 1984—preached a ponderous lecture on Russian-Ethiopian relations, starting with the Middle Ages, he irritated many of the Ethiopians in attendance. He also confirmed their suspicion that Russian imperial ambitions in the Horn/Red Sea/Indian Ocean area have always been self-serving and Ethiopia's own needs incidental. Tsarist Russia exerted itself to gain a foothold in the African Horn during the second half of the 19th century. There were "scientific expeditions" and

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Orthodox Church delegations and even an attempt to set up a colony called New Moscow on the coast north of Djibouti in 1888. The tsar sent a military mission to aid Emperor Menelik II as he prepared to do battle with the Italians at Adowa in 1896 and maintained medical and administrative advisers in the country for several years afterward. But after Russia's defeat by Japan in 1905—as shocking to European opinion as Italy's defeat by the Ethiopians nine years earlier—tsarist officials were too hard-pressed at home to have time for further adventurism in Africa.

America's relationship with Ethiopia began more casually. Consul-General Skinner, assigned to Marseille, was ordered to go to Ethiopia in December 1903 to explore opportunities for expanded trade. U.S. merchants were already selling several million dollars' worth of cloth per year to Ethiopia. Formal diplomatic relations were established but amounted to little. They had lapsed completely by the beginning of World War I and were not re-established until 1927. Trade did expand. The Singer Sewing Machine Company opened a branch in Addis Ababa in 1909. The U.S. regularly purchased sizable quantities of Ethiopia's high-grade coffee.[3] By the end of the 1920s the most important American exports to Ethiopia were automobiles and spare parts for them. One of the first American blacks attracted to Ethiopia got a concession from Menelik II in 1899 and became a successful cotton planter. Other black Americans also found their way to the only black African state that had maintained its independence since ancient times, but the relationship was uneasy. Historically, Ethiopia was oriented toward the Middle East, and its dominant Semitic peoples did not regard themselves as Negroes. When Ethiopians began coming to the U.S. to visit and study they were surprised and angered by racial discrimination. American missionaries became active in Ethiopia after World War I and within a decade dominated the missionary community.

As Ras Tafari, the future Haile Selassie, consolidated his power in the 1920s, he was eager to draw on foreign help to modernize the country. A British traveler, F. N. Rey, wrote in 1927: "The Regent, impressed with the wealth and power of the States and feeling that he need be under no fear of territorial trouble from that far-off country . . . has always encouraged the visits of Americans and urged them to undertake operations in [Ethiopia]." Frequent requests for American advisers met with little response from the State Department, but one who was recruited, financial specialist A. E. Colson, became prominent. At the time of the Italian invasion, the London *Times* correspondent G. L. Steer characterized him as one of the leading personalities in the country: "Colson served the Ethiopians loyally, but frankly. That was why they liked and depended on him." The same could be said of another American, legal adviser John Spencer, who devoted much of his professional career to Ethiopia. He first served at the time of the Italian invasion, returned after World War II service, worked with the Ethiopian foreign ministry and until 1974 often advised Haile Selassie personally. (He has recently published a fascinating account of his experiences, *Ethiopia at Bay*.)

The *National Geographic* ran its first lavishly illustrated article on Ethiopia in June 1925 and several American travelers wrote books about the country in the decade that followed. But contact remained extremely limited. Russia was entirely absent from Ethiopia during this period—there were no diplomatic relations—but Russians themselves were not. A small group of refugees from the Bolshevik Revolution settled in Ethiopia and one, Colonel T. E. Konovaloff, served with the Ethiopian army during the Italian invasion.

Ethiopia entered popular American consciousness only with the invasion. The American public had gradually become aroused to the

[3]It continues to do so today, providing revolutionary Ethiopia with its largest single source of export income. Coffee production has stagnated in Ethiopia since marketing was nationalized but the U.S. regularly purchases approximately 30 percent of the amount available for export. Most of the remainder is sold to Europe. Ethiopia has had poor experiences trying to sell coffee to the USSR and East European countries.

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danger of dictators and aggressive powers: Japan in Manchuria, Hitler in Germany, Stalin's brutal collectivization. Mussolini appeared, to most Americans, to be a bully. Press accounts of fascist bombings, the use of mustard gas, and the drama of the Ethiopians' futile fight to defend their mountains generated a wave of sympathy. The crowning event was the appearance of the exiled but undefeated "little emperor" before the League of Nations. There was a good measure of detached self-righteousness in American attitudes. Europeans were condemned for insincere posturing in their efforts to forestall the Italian invasion, and the League of Nations, which the U.S. had never joined, for its impotence. The official U.S. policy was neutrality—no arms were sold either to Ethiopia or to Italy—and avoidance of entanglement in the flurry of European diplomatic activity that accompanied, but in no way hindered, Mussolini's great "civilizing mission."

Nevertheless, sympathy for Ethiopia, a sense of special concern for the country, and a perception of the country as unique in Africa, have persisted in the United States, and throughout much of the Western world, for fifty years. This intangible emotional factor is part of the explanation for the outpouring of aid to alleviate the present famine.

The USSR was much more involved than the U.S. in the diplomatic hustle and bustle provoked by the Italian invasion. Rhetorically Moscow condemned fascist aggression, but in practical terms Stalin was not eager to alienate Mussolini, whom he regarded as less dangerous to Soviet interests than Hitler. The Russian people, convulsed by collectivization, famine, and the beginnings of the Great Purges, cared little for the fate of Ethiopia. When the dust had settled, both the U.S. and the USSR were counted among the small group of countries who refused to recognize the Italian conquest.

IV

LIKE the Afghans today, Ethiopians were not easy to subjugate. The Italians cultivated regional leaders who had opposed Haile Selassie, but the majority of Ethiopians never accepted Italian rule. When the Italian viceroy, Marshall Graziani, was wounded in an assassination attempt in February 1937, Mussolini ordered the slaughter of thousands of young Ethiopians. Almost all who had higher education were eliminated. To break Orthodox Church opposition, the Italians attacked Debra Libanos, the country's leading monastery, and killed hundreds of monks. Resistance stiffened. Guerrilla bands—called Patriots—expanded. To improve their mobility the Italians built roads. These made it easier for British Commonwealth forces, collaborating with the Patriots, to liberate the country in 1940–41, after Italy entered World War II. South Africans played a major role in these operations, which also resulted in the conquest of Eritrea and Somalia. It was the first Allied victory in World War II. Haile Selassie returned to Addis Ababa on May 5, 1941, five years to the day since the Italians had marched in, six weeks before Hitler's attack on Russia, and seven months before the Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor brought the U.S. into the war.

It was World War II and its aftermath that brought about a U.S.-Ethiopian special relationship. The same was true of Iran. There is an interesting parallelism in several features of these two old countries' American involvement. As with Iran, which rapidly became the prime channel for lend-lease supplies to the USSR, the U.S. was initially interested in Ethiopia as a link in the communications and supply system supporting Allied military operations in the Middle East. The British retained a position of dominance in Ethiopia throughout the war, but American forces began using facilities in Eritrea in 1942. By the time a lengthy UN-sponsored effort to settle the status of Eritrea resulted in its federation with—and thus *de facto* return to—Ethiopia in 1952, the British military presence had dwindled to a symbolic level, while American communications facilities at Asmara and naval support installations at Massawa had become valuable links in the worldwide network of American strategic bases set up to contain Soviet expansionism.

For Haile Selassie, a close American tie not only had the negative benefits the *Times* corre-

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spondent had described in the 1920s, but also was now a credible basis for a more active foreign policy, because the U.S. had committed itself to a world role with the founding of the United Nations (of which Ethiopia was also a charter member). Gratitude to British forces for expelling the Italians had not prevented strains. Though the British had intervened to put down a rebellion against Addis Ababa in Tigre in 1943, some Britons favored detaching parts of Eritrea for incorporation into Sudan, and British delay in returning the Ogaden to Ethiopian administration caused resentment. There were no strains with the U.S. A treaty of friendship and cooperation and an agreement on a formal military assistance program were signed in 1953. The U.S. was given 25-year rights to facilities in Eritrea. By the time the military relationship was broken off by Mengistu in 1977, the U.S. had supplied nearly $300 million in arms aid to Ethiopia. Three Ethiopian battalions fought in Korea, and others helped maintain order in Zaire in the 1960s.

Nevertheless, American economic aid always exceeded military aid. Long before the U.S. government entered this field directly, TWA set up Ethiopian Airlines (EAL) in 1946. Managed and piloted entirely by Ethiopians since the late 1960s, EAL remains one of the safest, most efficient, and profitable carriers in the developing world. Always a state corporation, it could not be nationalized by the revolutionary regime, as most foreign investment was. Its leadership has successfully resisted political interference. Thus EAL, which put two Boeing 767s into operation in 1984, remains a monument to American private enterprise.

Official development aid was never lavish, which is one of the reasons it was well spent, and American aid personnel were relatively few in number. Haile Selassie had a clear concept of economic development, with the state building infrastructure while private enterprise and foreign investment were favored. From 1962 to 1967, the U.S. provided $275 million in economic assistance. During the Kennedy administration, Ethiopia was selected to receive a larger number of Peace Corps volunteers, assigned primarily to high school teaching, than any other country. Assistance from the Peace Corps totaled an additional $34 million.

The University College of Addis Ababa, set up by the Canadian Jesuits in 1950, was expanded into an American-style land-grant university in the 1960s. It benefited not only from official aid grants but from American foundation support. The emperor had begun to send Ethiopians to America for higher education in the 1940s. After the country's own university began to turn out graduates, they frequently came to the U.S. to do post-graduate work. Young Ethiopians who profited from all this educational effort at home and abroad found their way in large numbers into development projects, government ministries, and many kinds of private enterprise. More than a decade of revolutionary Marxism has not altered the positive orientation of most Ethiopians toward American education and American methods.

The U.S. was not alone in providing aid and encouraging Ethiopian development. Most European countries were active in Ethiopia. Haile Selassie forgave the Italians in 1941 and invited those who wished to do so to stay and help modernize the country. Italian reparations helped build roads and power stations. As international agencies developed a greater capacity to assist developing countries, the United States encouraged the World Bank and other multinational bodies, such as the European Economic Community, to play a greater role. Though Marxist students hounded most of the Peace Corps volunteers out of the country in 1970, no mass anti-Americanism or anti-Westernism developed in Ethiopia. In this, Ethiopia was very different from Iran. And though Haile Selassie, who had devoted much of his life to modernizing the country, began to be perceived as too tradition-bound, too paternalistic, too comfortable with officials who were less disposed to change than the young technocrats who worked for them (he kept the same prime minister for 18 years), he was never the object of widespread rancor and bitterness, as was the shah of Iran.

The Ethiopian Revolution of 1974 was neither anti-American, nor anti-foreign. Reli-

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gion played no role in it. It was essentially a revolution caused by rising expectations. Economic growth, which had averaged 4 to 6 percent per year in the decade before, had reached the point at which the urban population and significant elements among the rural population wanted modernization to go faster, and wanted to benefit more from it. Accustomed to competent imperial rule, and taking for granted a degree of internal security and rule of law unknown in earlier decades, Ethiopians welcomed what they thought would be a more open society and an accelerated pace of development. Socialism, as such, meant nothing to them. Why the motley group of military men who deposed the puzzled emperor on September 12, 1974, felt compelled to turn eastward for political inspiration remains in large part a mystery. What had the Russians done to gain such favor?

V

AT A TIME when it needed all its resources to repair the devastation of the war—and was stripping Eastern Europe and Manchuria of technology—the USSR mounted its first Third World aid effort: the building and staffing of a hospital in Addis Ababa, a revival of a tsarist project from the turn of the century. Begun in 1946, it opened in 1948. Here we see a clear perception of Ethiopia's strategic significance. A Soviet embassy had already been set up and young officers were sent to learn Amharic. But the Russians did not do well. Their bid for participation in a trusteeship in Eritrea failed. Haile Selassie kept them at arm's length, and after the treaty with the U.S., *Pravda* denounced him as "not the Lion of Judah but the Jackal of American Imperialism." Khrushchev's more adventuresome approach to world politics led to an invitation to Moscow in 1959. Here the emperor was given a military decoration, an academic degree, a helicopter, and a $100 million economic development credit. An oil refinery expropriated from Romania in 1944 and taken to Baku was now obsolescent. It was donated to Ethiopia and set up in Assab, on the Eritrean coast. Most of the rest of the $100 million credit was still undrawn when the revolution occurred 15 years later, but the Soviet embassy in Addis Ababa had grown steadily and the Russians had not been idle.

The Russian program for gaining influence in Ethiopia, which gained momentum in the late 1960s, was three-pronged. Eritrea, where rebellion was supported through Syria, Cuba, Iraq, and Libya—and for a period in competition with Beijing—was one area of concentration. Somalia was another. The Soviets began military aid to this strongly irredentist country soon after it gained independence. After a military coup brought a "socialist" regime to power there in 1969, they embraced the country more enthusiastically. By 1974, when they concluded a friendship treaty with President Siad Barré, Somalia, with not much more than a tenth of Ethiopia's population, already had an army that was half the size of Ethiopia's and generously equipped with Soviet weaponry. Somalia had stoked a rebellion in southeast Ethiopia in the late 1960s. The third prong of the Soviet destabilization effort was support for Marxist students and intellectuals in Ethiopia and abroad. All this was done behind a façade of proper diplomatic relations. Even when students began hijacking EAL flights and terrorists assassinated officials in Eritrea, no one accused the Russians of having a hand in the business.

The continuing warmth of the U.S.-Ethiopian special relationship was underscored in July 1971 when Vice President Agnew came to tell Haile Selassie of the Nixon administration's shift in China policy. By the time the agile Ethiopian monarch celebrated his 80th birthday the next summer, he had been to Beijing with an entourage of nobles, met with Mao and Chou, and concluded an agreement for recognition and a Chinese aid program; in return, the Chinese committed themselves to cease all support for rebellion in Eritrea. Thus assured, Haile Selassie proceeded to work out an arrangement with Sudanese President Gaafar Nimeiry whereby Ethiopia would cut off all support for, and facilitate conciliation with, southern Sudanese rebels; for its part, Sudan would move to cut the supply lines to rebellious Eritreans. This was statesmanship of a high

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order, the like of which the Horn has not seen since. All these developments were no doubt distasteful to the Soviets, who continued support for the Eritreans through various surrogates, including Qaddafi and the South Yemenis, kept arms flowing to Somalia, and subsidized Ethiopian student agitators in Europe and the United States.

The biggest gain for the Russians was the withdrawal syndrome that set in among Americans. Technological advances had made U.S. communications facilities at Asmara redundant by 1971, and a decision was taken to phase down operations. Ethiopia was not officially informed. One school of thought in the State Department held that Ethiopia would no longer be of importance to the U.S. once the Eritrean sites were closed. The Defense Department did not seem to be doing any thinking about Ethiopia at all.

VI

THE FERMENT that led to the revolution of 1974 developed in the wake of the Yom Kippur War of October 1973. Haile Selassie broke off a long and warm relationship with Israel. Ethiopia was hard hit by the oil price hike. With radical Arabs increasing support for Eritrean Marxists, Ethiopian soldiers were frustrated by the long stalemate in Eritrea. As the paternalistic imperial system began to unravel, ministerial shifts always came too late to satisfy popular demands for change. Traditional leaders were indecisive. Young technocrats did not know how to lead. A mysterious military committee—the Derg—gradually coalesced, skillfully undermined what remained of imperial authority, and pushed Haile Selassie off his throne on the Ethiopian New Year.

For Ethiopians who hoped the U.S. might help them through the transition, things could not have fallen apart at a worse time. Washington was paralyzed by Watergate and demoralized by withdrawal from Vietnam. There had been no U.S. ambassador in Addis Ababa for months and the embassy was in weak hands. It can be said with certainty that there was no U.S. interference in the Ethiopian revolutionary process.

What is far less certain is that there was no Soviet involvement. The fact that no direct evidence has come to light can hardly be taken as proof of its absence. Key features of the revolution remain to be explained: Why the sudden turn to blood and extremism and the elimination of a respected political moderate such as General Aman Andom? Why the rapid adoption of Moscow-style socialism? Why did Derg members avoid all contact with Americans and Europeans? Why the sudden flow of Soviet propaganda? Why did the Derg operate from the beginning as a clandestine conspiracy? (Members' names and functions were never published.) Ethiopia had a constitutional framework and a functioning parliament that could have served as the basis for a more open political system. It was all jettisoned. There was no consultation with "the broad masses," no national congress, not even a promise of elections.

Sweeping nationalizations and "reforms" followed one another during 1975 and 1976. The clear aim, soon openly acknowledged, was to turn the country into a "People's Democracy." The result was near chaos. Offensives in Eritrea failed. Rebellions erupted everywhere. Through it all the U.S. continued its economic aid programs and increased the flow of military assistance. F5-E fighter-bombers, promised to Haile Selassie in 1973, were delivered in 1976 after a personal review by Henry Kissinger. The charge that the U.S. was hostile to the revolution and tried to cripple Ethiopia's capacity to defend itself cannot be honestly sustained. It can be argued, instead, that the Ford administration tolerated Derg ill will and brutality well beyond the point at which pressure and interference would have been justified.

Meanwhile, the Russians played hard to get. They invested almost nothing in Ethiopia through 1976, and though they encouraged radical Derg rhetoric, they increased military aid to Somalia sharply. They also kept supplies flowing to the Eritrean rebels, where Marxists now had the upper hand. Mengistu Haile Mariam had come through periodic Derg shootouts as strongman, but the Russians were ap-

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parently unsure of him; they would have preferred a civilian-led Marxist party. So they encouraged political competition among Ethiopian leftists. And weak as the U.S. position seemed to be, Moscow could not be sure Washington might not react precipitately to an open challenge in Ethiopia. So they dawdled on military aid until after the 1976 U.S. elections. By this time, the Ford administration had become embroiled in criticism of human rights violations in Ethiopia—quite justified, for violence in all forms had reached an appalling level—and the Carter administration had neither the inclination nor the opportunity to modify the U.S. stance. So Mengistu had a convenient pretext for breaking off the U.S. military relationship in the spring of 1977. As far as Soviet policy is concerned, the key is provided by developments in Angola in 1975–76. When the Carter victory in 1976 ensured that the Clark amendment would continue to form the basis for U.S. policy in Africa, Moscow concluded it could risk a full military relationship with the Derg. The price was expulsion of the U.S. military from the country.

If the Russians had cleverly planned to lock the U.S. into a no-win predicament in the Horn in 1977, they could not have done better. But the "Soviet Master Plan" thesis cannot stand the test of serious analysis. Until late in the game, they hoped to win the whole Horn by capitalizing on their $600 million investment in Somalia. Siad Barré had his own timetable. He could not resist trying to deal not simply the Derg, but Ethiopia itself, a death blow. It was a costly miscalculation, for he aroused Ethiopian national feeling that, along with the U.S. F5-Es, enabled the hard-pressed Ethiopian military to fight the invading Somalis to a standstill by the end of the summer and to gain time for the Soviets to bring Cubans to Ethiopia's rescue in November. By the time the shooting stopped in the spring of 1978, the Soviets had expended more than $2 billion, lost Somalia, and embraced Mengistu as a client. They faced a dilemma in Eritrea (still unsolved) and, in effect, had taken on the whole problem of economic and political development in Ethiopia. They had aroused other states in the region, notably Sudan and Kenya, to seek closer links to the U.S. Last but not least, they had for all practical purposes made it impossible for a once eager Carter administration to keep up the illusion of detente.

VII

POLITICS is not a zero-sum game in the Horn of Africa any more than in any other complex region of the world. Those who bemoan U.S. "failure" to support Somalia in 1977–78 argue as if they thought it were. So do those who advocate backing the Eritreans, Tigreans, and other regional separatist movements in Ethiopia today. Supporting the fragmentation of an old historical state such as Ethiopia makes no more sense than trying to break up Iran, just because we find ourselves at odds with its present government. Why imitate the approach the Soviets take only when they are in a destabilizing and destructive phase—and then abandon when they have the opportunity to gain leverage over a country as a whole? An open society cannot be as crass in its foreign policy as a totalitarian one, nor as irresponsible. Its electorate will call its government to account. There has been a wise continuity in policy toward the Horn from the Carter era into the Reagan administration. Neither has had much leverage, but opportunities for leverage are now improving.

The systemic crisis in Ethiopia—of which the famine is merely the most dramatic symptom—underscores the historical truth that a quarter century of Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa has brought nothing but hardship and disaster for the people who live there. The Soviets have exacerbated all the region's political problems and inhibited economic development. The whole area bristles with arms—mostly Soviet-supplied. Everyone who lives in these countries, including the rulers, enjoys less physical security than he did 25 years ago. At least half a million people in the Horn have died as a result of violence during the past two decades; at least another half million have starved. Three or four million have been up-

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rooted and live as refugees. The Russians lack both the means and the will to remedy or reverse this situation. They provided the bombs Nimeiry needed to attack Sudanese southerners in 1969–70. They provided Somali guerrillas the arms and ammunition with which they disrupted life in southeast Ethiopia in the 1960s. Soviet proxies and surrogates fanned the Eritrean rebellion in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and have continued to encourage violence in Eritrea—both among the Eritrean rebels and through the Derg—into the 1980s. The Soviets provided the Somalis with the arms and major military equipment that enabled them to invade Ethiopia in 1977.

No U.S.-supplied arms enabled any Horn country to commit aggression against a neighbor. Since the commotion of the mid-1970s, the U.S. has supplied the major portion of the relief assistance that has sustained the hordes of refugees that Soviet policies have created. In contrast to the blood that blots the Soviet record in the Horn, the American people and the U.S. government have nothing to apologize for as a result of our involvement in the area during the past four decades. We have nothing to lose now by enunciating a policy for the area that reflects the best in both our experience and our tradition. More arms are what the Horn needs least. Our recent experience of military support for Nimeiry's regime in the Sudan serves to underscore this point. Taking sides in the chronic quarrels of the region can only do all its peoples more harm. Military costs already represent an intolerable budgetary burden for every country in the Horn. There is no moral justification for helping any of the weak, insecure, and undemocratic governments in the area devise more efficient ways of oppressing their people in the name of Marxism, Islamic fundamentalism, or any other brand of tyranny.

THERE IS every justification for pressuring, persuading, cajoling—and occasionally, when circumstances permit, forcing—these governments to stop regimenting and exploiting their farmers and instead to provide them the minimal prerequisites they need to produce and sell. Free agriculture, with genuine state support of private initiative, can generate export surpluses in the Horn. We should badger all these governments into more productive investment of the development aid Western donor nations and international lending agencies are still providing. We should propose regional development institutions and programs, and promise support for them. Several good proposals have been on the books for years and some have received serious study: irrigation and power in the Webe Shebelle valley, the Blue Nile valley, and along other rivers that flow from Ethiopia into Sudan. Some modest regional projects—livestock development, locust control—stand even now as examples of cooperation. We should encourage as many of our allies as possible to join in these efforts. We have nothing to lose by painting a vision that corresponds to our own ideals and is at the same time realistically anchored in the formidable technical and scientific progress the Free World has already achieved.

The peoples of the Horn know that Marxism-Leninism, "scientific socialism" and all kindred dogmas are hollow. A few intellectuals still pretend otherwise—but the real attraction of Marxism-Leninism to them is power, not progress. It is the productivity of Free World agriculture that now keeps several million people in the Horn from dying of starvation. Their only hope to become self-sufficient again lies not with Marxism, but with the West. The present generation of Ethiopians is bound to loosen itself from the still incomplete and now faltering grip of the Derg and begin moving forward. Ethiopia, because of its geography, its historical tradition, and the size, talents, and sense of purpose of its population, remains the true hub of the Horn. The American response to the Ethiopian famine carries with it a degree of obligation to work systematically and with determination for change there. A policy combining principle with prudence should be based on sustained pressure for change in overall economic policy, especially with respect to agriculture; a commitment to resume development aid on a significant scale and to encourage American private investment, as soon as favorable conditions for it are created; and a willingness to

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re-establish a military relationship based not on increased arms supply but a commitment to balanced regional security arrangements.

We should also agree on certain basic political principles: we recognize and support maintenance of Ethiopia's territorial integrity; encourage measures that will give disaffected regions of the country a say in their local affairs; stand ready to facilitate mediation of quarrels with neighboring countries such as Somalia and Sudan; and we will facilitate regional economic arrangements and support them both directly and through international lending agencies.

The strategic value of countries and regions can be judged only in relative terms. Those who maintained in the early 1970s that Ethiopia—and indeed the whole Horn—would be valueless to the U.S. once the need for communications facilities was past took much too benign a view of the world. They were blind to the destabilizing influence a hostile, pro-Soviet Ethiopia would have in the Horn; to the dangers it would represent to vital sea and air routes from the Indian Ocean through the Red Sea to the Mediterranean; to the disasters poor leadership would bring on the country itself. The frustrations we have experienced since 1977 trying to regain a position of strength in the region teach an important lesson: the only way to restore balance and sanity to the region is to help the people of Ethiopia out of their present impasse.

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Mutiny & the Warsaw Pact

Stephen Peter Rosen

THE UNITED STATES seeks to protect its interests while avoiding war with the Soviet Union. In the case of Europe, official U.S. policy is to deter Soviet attack if need be by threatening a nuclear war if the forces of the Warsaw Pact attack the members of NATO. Battlefield, theater, and strategic nuclear strikes against Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union have been elements of NATO doctrine for decades, and remain so today, even though figures from Charles de Gaulle to Henry Kissinger have called into question the credibility of such threats in a world in which the United States no longer has strategic superiority.

But deterrence need not be based only on threats of nuclear retaliation. It should rest on the ability to threaten the vital possessions of the enemy power in a way that does not bring catastrophic damage down on the heads of the very countries that are trying to protect themselves. Aside from the maintenance of Communist Party rule in the Soviet Union, maintenance of control over Eastern Europe is probably the Soviets' highest defensive objective. The desirability of deterring war without recourse to nuclear weapons inevitably draws our attention to Eastern Europe.

Can NATO induce the peoples of Eastern Europe to attack the forces of the Warsaw Pact in time of war? If an East European resistance movement could be created, what costs would it entail, and of how much help might it be to NATO? What are the obstacles to be faced before such a resistance movement can be seriously considered?

The role that the East European peoples might play in wartime has been by and large neglected by Western military analysts, despite the blatant unpopularity of Soviet rule among these peoples. We need only mention the years 1953, 1956, 1968, 1970, and 1981 to remind ourselves of just how unpopular that rule is and has been. This curious silence can also be explained, in large part, by reference to a particular year. Memories of how the rhetoric of "roll-back" and "liberation" may have contributed to the 1956 Hungarian uprising, and memories of how little the West was actually prepared to do to help the Hungarian freedom fighters when the Soviet tanks arrived in Budapest, have had a chilling effect on those who were aware of the military potential of East European resistance and who would otherwise be disposed to encourage it in wartime. For that reason, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that no one advocates a variant of roll-back to be undertaken in peacetime. As we approach this issue, the analogy in our minds should be France in 1944—when the French resistance aided the Allied invasion force—and not Europe in 1848 or Hungary in 1956, when unarmed populations were mowed down by regular troops.

The second reason this issue has remained invisible is the widespread desire not to threaten the Soviet empire with destruction, thus pro-

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voking a Soviet retaliation that might lead to a third world war. No one would advocate a policy that began by liberating the peoples of Eastern Europe but ended by destroying much of the world. We will not discuss peacetime measures to end Soviet rule (which might provoke a Soviet attack), but what we might do if the Soviet Union had *already* begun a war. In a wartime environment—in which we are killing Soviet soldiers, bombing Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and contemplating the use of hundreds of megatons of nuclear explosives—efforts to encourage an East European resistance movement should not be considered an unthinkable escalation, or a destabilizing threat to deterrence. The measures that we will consider would be put into effect only if deterrence fails, but the *prospect* that the West might employ these measures in wartime would reinforce the reluctance of Soviet decision makers to launch an attack at all, thus enhancing deterrence.

If it is important to eschew roll-back, it is equally important to avoid two other forms of error. The first is the idea that resistance operations in Eastern Europe can win a war. By this reasoning, the Soviet empire is so fragile that it would collapse of its internal weaknesses under the stress of war. This is an old error with impeccable historical precedents. In 1940, as Great Britain faced a Nazi-controlled Europe alone, it was forced to consider far-fetched measures for winning the war. It was at this time that Winston Churchill turned to Hugh Dalton to set up the Special Operations Executive with the words, "And now set Europe ablaze." At first, Dalton thought in terms of promoting "permanent revolution" in Europe, which would expel the hated Nazi occupiers. Churchill himself wrote as late as August 1941, "It need not be assumed that great numbers of men [in the invasion force] are required. If the incursion of the armored formations is successful, the uprisings of the local population, for whom weapons must be brought, will supply the corpus of the liberating offensive." But Churchill and Dalton were forced to revise their expectations. The rate at which Germany killed isolated French guerrilla fighters in their first years of operation led the British to abandon the "detonator" concept of resistance. The experience of the Warsaw uprising of 1944, and the clashes between French guerrillas and Nazi armored forces, suggest that, in direct combat, it is unwise to expect lightly armed troops to defeat heavily armed troops with large reserves of material. But resistance fighters *were* useful complements to friendly heavy troops fighting the enemy. Any resistance effort should be considered as one part of an effort of combined arms.

An opposite error assumes that Soviet totalitarian social control, let alone Soviet military discipline, is so tight that no effective resistance can be organized. As evidence for this view, there is Stalin's infamous order number 277, which created "blocking" units that stood a few hundred yards behind the Soviet line and shot any troops that withdrew without order from the Soviet high command. Analagous units exist in the KGB border guards today.

There is no question that the Soviet Union has always been extremely sensitive to the problem of troop reliability, and has gone to great lengths to secure it. Nonetheless, neither Soviet nor Nazi controls were adequate to prevent serious anti-regime activity *in wartime*, as we shall see. There is also no question that NATO would have different problems in creating an anti-Soviet resistance movement from those faced by the British in World War II. The biggest problem would be time. In July 1940, Great Britain had not one active agent in Nazi-occupied Europe, from the Channel to the Balkans. But the British had four years to prepare a resistance network to support the Normandy landings. NATO would have nothing like that much time. Still, wartime conditions would not be such that the organization and operation of a rapidly prepared anti-Soviet resistance need be a suicidal or a futile undertaking. In addition, we may be confronted by the same phenomenon that the British faced in France: resistance fighters who are far more eager to act than their foreign sponsors. It is therefore important to consider how advantage could be taken of these men and women.

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THERE ARE several categories of people with whom we might work in wartime. Broadly speaking, it is theoretically possible to work with anti-regime dissidents, with the governments of Eastern Europe, or with the military units of Eastern Europe. Anti-Soviet dissidents would be attractive allies in that they are well motivated and have some clandestine organization. The disadvantages of working with them are just as obvious. At the start of any war they would be totally unarmed. It is worth noting that in the four years from the fall of France in 1940 to just before the Normandy landings, Churchill's Special Operations Executive was able to air-drop only 4,000 tons of supplies—of all kinds—into occupied France. The total weight of the explosives used in sabotage attacks in France came to 3,000 *pounds*. In short, not much in the way of weapons got in. NATO would have even less time and more formidable air defenses with which to contend. Arming dissidents from scratch would be difficult. In addition, while the visibility of the dissidents and the existence of a dissident organization in peacetime would help NATO organize a resistance, it would also help the Soviets round up the dissidents at the outbreak of war.

At the other end of the spectrum are the East European governments themselves. The allies of totalitarian powers have switched sides or opted out of wars in the past. The coup d'etat against Mussolini in July 1943 took Italian troops out of Germany's war effort. The government of Hungary declared its neutrality late in 1944. Unfortunately, governments appear to change sides only to move to what is clearly the winning side. NATO may wish to have assistance somewhat earlier in the war.

This leaves the armed forces of Eastern Europe and the East European units of the Soviet Union. If we can induce groups of soldiers to run away from battle, or, better, induce units to resist, passively or actively, the Soviet war effort, we will gain armed men who may be in key military positions. From these positions, they may be able to disrupt military operations, arm the local population, and perhaps even seize their national governments or induce them to declare neutrality. The military forces of the Warsaw Pact appear to be the key to building a resistance movement.

We are now talking about soldiers turning their coats, shooting their officers, or fighting for the other side. In short, we are talking about mutiny. The scholarly literature on mutinies is thin, but there are some suggestive writings.[1] In particular, when thinking about the problems an imperial power has controlling a multinational army, it is useful to refer to the experiences of another power that had to handle a mutinous multi-national army, the Indian Army of the British Empire. An excellent book on this subject is Philip Mason's *A Matter of Honour*. After reviewing the experiences of the British in India before and after the Great Mutiny of 1857, he articulates what he believes to be three necessary conditions for a mutiny.

The first is the absence in a military unit of familiar, trusted officers, and their replacement with new, untested, and untrusted officers. In India, army reorganizations sometimes resulted in block changes in the officers of a unit. This often produced some troop unrest until new, personal command relations were established. This is a manageable problem if the two other conditions for mutiny are not present as well.

The second condition is a concrete and immediate grievance within the unit, directly affecting the men: bad pay or no pay, incompetent leadership that causes hardship, or the infamous cartridges greased with unclean fat that were the trigger for the Great Mutiny. The immediate grievance is necessary to mobilize men who are used to obedience and are normally apolitical or only vaguely hostile to their rulers. Again, this is a manageable problem as long as officers the men trust are present to assure them that their grievances will be settled justly.

The final condition is the existence of social unrest outside the unit—unrest that can, however, permeate the unit. Units in the field, isolated from populations with which they might be in sympathy, seldom mutiny; this is true for the simple reason that they are depen-

[1]The only work I have discovered that discusses the general phenomenon of mutinies is by Elihu Rose, "The Anatomy of Mutinies," *Armed Forces and Society* 8:4.

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dent on military supplies to live, and there is nowhere to escape to once they *have* mutinied. Troop commanders trying to bring unruly units to heel often take them out into the boondocks, where they must depend on the military hierarchy for survival. If the troops are in contact with a politically active civilian population, on the other hand, their own military disobedience seems less illegitimate, and there is some place to flee to escape military retribution.

Mason does not mention a fourth obvious condition, probably because in the context of the Indian Army it went without saying. Within military units there must be cohesive units—ethnic, religious, or social—that are independent of the military hierarchy and that will support an individual soldier who decides to act. Again, troop commanders and prison guards around the world are aware of this, and try to make sure that social activity in their jurisdiction is channeled to prevent the emergence of any competing social command structures. Without such a social structure, any individual resistance is easily crushed. In the Indian Army, ethnically cohesive units were the rule because of recruiting practices and because feeding ethnically and religiously mixed units would have been difficult. But one result was a well-organized alternative social structure, and great potential for trouble. Cohesive groups can appear in military units for other reasons. Field Marshall Slim, while a junior officer in World War I, was faced with a mutiny in his unit. Upon investigation it turned out that there was a pay grievance with men who until recently had been coal miners and iron workers. They were union men, and knew what to do when faced with a grievance: organize a strike committee and down tools.

HOW WELL does this description of the causes of mutiny fit with what we know of mutinous European armies? There is not as much information as one might want, but there is some. The two main sources of historical information are the mutinies in the French Army in 1917 and the actions of the non-Russian soldiers in the Soviet Army in World War II.

In the spring of 1917, the new French Army commander launched a series of attacks that would, he claimed, win the war. In fact, they were repulsed, with enormous casualties borne by the French. In the aftermath, 110 French units from 54 divisions mutinied. The three conditions noted by Mason appear to have been present. The regular officers were in many cases absent because they had been killed in the offensive. There was conspicuous military incompetence leading to hardship for the men: the French Army had advanced four miles in a month and had taken 187,000 casualties. More specifically, one historian of the mutiny wrote: "The mutinies were not against the war. . . . They were a passionate protest against stupidity, incompetence, and indifference, against bad food, sour wine, miserable pay, inadequate leave, [and] dreadful discomfort." When Petain took over, one major measure he adopted to guard against future mutinies was simply a liberal leave policy. Finally, contact with a supportive, anti-regime civilian population was as easy as a trip to Paris or a letter to the front. Anti-war literature was detected in combat units at the end of 1916. It increased in 1917. The French government has not yet released information that would enable us to understand the social composition of those units.

Detailed information about the mutinies among the non-Russian soldiers fighting in the Soviet Army in World War II is, not surprisingly, also unavailable. A former Soviet Army general, Piotr Grigerenko, reported that in late 1941 the Soviet leadership issued a secret order acknowledging that most Soviet nationalities had proved unreliable in combat; he warned against their employment in large concentrations. The Soviet leaders perhaps had in mind the spontaneous uprising that is reported to have taken place in Soviet Lithuania on June 23, 1941, the second day of the war; it involved 100,000 Lithuanians, who drove out the Red Army after inflicting some 5,000 casualties. A similar uprising is reported to have taken place in Latvia in July 1941. And in 1942, one of the major reasons for the rapid advance of the Nazi armies through the Ukraine and Volga regions is reportedly that non-Russian Soviet soldiers ran away from the battlefield. The

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former Soviet soldiers and subjects who later fought alongside the Nazis in the war do not appear to have mutinied from their Soviet units *en masse*. Rather, they joined Nazi-sponsored paramilitary units after they had been taken prisoner or after the Nazi military government recruited them from the occupied zones. The Vlasov men, for example, were drawn from the Nazi POW camps, and the *Ostlegion* units were recruited from the southern Soviet Union—where the occupation policies were determined by the army, not the Nazi Party, and were less atrocious than in other Nazi-occupied territory. There are only isolated reports of Cossacks, and perhaps a Polish unit, defecting as *units* to the Nazis.

Although the circumstances in which mutinies or defections took place in the Soviet Army in World War II cannot be determined exactly, it is clear that hundreds of thousands of Soviet men of military age went over to the Nazis during the war, despite the monstrous character of the Nazi regime. One estimate is that there were between 600,000 and 1.4 million Soviet subjects acting as support troops for the Nazis on the Eastern front, and about 600,000 Soviet subjects in police and anti-guerrilla units, for a total of two million men. In addition, in 1944 there were three divisions of Baltic origin fighting against the Soviet Union, and approximately 250,000 Soviet Moslem soldiers fighting the Soviets in the Nazi *Ostlegions*.

The decisive question is whether the *current* Warsaw Pact armies contain the seeds of mutiny. Has the Soviet Union learned the lessons of World War II and acted to preclude the possibility of troop unreliability? The Soviet military has indeed adopted a policy of dispersal of non-Russian ethnic groups throughout the military in peacetime. This is done in two ways. First, unreliable ethnic groups tend to be excluded from combat units and other sensitive positions, and are instead dumped into military construction units to perform manual labor. This reduces the damage that their unreliability might cause, and also relieves the Soviet military of the need to undertake the remedial education of these by and large less educated troops that would enable them to perform sophisticated tasks. This practice may explain the fact that many Asian-looking troops were observed by Western reporters in Afghanistan shortly after the 1979 invasion. Reporters in urban areas are more likely to see construction troops than combat troops.

Second, the Soviet military disperses non-Russian ethnic groups throughout the military. Very briefly, this is accomplished by giving personnel "buyers" from a given administrative unit a quota of new recruits to be taken from each of the geographically dispersed military commissariats that register local draft-age men. By this means, it is ensured that Estonian and Armenian recruits, for example, will be dispersed among Russian troops. In practice, however, this system results in micro-concentrations of ethnic groups in military units, since the buyer can go to Estonia and fill that quota with men from one city or even one neighborhood. Even these minor concentrations of non-Russian ethnic groups cause problems.

But this is the peacetime army. The Soviet wartime army will face increased problems for one basic reason: mobilization. Most of the Soviet divisions that are not already stationed in Eastern Europe have less than a full complement of personnel; upon mobilization, they will draw between 25 and 75 percent of their troops from the reservists in their area. The need to draw on these men rapidly dictates a regionally based mobilization structure. In the absence of a total restructuring of the Soviet wartime manpower system, after mobilization there will be many divisions with large non-Russian components. The names of the three westernmost military districts in the Soviet Union suggest their ethnic composition: Baltic, Byelorussian, and Carpathian. The number of divisions that will need to mobilize reserves before going to war is quite large. Twenty-eight of the 63 Soviet division-equivalents in the three western military districts, or 44 percent, are what the U.S. calls Category II or III divisions—up to 75 percent understrength in peacetime.

WILL THE RESERVISTS mobilized for duty in these divisions cause the Soviet leadership any problems? Much will depend on the presence of the other

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conditions for mutiny. But from what we can observe in peacetime, it is safe to say that despite forty years of Soviet rule, Baltic nationalism is far from dead. In Lithuania and the western Ukraine, Catholicism is linked with anti-Soviet nationalism and becomes visible from time to time. In Lithuania, there are reports of clandestine seminaries and nunneries and a *samizdat* press. When the Soviet government confiscated a Catholic church in 1979, 150,000 Lithuanians (out of a total population of three million) signed a petition in protest. In 1981, 59 of 60 official Catholic Church representatives in Lithuania, and a majority of priests, signed a declaration that they would defy Soviet regulations harmful to the Church. A clandestine Catholic Church is active in the western Ukraine. In 1982, the first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party wrote in an article in *Kommunist* that the 1981 events in Poland triggered unrest in Estonia that required all of the efforts of the Party to control.

In the other communist countries of Eastern Europe, the evidence of anti-Soviet sentiment is so abundant that it does not need to be reviewed. What is of some interest is the number of divisions in these countries that will be mobilized in wartime. In Poland and Czechoslovakia, eleven of the 25 divisions are Category II or III, and will be fleshed out in wartime with men whose contact with civilian life will be fresh in their minds and who will bring with them the loyalties and social contacts of civilian life. These are men who may be more likely to mutiny. It is interesting to note that in East Germany, the country that harbors the strongest anti-Soviet national tradition—and probably looms largest in Soviet minds as an untrustworthy ally—there are no Category II or III divisions. The Soviets appear to have guarded against German troop unreliability by *not* planning to go to war with German citizen-soldiers. The men there have been in their units for some time—separated from civilian life—and have been disciplined into good soldiers.

An additional source of ethnic trouble may arise in the Czechoslovak Army. Reliable information is not available, but the new party chief, the new head of the ministry of defense, and all three heads of the central committee's military department were Slovak in 1980. Units with Slovak senior officers and junior Czech officers and Czech men may be divided along ethnic lines and may disobey orders in wartime.

What of the other conditions for mutiny? Will there be new, untrusted officers leading the men? Will there be concrete military grievances? That will depend on how well NATO's regular forces fight. As I emphasized at the outset, an East European resistance can only function as part of a combined arms team. If NATO fights well, there will be new, untrusted officers simply because we will have killed many of the regular officers in combat. The soldiers will have a large, concrete military grievance if we can stop the Warsaw Pact offensive and inflict heavy casualties and hardship on the troops. There is no escaping the fact that Warsaw Pact soldiers who are deep in NATO territory and part of an offensive that appears to be doing reasonably well will have little incentive to mutiny. The reliability of the non-Russian Warsaw Pact soldiers is a *latent* problem, one that can only be brought out by Western military success.

Whether the Warsaw Pact soldiers are in contact with supportive civilians will depend on who and where those soldiers are. East German soldiers in West Germany might prove very receptive to NATO appeals. The other East European soldiers would pose a more difficult problem. The third condition for mutiny would prevail at least in part if NATO had people with the necessary language skills and knowledge of East European culture to make appropriate appeals to the soldiers. NATO would have to make clear to them that defectors would not be forced to return home after the fighting stopped, as has previously occurred in POW exchanges. Corridors from east to west, through which unarmed men could pass on foot without being shot, would have to be established and their existence made known to the Pact troops. A decisive event would be the movement of NATO forces into the territory of the Warsaw Pact. At that point, soldiers fighting in their own countries could defect in place, disappearing into the population to fight as guerrillas.

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The northern Italian soldiers who left their units with their weapons in 1943, after the Allied landings in Italy, formed the core of the anti-Nazi Italian resistance; East European soldiers might play a similar role. Most powerfully, NATO could pledge that any Warsaw Pact territory liberated in a war would not be returned to communist control, and provisional non-communist governments might be established.

At this point, some may argue that if NATO could stop the Soviet offensive and even move into Eastern Europe, it would not *need* the East European resistance effort. But this is an extremely short-sighted view. We can get a better perspective on this issue by looking at the resistance effort as an alternative way of stopping or weakening the Warsaw Pact's so called "second echelon." Right now, NATO is developing and evaluating enormously expensive new weapons technologies to deal with the forces the Soviets could mobilize and bring to the front if their forward-deployed divisions cannot win the war. Deep strikes to interdict these second echelon forces are now envisioned. Elaborate target acquisition, target designation, navigation, and weapons delivery systems to reach deep into Eastern Europe will cost tens of billions of dollars, if they can be made to work. But they will be of no value at all if the Soviet *first* strategic echelon succeeds. No one argues that these systems would be valueless because other forces will have to fight and beat the first echelon. The East European resistance would put at risk the same class of targets in Eastern Europe: the follow-on divisions and the areas through which they would move. The direct cost in dollars would be nowhere near as large.

WHAT HELP can we reasonably expect the East European resistance to provide to NATO's regular forces? Cases from World War II offer some suggestions. On the day after the Normandy landing, the 2nd SS Panzer Division, *Das Reich*, was ordered to proceed from Toulouse to the beachhead area. The French resistance organization effected over 800 cuts in the railway lines on which the division would have to move. Sniper attacks killed officers who mounted a road convoy to bypass the rail cuts. The division did not arrive until D+17, taking over two weeks on a journey that normally took three days. It arrived piecemeal, worn out, and with its fighting power diminished. A different Nazi armored division was shifted from the Eastern front to France to respond to the invasion. It took the division eight days to reach Strasbourg from Russia. It then required 23 days to reach Caen through areas in which the resistance was active.

Some caution is in order. The Allied air forces were also attacking the transportation networks utilized by the Nazis. The British and U.S. strategic bombing forces were diverted to missions in France to isolate the Normandy area from Nazi counterattack. Fighter bombers were used with great success to attack bridges and trains. The Nazis blundered by ordering their armored divisions to fight the resistance along the way, instead of proceeding directly to the front. Still, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces estimated after the campaign that the total 3,000 cuts in the rail line slowed Nazi reinforcement and resupply efforts an average of 48 to 72 hours. Maitland Wilson, the commander of the Allied landings in the south of France, wrote after the war that the French resistance reduced the fighting efficiency of the Wehrmacht forces in his area by 40 percent. Against this, we must weigh the claims of the Nazi commanders on the eastern front, who faced an extremely well organized, Soviet-led resistance movement to their rear. The chief of transportation, Army Group Center, testified after the war that the Soviet partisans cut the 7,000 miles of rail line in his area in over 8,000 places. Nonetheless, the Nazi anti-partisan officers wrote after the war that in not one case did partisan activities have "any important influence on the operational situation of the German front."[2]

The direct costs resistance movements inflict are important, but perhaps even more

[2]N. Galay, "The Partisan Forces," in B.H. Liddell Hart, editor, *The Red Army* (New York: 1956). Galay was the commander of a Nazi anti-partisan battalion in the Vlasov Army on the eastern front.

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important are the indirect costs they impose. The forces the enemy must divert to handle the resistance are one instance. Eight of the 60 Nazi divisions ultimately fighting in France had to be diverted to rear area security. To be sure, they were the poorest divisions, but they still represented a diversion of over 10 percent of Nazi forces. The Nazis similarly diverted about 10 percent of their forces on the eastern front. More subtle costs were also imposed. The Nazis could repair the rail cuts made by the partisans, but rail traffic bunched up behind the cuts. These traffic jams provided excellent targets for Allied fighters. When the resistance cut the telephone lines, the Nazis shifted to radio communications that could be intercepted and read by Allied intelligence services. Resistance activity successfully contributed to the Allied deception effort and caused the Nazis to look away from Normandy for the invasion. Nazi troops were denied secure rear areas for rest and relaxation. This took its toll on morale, though it also led to savage reprisals in areas where the partisans operated. It was the 2nd Panzer Division, on its long trip to Normandy, that massacred the village of Oradour.

In the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war, an East European resistance movement could have one particularly important indirect effect. Everything we see from the Soviet military press strongly suggests that the Soviets would rely on detailed, tightly scheduled plans for the execution of their campaigns. They consciously avoid the Western emphasis on what they derisively refer to as "native wit," emphasizing instead the importance of plans and doctrine. The writing of Admiral Sorokin on military discipline reflects this distrust of spontaneity: "The meaning of military discipline rose a hundredfold in the era of the scientific-technical revolution. . . . The collective nature of weapons and military equipment [increases] the dependence of the overall result on precise actions and unconditional execution by each soldier-specialist separately."[3] If Warsaw Pact troops can disrupt the Soviet timetable by hours or days, the psychological impact on leaders who emphasize the prompt execution of a plan may be disproportionately large.

WHAT WOULD the costs of such a resistance effort be? If the experiences of World War II are any guide, the costs in manpower and material will be small. Only 800 or so agents from the British Special Operations Executive were inserted into France before D-Day. At its peak in the summer of 1944, the SOE-sponsored resistance effort numbered some 15,000. There is a danger of Soviet reprisals against East European civilians, but this has to be weighed against the damage that would be done by conventional or nuclear attacks against targets in Eastern Europe.

The main objections to the establishment of such a resistance effort in wartime will not derive from the material costs. The two objections will be the result of organizational politics, and of politics pure and simple.

The first problem is who should run the resistance business in the West. The natural choice is the intelligence organizations. But their main peacetime mission is the collection of information, and they will see this as their main wartime mission as well. Encouraging guerrilla warfare in the enemy rear area hinders that effort. If enemy soldiers must be diverted to protect rail lines, headquarters areas, and the like, that should be counted as a resistance success. The intelligence operatives who must try to collect information after the resistance has stirred things up and forced the enemy to button up will not see it this way. In fact, the British intelligence organizations in 1941 actively opposed SOE activities for just this reason. It was only Churchill's support that forced the intelligence services to cooperate.

The second organizational obstacle will come from the professional military planners. As we have emphasized, the resistance must be used to support regular military operations if it is to be successful. They should cut enemy communications when and where a friendly attack is planned. They should seize and protect enemy communications for use by friendly forces. But regular military planners will be

[3]Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *USSR Report: Military Affairs*, No. 1725.

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extremely reluctant to base their plans on the operations of untested turncoats. As an official history of the World War II resistance put it, its "heterogeneous composition, paucity of equipment and lack of military experience, and the impossibility of calculating the size and efficiency of resistance groups, prevented [its] playing an integral part in the operations which depended on exact and secret plans. From the Allies' point of view its achievement was to be regarded as a bonus."[4] One anecdote will make the psychology of the military leaders more plain. Early in World War II, there was a rivalry between the British Bomber Command and the Special Operations Executive. In many cases, they were going after the same targets, and they both needed airplanes to deliver payloads to France. Charles Portal said at that time to SOE: "your work is a gamble which may give us a valuable dividend or may produce nothing. It is anybody's guess. My bomber offensive is not a gamble. Its dividend is certain: it is a gilt edged investment. I cannot divert aircraft from a certainty to what may be a gold mine or may be completely worthless." The only possible response to this objection is to acknowledge that we are making a bet in which our stake, in terms of men and material, is low, and the potential pay-off is high. It is a bet worth making.

The final objection is, of course, political. Some will argue that one should not undertake such measures in wartime, one should not even contemplate them in peacetime, because doing so confronts the Soviet Union with a threat to its very existence, one that may cause it to launch a nuclear attack to destroy the West rather than see itself destroyed by internal enemies aided *by* the West. This is unpersuasive. I have been discussing efforts to be undertaken after a war is initiated by the Soviet Union. However much any of us might wish to aid armed resisters in Eastern Europe, no one would contemplate doing so in peacetime, or launching a war to liberate Eastern Europe. But the knowledge that the West could work to bring down the Soviet empire in the event of a war would be a powerful additional deterrent to Soviet attacks or actions that might lead to war. This Western retaliatory threat has the advantage of striking at a particularly sensitive Soviet nerve, but one that enhances peacetime deterrence. As far as deterring a Soviet nuclear strike once a war has started and the resistance begins to operate, we might ask ourselves what deters a Soviet nuclear strike in the event Western conventional military success threatens the stability of Soviet rule. In both cases the NATO nuclear forces must be strong enough and survivable enough such that no Soviet leader would choose to launch a nuclear strike and receive a nuclear counterblow rather than face an uncertain but bad domestic situation. When considering conventional or irregular military options, NATO should not be deterred from taking measures that might actually lead to a Western victory. To admit that we are deterred from seeking victory in wartime is to perpetuate the present unsatisfactory situation, in which the Soviet leaders know that if they launch a war and NATO does not choose nuclear suicide, the worst outcome the Soviets face is the restoration of the status quo.

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[4]Quoted in David Stafford, *Britain and European Resistance 1940–1945* (Toronto: 1980). This is the source I have drawn on for much of the information here about World War II. For the activities of the Special Operations Executive, the key source is M.R.D. Foot, *SOE in France* (London: 1966).

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The Potemkin Palace

Daniel Patrick Moynihan

A VISITOR to Panmunjom in Korea undergoes a succession of experiences. First one senses the tension, unlike anything to be encountered on other borders between the communist and noncommunist world. A Military Armistice Commission meets here. The fighting has stopped; the peace is still to come. Next one notices the tiny temporary buildings in which the Commission meets: little more than Quonset huts, the sort of thing put up to last out a three- or four-year war, but now in use for a third of a century. Then suddenly, looking up, out, something different. There, looming over the tin roof shacks is a massive white masonry palace put up by the North Koreans. It is hard to place architecturally. Late Stalinoid doesn't quite do, for there are slight oriental touches about the three doorways that intersperse twelve large windows along a second-story balcony. But any architectural interest is quickly displaced when one learns that the building, a full 34 meters long and 9 meters high, is 4 meters deep.

Off in the middle distance is a thriving village at the center of which is a flagpole some 160 meters tall. As the Washington Monument is 169 meters in height, we can safely say this is the tallest flagpole on earth, and the 15 by 30 meter red flag flying there may be safely assumed to be the largest of its kind. The village itself would accommodate hundreds of contented collective farmers, save for the problem we encounter at Panmunjom itself: the buildings are all facades; nobody lives there.

A visitor thinks immediately of the Potemkin villages said to have been erected for the edification of Catherine the Great of Russia and the foreign ambassadors who accompanied her on a celebrated journey down the Dnepr River in 1787. (Historians have quite rejected the tale of a hoax perpetrated by Prince Potemkin, the governor of the newly acquired southern territories through which the party traveled. It seems he did apply a touch of paint here and there, but the villages were not stage props carted downstream one after the other, nor were the villagers Lithuanians conscripted for the festivities, as was anonymously reported in the German press by the Saxon envoy von Helbig, whence the myth began. To the contrary, it appears the Czarist conquests were doing well enough. Only in contemporary Soviet satellites is the need for dissimulation total: brave and yet so pathetic.)

Such a sight brings to mind not just the long history of deceptions, including at times self-deception, by which various despotic governments have sought to advance their causes, but also the difficulty that free peoples sometimes have in perceiving those deceptions.

I have been in government for a long while now, long, that is, for someone who serves in appointive or elective office. I have served in the cabinet or subcabinet of four presidents, have been an ambassador for my country on several

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occasions, and now serve in the Senate. And so I have been involved with American government during a long period when American power, the strength of the political ideal of freedom, has been repeatedly tested.

I went to Washington with John F. Kennedy, which was a complex fate. Early on one was to experience the assertion of American ideals in the most stirring terms, and the ready acknowledgment that if ideals are of any consequence they must be defended, which is to say that American ideals required American power. Next, one learned the limits on American power imposed by the growing nuclear strength of the Soviet Union. Finally, slowly, and well past Kennedy's death, one learned in Southeast Asia something of the inherent limitations on American power which those very ideals impose.

I THOUGHT at the time, and think now, that this latter point impressed itself on Kennedy as time passed. I believe he was referring to this almost paradoxical aspect of Democratic government in an address he made at Dublin Castle in Ireland in June 1963, the last year of his life. In a particularly poignant passage he said: "Democracy is a difficult kind of government. It requires the highest qualities of self-discipline, restraint, a willingness to make commitments and sacrifices for the general interest, and it also requires knowledge."

It is that last point I wish to dwell upon: knowledge. Knowledge, and the various decisions or non-decisions that led us, beginning with Kennedy, into a war in Indochina that proved the most serious setback we have ever encountered as a nation, at least since the British burned the capital. (Military correctness requires that I note that we had first burned what is now Toronto.)

I admit to a certain fatalism about the war at the time. My generation had reason to think of violence as a normal condition of life. I was in the navy at age seventeen, and save for the nuclear bomb, would be long since dead on the beaches of Kyushu or some such bastion of the Japanese archipelago. Serving in the Johnson and Kennedy administrations, I knew, without significant exception, the persons who made the initial decisions to enter the conflict and then to intensify it to the point where a presidency was lost, and of course much else. I followed their reasoning. North Vietnam was seen as the point of a lance firmly grasped by two other comrades in arms, the Soviet Union and its militant ally, the People's Republic of China.

A recent visit to China reminds me, however, that during the years of the greatest intensity of American involvement in the Vietnam war, resisting what we viewed as the coordinated expansion of three communist nations along the eastern rim of Asia, those very nations were practically at war with one another, and one of them was at the point of internal collapse.

This latter, of course, was China. In his masterful study, *Vietnam: A History*, Stanley Karnow writes: "Though American officials repeatedly portrayed Mao Zedong as the guiding spirit behind the Communist aggression in Vietnam, Mao actually took a cautious approach to the war." He was preparing to launch his Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, what Karnow calls "his devastating purge of the Chinese Communist party," and needed his army to help him carry out the political campaign. A large war to the south would only weaken him at home. Further, the Chinese communists were by now thoroughly estranged from the Russian communists, and the military threat on Mao's northern and western borders was growing. (In 1966 the Soviets brought tactical nuclear weapons to support their growing deployments on the 4,150 mile border.) In *Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Nation in World Politics, 1970–1982*, Adam Ulam records that "as early as February 1964 Politburo member Michael Suslov, speaking before the Central Committee, attacked the Chinese leaders and warned that 'they would not refuse to improve relations with the United States, but as yet do not see favorable circumstances for such an endeavor.' " According to Karnow, the Vietnamese later claimed that Mao "wanted to use them as proxies in a war that would . . . leave them too exhausted to resist Chinese domination."

It is 1964. Three communist nations are

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already well advanced in venomous assessments of treachery by one another. But somehow the United States sees instead a human wave of ecstatic red soldiery waving ancient rifles on their united way south. It was as if we were looking at one of those giant billboards you could see in Canton, and as with the palace at Panmunjom, we did not realize that, no matter how tall and how long, it was not even four inches deep.

For reality was so different. The communist powers were absorbed with internal divisions within the communist world, and preoccupied with efforts to manipulate one another. No American in the 1960s could fail to be impressed by the manic menace of Chinese pronouncements concerning the United States. But it now appears that it was the Soviets the Chinese were actually trying to influence! Thus Adam Ulam: "China's virulent anti-Americanism before the 1970s had been largely designed to bar any reconciliation between the USSR and the US."

It would appear that the Chinese opening to the United States came primarily from fear that the Brezhnev Doctrine would lead to a Soviet invasion. To this day visitors are shown about the fantastic underground cities in Beijing where the population was to go when the nuclear exchange began. Limited hostilities did indeed break out in March 1969, described in the *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping* as the "Zhenbao Island counter-attack in self defense . . . made by Chinese frontier guards."

IN THE MEANTIME the Cultural Revolution had commenced. Pronouncements apart, it first appeared to the West in the form of flotillas of bodies, bound hand and foot, floating down the Pearl River into the South China Sea at Hong Kong. Not an everyday event: but somehow something we could not interpret.

Simon Leys, in *Chinese Shadows*, describes the Red Guards as an "anarcho-revolutionary movement." Destruction reigned. Intellectuals were the primary target. Again the *Selected Works* of Chairman Deng: "During the 'Cultural Revolution,' the Gang of Four slandered the intellectuals as the 'stinking Number Nine'—the ninth category after landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, Rightists, renegades, enemy agents and 'capitalist roaders.' " Universities were closed, high schools were closed. Faculties and party officials—Deng Xiaoping—were sent en masse to the countryside to plant rice and slop pigs, with (again the *Selected Works*), "disastrous consequences." Evidently millions died. (A few years ago, having remarked to Alexander Solzhenitsyn that few would have expected that the great literature of the 1960s would come out of Russia, I asked where he thought it would appear next. "In China," he replied, "in the 1990s." Which is to say when those who survived the 1960s begin to write of their experiences.)

There were successive stages. First the monster rallies in Tian'anmen Square in Beijing: a million youth brandishing the Little Red Book. Next the sanctioned slogan, "Rebellion is Justified." Then, in the words of Joan L. Cohen and Jerome Alan Cohen in *China Today*, an "unprecedented assault" by Red Guard groups with the assistance of Lin Biao's army units on "Party organization at every level." A reign of terror in the cities. On New Year's Day 1967, Mao urged the nation to a "general attack" on "monsters and demons anywhere in society." The Cohens write: "By the summer of 1967 China seemed to have reverted to the civil war and chaos that had debilitated her during the century prior to Communist rule." Next the army under Lin Biao took over, and at Mao's orders turned on the youthful revolutionaries they had set loose in the first place. Then, evidently, Mao murdered Lin Biao, his named successor, and contrived a story of his attempted coup as a running dog of the Soviet revisionists.

And so it went: to the point I would suspect of simple exhaustion. I visited Beijing in 1975, about the last year of the convulsion, and as I wrote at the time, found nothing but "Stalinist art and Meiji manufacture." Although the break with the Vietnamese and the Soviets was complete by this time, it was not until 1979 that a shooting war would commence. I cite the *Se-*

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lected Works one last time: "The counter-attack in self defense on Viet Nam was undertaken . . . to defend China's borders against the Vietnamese aggressors." As is well known, the Chinese forces were soundly licked.

I will refer only briefly to an event of almost equal significance. By 1965 Indonesia, the fifth most populous country in the world, with the largest communist party in a non-communist nation, had broken with the United States and its President Sukarno had got to proclaiming that a Beijing-Jakarta axis would marshal the "emerging forces" of the new Afro-Asian nations. The *Encyclopedia Americana* states plainly that "During most of 1965 Indonesia seemed destined to become a Communist country." Thereafter the united Soviet-Chinese-Vietnamese forces driving down the eastern perimeter of the continent would join forces with a massive new communist country, one pointing westerly and north towards India, such that the encirclement of the Eurasian land mass would proceed apace. This was not to be. An abortive communist coup in September in 1965 led in turn to the overthrow of Sukarno, and the total destruction of the PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party. Upwards of 500,000 persons were massacred. Not an everyday event either, and one surely that required notice, like those corpses floating down the Pearl River. But little seeming notice was taken.

HOW COULD IT have happened that, in thinking about this part of the world, these developments were not central to our calculations? From first to last, our foreign policy proceeded from something very like delusion. We saw unity where there was division, strength where there was weakness. Why did the evidence escape us?

There are those who, not without provocation, will ascribe America's blindness to rapturous accounts of carefully programmed visits by assorted academic and literary folk. This is a long-observed phenomenon. In *The Mill on the Floss*, written 125 years ago, George Eliot writes: "People who live at a distance are naturally less faulty than those immediately under our own eyes; and it seems superfluous, when we consider the remote geographical position of the Ethiopians, and how very little the Greeks had to do with them, to inquire further why Homer calls them 'blameless.' "

Of course there are more depressing judgments that can be made about the effect this phenomenon has had on the reputation of successive totalitarian regimes during this century. It *is* powerful, but I believe it is also, usually, temporary. Moreover, the half-life of the original rapture seems to me to be declining. The reports of prodigies of production, of poetry readings, of child care facilities taper off fairly fast now. When was the last time any youth showed up in Cuba to help with the sugar cane harvest? I would concede the current enthusiasm of the "sandalistas," as Western journalists have come to call their compatriots in Managua, two years at most. In any event, such propagandists have had, or so I think, but little influence. Unsentimental people make American foreign policy. My concern is the degree to which they, we, are insensitive as well as unsentimental. Insensitive, that is, to political and social nuance of the sort a liberal education is designed to impart.

Even a casual reading of Orwell would have alerted the policy maker of 1966–76 to the type of totalitarian behavior on display in Mao's China. Recall, from *1984*, Emmanuel Goldstein's explanation in *The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism* that party members are expected to live "in a continuous frenzy of hatred of foreign enemies and internal traitors." Or for that matter, a mild acquaintance with the early history of the Soviet Union—especially the "war scare" of 1927, which Stalin contrived as a cover for the collectivization of agriculture—would have offered a suggestive parallel. Which is to say no more than that foreign policy in an era of totalitarian states must take into account the possibilities of internal convulsion and chaos that simply do not exist in the democracies.

This is but another instance of President Kennedy's proposition that above all democratic government "requires knowledge." It requires a knowledge of texts, a perception of nuance, the art of association—to a degree I think we have

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not ever before required, simply because our adversaries are in all ways so distant and in some ways so new.

In the course of the Cultural Revolution Madame Mao suppressed all opera in China. Leaving, in Ley's words, "this artistic, subtle, opera-mad people . . . to the strict regime of . . . six feeble Punch and Judy shows, where the only 'revolutionary' daring is to maneuver on stage, to the languorous saxophonic Khachaturian-like music, platoons of the People's Liberation Army complete with banners and wooden rifles." Statesmen needed to take note. I believe, although I could scarcely claim certainty, that the vulgarization of art in totalitarian regimes marks a decline in societal energy; the re-emergence of art often marks a sign of revolt. No matter: *this is the world of politics also.* Until such concerns more deeply penetrate our political sensibilities I fear we will miss much that is going on in the world.

FAIR ENOUGH, analysts will say. But supposing the magnitude of these events and their implications had been fully appreciated at the time, *ought* we to have behaved differently? *Would* we have behaved differently? I reply, most emphatically, yes, while allowing that a whole range of different responses might have been chosen. At one extreme we might simply have withdrawn from the mainland, leaving Vietnam to Hanoi and to border war with the Chinese and the Cambodians. (Would this have been any less honorable than the policy we arrived at eventually, in which we asked of Hanoi only a "decent interval" between the time of our departure and their final takeover?) At the opposite extreme, betting that the Chinese would not intervene, we might have taken the war directly to the enemy in the North. We might have seized Hanoi, as we could have done. Instead we sank into the protracted, low-level warfare that Orwell foresaw on a global scale, but which he quite understood could only be sustained by rigidly totalitarian regimes.

I think of Dean Acheson, an exemplary secretary of state, perhaps our greatest, and the way he had of making the obvious obvious. Here is a passage from his celebrated address at the National Press Club in Washington in January 1950, when the nation was still reeling from the implications of the communist triumph in China. He saw Chinese more than he saw Red, and gave to his address the title: "Relations of the People of the United States and the Peoples of Asia," with the subtitle, "We Can Only Help Where We Are Wanted." Here is the key passage.

> . . . I should like to suggest . . . that the Soviet Union's taking the four northern provinces of China is the single most significant, most important fact, in the relation of any foreign power with Asia.
>
> What does that mean for us? It means something very, very significant. It means that nothing that we do and nothing that we say must be allowed to obscure the reality of this fact. All the efforts of propaganda will not be able to obscure it. The only thing that can obscure it is the folly of ill-conceived adventures on our part which easily could do so and I urge all who are thinking about these foolish adventures to remember that we must not seize the unenviable positions which the Russians have carved out for themselves. We must not undertake to deflect from the Russians to ourselves the righteous anger and the wrath and the hatred of the Chinese people which must develop. It would be folly to deflect it to ourselves. We must take the position we have always taken that anyone who violates the integrity of China is the enemy of China and is acting contrary to our own interest. That, I suggest to you . . . is the first and the greatest rule in regard to the formulation of American policy toward Asia.

This is a classic perception of diplomacy: in the main, nations have different interests, or think they do, and rarely combine in a costly common enterprise. Still more rarely do they sacrifice themselves for others. Statesmanship is the craft of encouraging division and distraction among adversaries, especially by a nation such as the United States, which has no great designs on the existing international order. In particular the statesman will be wary of accepting at face

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value the claims of adversaries that they have even so combined their forces and are on the way to invincibility. Had we thought no further we might have avoided a lot of trouble in Southeast Asia.

Let me offer a suggestion as to why this proved so difficult: more to the point, why it didn't happen. There is a rule, of sorts, that organizations in conflict become like one another. We associate it with the turn of the century German sociologist Georg Simmel, who observed, for example, that the Persians finally figured out it was best to have Greeks fight Greeks. Somewhere in the course of the cold war the United States decided it was best to have ideologists fight ideologists.

I have argued, obviously, that this came after Acheson. A man of great intellect, he had even so a limited fascination with intellectuals. He was all his life busy with things of the world, in real time, real life settings. Dulles, if not so agile, was even so not all that different.

The change came with the 1960s. The surest mark was the appearance of academics in foreign policy positions: previously rare, soon to be routine. It was no longer enough to be anti-communist. It was necessary to understand dialectical materialism.

We had previously gone through bouts of, well, a vulgar anti-communism. Politicians, some of them demagogues, none of them especially or even faintly learned, preached the dangers of a monolithic and expansionist world communism. Curiously, in the age of Stalin they weren't that wrong. Although generally despised by American foreign policy elites, Simmel's law began to show itself. Elites, challenged, began to emulate their challengers, and to assert that they knew even *better* the dangers of communism, having read the Collected Works.

Something like that. An early result was Vietnam: in William Pfaff's phrase, "liberalism's war." Lyndon B. Johnson inherited it, and was suspicious of it, but couldn't persuade himself that he knew more about the subject than people whose good fortune it was to know more about it than the likes of him. A senior official of the Johnson administration said to me recently, defensively perhaps, but I think fairly, that by the time Mr. Johnson came to office his predecessors had created such a myth of invincible communism that Johnson and his advisors could not break out of the conception no matter how many corpses floated down the Pearl River.

Failure in Vietnam, or so it appears to me (and if it matters, it appeared so at the time) curiously strengthened this disposition. It was a limited failure; but the conclusions drawn from it were hardly such. First came a period of detente that had to it an edge of accommodation, almost deference, to the still presumptive leader of world communism.

By the 1970s the most startling of facts had emerged. The Soviet system could not feed its own people. And yet this seems to me to have had little effect on our thinking. In 1976, Murray Fesbach and Stephen Rapany compiled an astonishing report for the Joint Economic Committee showing that life expectancy for males in the Soviet Union was *declining*. Few understood.

AND NOW we are in the 1980s, when all or much is said to have changed. We are said to have awakened from complacency. Halfway through the decade we have seen a sustained arms build-up—which dates from the middle of the 1970s—beginning to produce almost a profusion of new weapons systems. (Of which, for my money, the cruise missiles are far the most innovative and formidable in their military implications.)

Does this bring any surcease? Ease? Evidently not. In September 1985, Mr. Reagan told a press conference: "the United States is still well behind the Soviet Union in literally every kind of offensive weapon, both conventional and in the strategic weapons." Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, ranking Democrat on the Senate Committee on Armed Services, responded with a measure of incredulity, which only Southern manners managed to soften. "I think," he said in a television exchange, "the president needs to sit down with the joint chiefs and hear about our submarines, about our aircraft carriers, about our tactical air, about our

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cruise missiles, about our bombers and other advantages." In a different context Stephen M. Walt of Princeton, writing in *The New Republic*, measures the various military weights of the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations, *and* the People's Republic of China (omitting those of the PRC is "something no Soviet strategist would ever do"). He concludes that "the balance against the USSR becomes almost overwhelming."

This is not to say there won't be a war, or that they can't win it, or destroy everything in attempting. It is surely not to say we have heard or seen the last of Marxist-Leninist successes. But History—there, I said it!—is not moving with them. Theirs is not the way things are going to turn out.[1]

Even so we persist in a strangely Soviet-obsessed politics that, while rattling with symbolic belligerence—"evil empire"—is subdued if not actually submissive in the realm of deeds. I offer two examples, both in some sense personal.

At midnight on December 13, 1981, the Polish army and police raided the offices of the independent trade union Solidarity in Poland and arrested thousands of persons in their homes. The organization was crushed, clearly on Soviet orders. On December 15, I introduced and the Senate adopted by a vote of 95-0 a resolution calling on the administration "to develop a concerted and sustained response." It was my thought that we should create an international crisis: convene the Security Council, rally the Europeans, impose sanctions, bellow our rage. The administration did nothing—nothing—save to commence to pay American banks money owed by Poland, so that Polish loans would not go into default. Perhaps I exaggerate. Four years later, the president met for ten minutes with Jerzy Milewski, international representative of the now-outlawed Solidarity. In a press statement that followed, the president described Mr. Milewski as a "thoughtful observer" of the Polish situation, adding that "History proves that increased repression only aggravates current problems and sows the seeds of the future discontent." He called for "genuine dialogue between the [Polish] government and important elements of society, including free and independent trade unions." According to the meticulously reliable Lou Cannon of the Washington *Post*, a "White House official" explained that the quality of the statement reflected " 'the East-West climate' " as the President prepared to meet Mikhail S. Gorbachev.

He could expect to meet a remarkably well-informed Gorbachev. Since the publication in June 1975 of the *Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States*, chaired by then Vice President Nelson Rockefeller (Ronald Reagan as a member), the Soviets have been conducting an increasingly massive interception of American telecommunications from their various embassy, consulate, and UN mission facilities on American soil. In October 1984, Walter G. Deeley, deputy director of the National Security Agency in charge of communication security, broke a long silence on what is viewed there as an increasingly grave security problem—and more: a problem of national integrity. The rights of Americans are being invaded as surely as if foreign troops were dropping from the skies. As Deeley told the New York *Times:*

> I want the country to be aware that if we don't protect our communications, it can do a great deal of damage to us. This is a problem that goes to the very fabric of our society. It is not just a worry of the national security agencies.
>
> . . .
>
> Anyone making a phone call to the West Coast or Boston from the Washington area . . . can presume the other guy is listening to it.

He continued:

> They are having us for breakfast. We are

[1] In October 1985 the Communist Party of the Soviet Union published in *Pravda* a Draft Party Program, the first since 1961. The tone was markedly subdued by contrast with that of its predecessor. In 1961 Khrushchev's party undertook "within the current 10 years [to exceed] the level of U.S. industrial output."

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hemorrhaging. Your progeny may not enjoy the same rights we do today if we don't do something.

The *Wall Street Journal* rails against the outrage. William Safire speaks of laser beams directed to the north windows of the White House once the Soviets assume occupancy of their new Mount Alto site in Washington. And yet the administration will do nothing to stop this. The FBI speaks out: 30 to 35 percent of Soviet embassy personnel in Washington do nothing but intercept telephone conversations. As a "watch list" is developed on specific phone numbers the possibility of blackmail, against which Rockefeller warned, grows ever more immediate—if it has not long since commenced. The recent conviction of Samuel Loring Morison for espionage would suggest that a very large portion of the senior officials of the United States government will find themselves at least potentially exposed not just to discomfiture but to ruin. I am referring to the normal Washington practice of officials passing on classified information to journalists. This happens most from the White House itself, in the sense, that is, of a secrets-per-sentence ratio or something such. But it is a widespread practice, a way we speak to one another here. Except in rare cases it is never meant to do the nation harm, and does none. Even so, it is illegal, and soon the Soviets will have the goods on literally thousands of public officials, if they haven't already.

For eight years I have been seeking legislation to put a stop to this. The technology is elementary. The politics is harder. It requires, in the first place, facing up to the Soviets, and in the second place admitting to the American public that you have not done so previously. The Carter administration would have nothing to do with the legislation. Nor would its successor. When I managed to get the legislation adopted by the Senate, the Reagan administration killed it in conference.

AT ABOUT this time James Reston made up his mind about Mr. Reagan. He had given him almost five years as president, and now concluded that the president "is an escapist who prefers fantasy to reality." There is surely this quality: along with others far more admirable. But I write not of a person but a period and a disposition. This president seems notably influenced by persons whose disposition is to *angst:* the decline of the West, the rise of the SS-18.

As the new Republicans took office, Strobe Talbott wrote that "Principal among the new Administration's views was the belief that the U.S. was now No. 2 in its military competition with the USSR." The president can say this with a smile; not those who share this view from the vantage of serious inquiry, detailed knowledge, and, now, office.

Some part of this is a passing phenomenon. Mr. Reagan, with generosity and political foresight, brought into his administration a range of liberal Democrats who became estranged when their party turned on "liberalism's war." A more generous or insightful Jimmy Carter might have done this, but didn't. There are more than a few members of the Nixon administration returned to office still stirring with resentments of detente. All this is normal enough in a churning political system. Advisors come and go. The problem is that the economic policies of the present administration are going to make the nation look relatively weak in the 1990s.

Mr. Reagan has thought it possible to weaken American government without weakening American influence. It is not. This is an old disposition of his, and that it has not changed is significant. In 1975, preparing to challenge Gerald Ford for the Republican nomination, he stated that he had a plan to cut $90 billion from the budget without touching defense or Social Security. Ford replied with some asperity that this would mean cutting *half* the rest of government. Having served in Mr. Ford's cabinet I can attest that Mr. Ford had no patience with, well, fantasy. But it was Mr. Reagan who was elected and then re-elected in the 1980s, and such fantasy became policy. The result has been the massive budget deficits, which will ineluctably lead to military cutbacks, as the Defense Department is just now beginning to realize. In *these* circumstances, and with no little bitterness

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and suspicion as to how it all came about, the problem of overestimating and misreading our adversaries will persist, possibly worsen. The more then shall we have need of history and of steadiness.

My principal concern is with balance. The wise diplomatist, like the victorious general, will make every effort to avoid underestimating the strength of the adversary. That as much as anything is a frame of mind: audacity yes, if needed, but overconfidence never. The first principle of Sun Tzu, the Chinese strategist of the 6th century B.C., is "Know your enemy." It is required reading for Marine Corps lieutenants, and ought to be for members of the national security staff! Far the most difficult and pressing task is to know the enemy's weaknesses. That is how battles are won. That is how eras are won.

The true diplomatist, like the true general, while aware of his adversary's strength is primarily concerned to find his weakness. The weaknesses of the totalitarian world are twofold: First, it is as much or more rent by ethnic conflict as the world in general, with the added difficulty that Marxist-Leninist doctrine predicted the disappearance of ethnic conflict with the establishment of "socialist" regimes. Second, and more important, it is a political form of government that cannot successfully exploit modern technology. Leninist governments are based on the greatest control of information by the smallest number of persons. This could be adapted to the production of steel. It cannot adapt to technology based on the diffusion of information. A year ago in Washington I asked an audience that I would describe as frenzy friendly: "How are you going to install home computers in a society that won't permit the publication of telephone directories?" My address was not a success, but I believe my question was fair, and I believe the answer is that you can't.

Managing the decline of these regimes will be a task requiring the utmost discipline *and* knowledge. For as they come to sense they are doomed, they must become ever more dangerous. Some, Walter Laqueur suggests, including China, might evolve "toward some modern version of bureaucratic autocracy." The Soviets won't; dare not. "In the name of God on high," as Mr. Gorbachev recently put it, let us watch *them* with hawk-like alertness. But, it seems to me that true knowledge of the state of the world just now requires that we keep that Panmunjom palace in mind also, and never for a moment neglect our own affairs, which in the end will most determine the condition of freedom in the world.

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Protectionism, Prosperity & Security

Lee Kuan Yew

IT CANNOT be often that someone representing two and a half million people from a small country in the Third World is offered the opportunity to address the representatives of 240 million people who form the world's most wealthy and most advanced nation. America is a great nation not just because of her power and wealth, but mainly because she is a nation moved by high ideals. Only the elevating power of her idealism can explain the benign manner in which America has exercised her enormous power since the end of World War II and the magnanimity and generosity with which she has shared her wealth to rebuild a more prosperous world. The idealism which inspired the Founding Fathers of this nation has, down the ages, also inspired free men and free women throughout the world.

Decisions made in this august chamber, especially in the decades since December 8, 1941, have determined the course of human history and settled the shape of the contemporary world. If the era after the war has seen a world relatively at peace and accompanied by an unprecedented degree of human progress, much of the credit must go to American leadership.

At a time of domestic disquiet over large imports and the possible loss of jobs, the attention of America's legislators has been drawn away from the fundamentals. These fundamentals, which successive administrations and congresses have successfully pursued for four decades from 1945, are: a world in which all peoples can seek to fulfill themselves without having to conquer or to dominate or to exploit other people.

America has encouraged a world which respects the sovereignty and the dignity of all, the great and the small, the mighty and the weak—a world which enables all to work and be rewarded for their efforts because what they produce is desired by others willing to pay for such goods and services under fair rules of exchange.

For many months now, troubled voices have come from the U.S. Congress.

I want to refocus your attention, distracted by the problems of trade imbalances, unemployment, high value of the dollar, and budget deficits, back to the basic issues of war and peace.

Since World War II, the United States has been involved in two major wars, both in the Western Pacific: Korea, 1950–53; Vietnam, 1965–73. This was not accidental. East Asian societies are on the move, seeking to transform their ancient civilizations into modern industrial

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Lee Kuan Yew is prime minister of the Republic of Singapore. He delivered this speech before a joint session of Congress on October 9, 1985.

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societies. All are seething with restless energy. Their people want to catch up with the rest of the world and have a better life. If Japan can do it, they believe they also can.

In the 1950s and 1960s, all countries in the Western Pacific, except communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam, increased their trade with the U.S. Many sought and received U.S. investment. The U.S. was the dynamo which hastened economic development. By the late 1960s, Japan had emerged as a second dynamo. The countries of East Asia, ASEAN, Australia, and New Zealand list either the U.S. or Japan as their most important trading partner with 10 to 45 percent of their total trade.

I suggest that the forty years of relative peace the world has enjoyed since World War II are not just because of the atomic bomb. The U.S. learned the lessons of World Wars I and II. She learned that the desire for the better life through industrialization and trade had caused the squabbles over the markets and the expansion of empires in order to build larger markets and acquire resources. The end of World War II and the emergence of the cold war made the U.S. put determined pressure on the European empires to decolonize.

More pertinent, when the war ended in 1945, the U.S. set out, with her European allies, to establish an open and fair trading system under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, in force since January 1, 1948), and a stable system of currency exchange under the original IMF agreement at Bretton Woods. These agreements led to the huge growth in trade, banking, and finance throughout the world.

Indeed, political leaders in the former colonial territories watched in wonderment as the British, French, Belgian, and Dutch governments dismantled their empires from 1945 to 1965, and grew more prosperous in the 1960s and 1970s. Their former subject peoples had expected them to decline into relative poverty after they lost their empires, like Spain and Portugal. The secret lay in GATT and the IMF, which ensured that trade and investments continued and expanded after decolonization.

The East Asian phenomenon of high growth has been well reported. As Japan took off, first South Korea, then Taiwan, then Hong Kong followed in her trail, picking up steam in her wake. They supplemented the Japanese economy, and followed the Japanese into the American and European markets. With investments from both the U.S. and Japan, they exported their manufactures to Europe. By the early 1970s, the ASEAN countries joined this fast-growth group.

These developments have had a profound impact on the leaders of China. After nearly three decades of Maoist seclusion and self-sufficiency, Deng Xiaoping decided that closing her doors on the world was the cause of China's stagnation. China needs to modernize. China has opened her doors to trade, investments, technology, and tourism. She wants to get the same economic uplift that Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and ASEAN have had from the free market economies of the West by plugging into their trading and investments power-grid. In the few years since this decision, China's trade with the U.S. and Japan has increased manyfold: from $0.5 billion in 1975 to a respectable $6.4 billion in 1984 with the U.S.; from $3.9 billion to $13.2 billion with Japan in the same period. China is seeking growth through trade, not territorial aggrandizement. Her quest for a better life for her people is through peaceful cooperation in trade, investments, and transfer of technology and know-how, not the use of force for territorial conquests, or the carving out of a sphere of influence or a trading bloc.

The North Koreans, too, have been impressed by the market economies of the West. They want to emulate the transformation of the South Korean economy. They have borrowed an estimated $1.4 billion from Japanese and Western banks in the 1970s. The investments were not successful and their debts had to be rescheduled.

CHINA'S decision is a most significant factor for peace, stability, and growth in Asia. For nearly 30 years, from 1949 until Mao died in 1976, a poor but ideologically

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fervent China was a ceaseless spoiler of other countries' economic plans. She undermined their stability. She was an exporter of revolution. She provided arms, ideology, and radio support to guerrilla insurgencies in Southeast Asia. China has, for the present, discontinued such support.

Every Chinese schoolboy knows how China's civilization began: through the unification, over 2,000 years ago, of the seven warring states by the emperor Qin Shihuang. China knows from her own history that the time-proven method for a dynamic, vigorous people to achieve greater economic power is to carve out a larger territory with a larger population to form a greater base on which peace and order are established. Then with a wide range of soil and climates and peoples, there will be more wealth from a greater diversity of goods and services for exchange.

The Vietnamese also know this. Fortunately for Asia, Vietnam's attempt to carve out Cambodia and Laos for herself has resulted in Vietnam's economic stagnation. Vietnam gets no investments from the West. Her trade is negligible. She is bogged down in guerrilla war in Cambodia and will be worn down in a clash of wills on the Sino-Vietnamese border.

A younger generation of Americans may not know that it was the carving out of empire that Japan undertook when in 1931 she set up the state of Manchukuo in Manchuria. In fact, Japan had embarked on a modern empire earlier, in 1895 when she annexed Taiwan, and in 1905 when she annexed Korea.

The success of the countries in East and Southeast Asia has caused many Third World countries to rethink their policies. Once infatuated with socialist economic policies of nationalization and autarky, Third World nations have now come to see that stagnation and decay have followed these policies. More and more Third World nations are seeking a better life for their peoples by opening their doors to trade and investments.

Putting up barriers to America's markets would halt the economic advancement of the free market oriented developing countries. It would send a signal that the model provided by the countries of East and Southeast Asia is no longer an available option. It could set off a chain reaction which would result in a downward spiral of the world economy.

China was a founding member of GATT. The present government of the PRC abandoned its membership in 1950. Recently, it has sent out feelers for readmission. If the U.S. cuts back on China's growing trade with her, then China has to rethink her economic strategy. Shutting out China's products, especially textiles, from America's markets, will have far-reaching implications. China must then look for other ways of getting foreign exchange to pay for modernization. If, as is likely, she cannot get enough alternative markets to make up for the loss of America, her modernization will slow down. She will become restive.

A Japan squeezed in such a protectionist trap has few attractive options. After thrashing around looking for market extensions in Latin America, Africa, and West Asia, Japan will turn back to her two major options: closer economic links with the Soviet Union, or closer ties with China. She could try to do both and reconcile or postpone the conflicts inherent in the two options. In the end, she has to choose one of these two. Either choice conjures up disquieting consequences for the rest of Asia, and the world.

Singapore has been an independent country for only twenty years. Whether it will be allowed to remain so, to work hard to thrive and prosper, depends on the rules under which the big and the small states are allowed to compete and to cooperate in trade and finance. Forty-four years ago the British could not prevent the Japanese from capturing and occupying us and our ASEAN neighbors. We were incorporated as part of Japan's "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." The present multilateral economic cooperation offers so much more to Singapore.

The irony is that it was the U.S. and Europe that forced a reluctant China and a hermit-like Japan to open up their countries to trade with the West. They were two oriental societies happy to be self-sufficient and to keep out the outside world. It seems preposterous

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that because America has temporary difficulties with her balance of trade, due in part to an overvalued dollar, the U.S. should begin to close her markets. And now it is the Japanese and the Chinese who have to come knocking at America's door to get in to trade. What a bittersweet and ironic role-reversal.

THE RAPID CHANGES in the Western Pacific are the result of a resurgence of dynamism in these societies, as they recover their balance and forge their will to compete and get on the move. They are societies capable of organizing themselves, of implementing and achieving high standards of universal education, of mastering the skills and knowledge of the industrial societies, of acquiring new technology, of improving product design and marketing, and of carrying out research and development. They have strong cultural bases on which to build a modern technological society.

There are two scenarios for the 21st century. The first is bleak: if, because of domestic problems, the U.S. loses the will to maintain free trade. There are over 300 bills in Congress dedicated to the protection of the U.S. market. Protectionism and retaliation will shrink trade and so reduce jobs. Is America willing to write off the peaceful and constructive developments of the last forty years that she had made possible? Does America wish to abandon the contest between democracy and the free market on the one hand and communism and the controlled economy on the other, when she has nearly won this contest for the hearts and minds of the Third World? Never in history have the peoples of the world enjoyed such high standards of living. For forty years the maintenance of political boundaries was made possible because thrusting, and usually aggressive, peoples have been able to fulfill their drive to better their lot through trade. If this method for adjustment and accommodation between societies moving at different speeds is no longer possible, then a return to the traditional ways of conquest or influence is likely.

Therefore, America will find that the putting up of tariff barriers is not enough. She will have to go one step further: she will have to be the policeman of the world outside the Soviet bloc, enforcing order over her sphere of influence.

After World War I the U.S. left the League of Nations and withdrew into isolationism. Nevertheless, inexorably, she was again drawn into the vortex of war by December 1941.

The Soviet Union, since World War II, has dominated her allies as satellites in COMECON. The Soviets also maintain the balance between them and the other aspiring communist societies like Cuba, Vietnam, and Ethiopia. In like manner, without adjustments through open and fair trade, the U.S. must enforce some kind of dominance over her own allies in Europe and Japan. And America and Europe together must police and keep the peace between the other jostling and contending societies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The more dynamic countries, prevented from thriving through trade, must be prevented from re-channeling their energies toward the expansion of their territory or of their influence to assure their markets. Unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately for the rest of the world, the U.S. Constitution enshrines a system of open government which does not allow its leaders to exercise such domination over other countries and governments in the same way that leaders of totalitarian states can.

Let us not forget that protectionism and less trade mean less growth for the developing countries. This means debt burdens cannot be discharged. Defaults may be unavoidable, with incalculable consequences for the international banking system. Even if the banks survive the upheavals, these developing countries will have to abandon all thoughts of liberalization towards pluralism and more democratic freedoms. Severe or repressive government is the other side of austere or negative economic growth.

An over-strong dollar has caused the huge trade deficits. A volatile and speculative foreign exchange market has exaggerated the factors working towards a strong dollar. The recent meeting in New York of the G5, finance ministers of the five largest industrial nations, has given grounds for optimism that the overvalued dollar can be brought down by concerted ac-

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tions of the G5 finance ministers and their central banks. Congress should stay its hand and allow these efforts time to work.

In case lobbyists for the Japanese believe they are going to be joined by one from Singapore, let me add that I do not suggest that Japan should not be cajoled, and if necessary coerced, with all the powers at America's command, to open up her markets. America can legitimately and justly use all means to knock down Japanese barriers and obstacles to imports. There was a time in the 1950s and 1960s when America looked with amusement and tolerance at the ingenuity of Japanese obstacles to imports. But since Japan has become the second largest economic power, as a result of open and fair trade, it is right that she should be made to abide by the rules that have brought her to her present unprecedented prosperity.

The rest of Asia will cheer with joy, for then their goods will also get into Japan without going through an obstacle course. Let me add that 96 percent of U.S. goods enter Singapore duty free and quota free. And for fourteen of the last fifteen years, the U.S. has enjoyed trade surpluses with Singapore. But if America puts up tariffs or barriers to Japanese goods, instead of tearing down Japanese barriers to American exports, it will hurt the rest of Asia twice over. First by having these same tariffs and barriers to overcome to sell to America, and second, by not being able to sell to Japan because Japan cannot sell to America.

It is right to compel the Japanese, and others, to help the system function better. And if threatening retaliation for unequal access to markets is part of this process towards open and fair trade, then so be it. America has the right to ask that those who have benefited from America's markets open up their markets. Some countries, like ASEAN, have supported the U.S. initiative to have GATT begin a new round of discussions for lowering barriers to trade in goods and perhaps also regularizing trade in services. The answer to job losses lies with more trade, not less.

AMERICA must upgrade her declining low value-added industries or they will continue to decline whether America goes protectionist or not, just as the ancient agricultural societies of pre-industrial China and Japan, with their self-sufficient, subsistence economies based on buffalo power and manpower, had to change with the advent of the industrial age. Rapid and profound change characterizes the world Americans have created by their inventiveness. American legislators have the awesome responsibility of deciding by what rules the peoples of so many different countries should undergo rapid changes in their ways of making a living, and yet avoid violent conflicts.

In every age, the leading power has to carry the burden of encouraging the peaceful acceptance of the status quo. This is done by punishing aggression and rewarding peaceful cooperation. The British carried this burden for over 100 years after they pioneered the industrial revolution. This responsibility passed to America after World War II.

It is inherent in America's position as the pre-eminent economic, political, and military power to have to settle and uphold the rules for orderly change and progress. Americans are leaders in a marathon for technological change and product innovation. American enterprise is blazing the trail into the microchip and computerized world of tomorrow. In the interests of peace and security America must uphold the rules of international conduct which reward peaceful cooperative behavior and punish transgressions of the peace. A replay of the depression of the 1930s which led to World War II will be ruinous for all. All the major powers in the West share the responsibility for not repeating this mistake. But America's is the primary responsibility, for she is the anchor economy of the free market economies of the world. In your hands therefore lies the future of the world.

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Kennan: the Historian as Fatalist

Paul Seabury & Patrick Glynn

OVER THE YEARS there have been many George Kennans—Kennan the diplomat, Kennan the historian; the prophet of ecological crisis, the critic of the student movement; the anti-Soviet hard-liner, the opponent of nuclear arms. The peculiar hold his views have on the public imagination, the peculiar position he occupies in our public life, has to do at least in part with the mystery underlying these various personae, and the absence of any clear grasp of how they all fit together. Clearly, Kennan's recent prominence in the debate over nuclear armaments owes much to his older reputation as the author of the famous "Mr. X" article and the explicator of the doctrine of "containment." It would be hard to imagine a contrast sharper than the one between his recent pronouncements on American foreign policy and his view in 1947 that the United States should "confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world."[1] There is, it seems, abiding surprise, or at least news value, in the impression that Kennan has changed his mind—though whether he has arrived at some kind of epiphany and attained that heightened awareness of danger to which opponents of nuclear weapons lay special claim, or whether instead he has simply remained a realist, as realistic about a policy of retreat now as he was about containment in 1947, is not, perhaps, made clear.

Raymond Aron, an astute observer of our country, spoke shortly before his death of the "suicide of an elite," by which he meant the defection of key liberals who had been mainstays of the bipartisan coalition in support of the containment policies Kennan first advocated. Aron attributed this defection to a "certain loss of confidence . . . in the country's institutions," to "a kind of fatigue." Members of "the East Coast establishment," he said, were at least partially responsible for the Vietnam war. But when it began to sour, and after Nixon's election, they opposed American involvement in that war and pressed polemics and propaganda against the Nixon-Kissinger administration. "They, and many others, helped tear the American people apart over this war in Vietnam that . . . remains a heavy burden even today."[2]

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[1] "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* (July 1947).

[2] Raymond Aron, *The Committed Observer: Interviews with Jean-Louis Missika and Dominique*

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Kennan, by virtue perhaps of the curious defection and recantation at the heart of his own career, has increasingly become a symbol and mentor of this disenchanted faction of the American elite.

But the most recent incarnation of Kennan is as historian, in particular as an historian of World War I. In two volumes of a projected trilogy on the antecedents of World War I—*The Decline of Bismarck's European Order* (1979) and *The Fateful Alliance* (1984)[3]—Kennan has raised anew a question that has become the focus of growing public interest and anxiety: how wars are caused. Kennan's research turns out to be in large measure a reiteration of a rather old-fashioned view of the origins of World War I—a variant of what was once known as the "revisionist" explanation of that catastrophe. But the relevance of this scholarly work to the nuclear and Soviet problem is never far out of sight. No less than his more obviously polemical writings, these historical books seek to drive home what for Kennan has become the overarching point: that American diplomacy, ever erratic, ever incompetent, is guiding the nation down a calamitous path to confrontation and war.

Casual followers of Kennan's career lately have tended to assume that he has been busy discovering new truths, coming upon "findings," changing his mind over time in response to events. In fact, his writings have tended consistently over the years to be vehicles for long-standing themes, to which he returns, with varying emphases, again and again. This is no less true of his recent histories than of his other work. In these volumes on events leading up to World War I, Kennan is less concerned about discovering new insights into late 19th-century statecraft than with America's current relations with the Soviet Union. What he has produced is an allegorical tale, and never far in the background of these elegantly detailed narratives is a preoccupation with the 20th-century split between Russia and the United States. To this contemporary moment Kennan's writings return again and again, as to a primal scene.

Wolton, tr. James and Marie McIntosh (Regnery Gateway, $17.00).

II

KENNAN'S disenchantment with the "containment" idea is by no means new. In the first volume of his *Memoirs*, published in 1967, he already had come to see irony in the fact that his rise to fame and influence had been occasioned by two tracts—the 1947 "X" article in *Foreign Affairs* and his "Long Telegram," written from the American embassy in Moscow in 1946—he now reviled:

> I read it over [i.e., the "Long Telegram"] with a horrified amusement. Much of it reads exactly like one of those primers put out by alarmed congressional committees or by the Daughters of the American Revolution designed to arouse the citizenry to the dangers of the Communist conspiracy.[4]

Perhaps no other public figure has so completely rejected the substance of the accomplishment that first conferred fame upon him. In recent years Kennan's admirers have wavered between the idea that his containment scheme was hijacked and misconstrued by the Truman administration, and the idea that the scheme was, after all, a terrible mistake.

It is interesting to note that Kennan's afterthoughts did not cause him immediately to disavow his "X" article, even when it attracted strong public criticism. When Walter Lippmann attacked him in the late 1940s, Kennan warmly thanked friends for rising to his defense; four years after "X" came out, he reprinted it—with no qualifications—as a chapter in his *American Diplomacy 1900–1950*.

Yet soon after the "X" article appeared, Kennan became alarmed at the interpretations others gave to his prescriptions. As head of the State Department's policy planning staff, he

[3] *The Decline of Bismarck's European Order: Franco-Russian Relations, 1875–1890* (Princeton University Press, $40.00 cloth, $12.50 paper), and *The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia, and the Coming of the First World War* (Pantheon Books, $19.95 cloth, $8.95 paper).

[4] *Memoirs 1925–1950* (Pantheon Books, $8.95 paper).

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recoiled from the strategic-military implications of his own central prescription. The differences between Kennan and his superiors and colleagues turned on questions of factual and military assessments and on Kennan's refusal to accept his policy's military requirements. He opposed the creation of NATO; he opposed proposals to develop the H-bomb; he opposed the expansion of conventional military capabilities envisioned in NSC–68. In 1949, in a memorandum to Dean Acheson, he urged that Washington desist in the hydrogen bomb's development and forfeit to Moscow the "moral odium" for making such a weapon. At that time Acheson called him on the carpet and told him that "if this was his view he ought to resign from the Foreign Service and go out and preach his Quaker doctrine but not push it within the Department."[5] After he left the State Department in 1950, Kennan's disbelief in any Soviet military threat prompted him to warn publicly of a "militarized" U.S. posture. For Kennan the cold war itself had its origins in a "militarization" of U.S. policy resulting not from any military danger posed by the Soviets but from a failure of American diplomacy and imagination.

Even in the early days of containment, therefore, there was contradiction in Kennan's thought, though it was not obvious to an audience outside the State Department. It was concealed by his eloquence, his extraordinary fluency in the language of the old diplomacy—a powerful idiom in an era when American policymakers were suddenly called upon to assume classic British responsibilities for the maintenance of international stability. There was nothing in the American vernacular to answer the dilemmas the United States now faced. Along came Kennan, steeped in Continental learning, with a kind of European accent, even, to provide policymakers with a language for articulating the new problems confronting them.

Kennan succeeded brilliantly in this task. As analyses of the foreign policy dilemmas of their era, the Long Telegram and the "X" article display then and now a clarity and elegance more reminiscent of British Foreign Office writings in their golden age than of American State Department prose at any time—least of all in the wartime years of self-delusion concerning the nature of the Soviet communist regime and "Uncle Joe."

Because Kennan, in these documents and elsewhere, employed the traditional idiom of the balance of power—delineating foreign policy in terms of interests and equilibria—there has always been a tendency to regard realpolitik as fundamental to his thought. "By the time the 'Long Telegram' had won him the reputation for being the foremost Soviet expert within the government," John Lewis Gaddis writes in *Strategies of Containment* (with characteristic admiration for his subject), "there was already present in [Kennan's] writing and thinking a depth of strategic vision—that knack for seeing relationships between objectives and capabilities, aspirations and interests, long-term and short-term priorities. . . ." Yet it was precisely on strategic questions that Kennan's thinking was even then contradictory and ambivalent—a fact the Long Telegram and the "X" article failed to make clear. Neither document disclosed a cardinal reservation, an eccentricity of temperament that was central to Kennan's approach to foreign policy but that would emerge only later as the dominant theme of his work: a profound reservation concerning—nay, a positive revulsion towards—the employment of military power as a cardinal element of policy. ("I recognized, at that moment," Kennan recalled in his memoirs of World War II, "that I stood temperamentally outside the passions of war—and always would.")

Not that Kennan was entirely inattentive to military requirements or as insouciant about the military challenge to the West as he would prove in later years. In 1945, when a number of scientists and political figures were proposing an open sharing of the atom secret with the Soviet Union as a gesture of goodwill, Kennan adamantly opposed the idea, writing from Moscow: "There is nothing—I repeat nothing—in the history of the Soviet regime which could justify us in assuming that the men who are now in power in Russia . . . would hesitate for a moment to apply this power against us if by doing so they thought that

[5]David McLellan, *Dean Acheson: The State Department Years* (New York: Dodd Mead, 1976).

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they might materially improve their own power position in the world. . . . It is thus my profound conviction that to reveal to the Soviet Govenment any knowledge which might be vital to the defense of the United States, without adequate guarantees for control of its use by the Soviet Union, would constitute a frivolous neglect of the vital interests of our people." Yet as the cold war developed, Kennan would remain unwilling to contemplate any major expansion of American military strength.

This reservation drove a fissure down the middle of Kennan's thought. While he weighed the world unsentimentally in the scales of the balance of power, he also insisted that the balance operate without any large-scale military effort. "You have no idea," Kennan told students at the National War College in 1946, "how much it contributes to the general politeness and pleasantness of diplomacy when you have a quiet little armed force in the background." From another man such a remark might seem an understatement. But in Kennan's case this interpretation would probably miss the mark; when he suggested that the essence of diplomacy was to be "polite" and "pleasant" while armies remain "quiet" and "little," there is no reason to suppose that this is not exactly what he meant. In the late 1940s he felt that the entire military task of containment in Europe could be accomplished by two crack mobile divisions of Marines.[6] The work of containment would be done not by the large-scale marshalling of U.S. military power but rather by brilliant diplomacy, coupled with a spiritual renovation restoring America to its original admirable traditions—an accomplishment that would display to the world a flawless alternative to the Soviet system he despised.

III

THE LATTER THEME points to another major reservation hidden below the hard surface of the idea of containment—the doubts arising from Kennan's ambivalent feelings about the moral worth of the American nation as it actually existed. These feelings, which have become more fully apparent in statements made by Kennan in recent years, played a powerful role in his view of American civilization even in his youth. It is thus strange that in his "X" article, Kennan put so much stock in America's moral potential. In the Walgreen Lectures in 1951, he noted, curiously, that:

> [the] thoughtful [American] observer of Russian-American relations will find no cause for complaint in the Kremlin's challenge to American society. He will rather experience a certain gratitude to a Providence which, by providing the American people with this implacable challenge, has made their entire security as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear.[7]

The Soviet challenge to American safety, therefore, was to be welcomed as a kind of baptism of fire, burnishing moral rectitude into a slipshod and decadent American character.

Such ideas took hold of Kennan's imagination quite early. In the 1930s, still a young diplomatist, he already had concluded that the American political system was almost hopeless; only draconian measures could save it. The Constitution was obsolete; representative government had degenerated into corrupt, faction-ridden democracy; crime and racial antagonisms were pervasive. When many young American intellectuals were mesmerized by Roosevelt's New Deal, he had no faith in it. (He also had no illusions about the Soviet system under Stalin, which from first-hand observation he despised, even as many of his contemporaries admired it from afar.)

Kennan's private prescriptions from this period for American recovery of civic virtue are curious, to say the least. One idea was to curtail radically the suffrage—taking it away from women, racial minorities, naturalized citizens,

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[6]Paul H. Nitze, "The Development of NSC 68," *International Security* (Spring 1980).

[7]*American Diplomacy 1900–1950* (University of Chicago Press, $15.00 cloth, $9.95 paper).

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and welfare recipients. Another proposal was to shield the conduct of foreign policy from the touch of ignorant, petty politicians, entrusting it to an elite of carefully chosen and trained janissaries. Such a cadre, as one scholar recently has written, would "chart unexplored, brave worlds and discard for good bankrupt political institutions."[8]

Such thoughts might be dismissed as the ramblings of intemperate youth had not the general tenor of Kennan's theme persisted over time. His distrust of particular groups in American society reappeared in a memorandum he prepared for Acheson in 1949, dealing with the appeal of communism for "maladjusted groups: in our country—Jews, Negroes, immigrants—all those who feel handicapped in the framework of a national society." In the 1960s—the era of adolescent anti-war protest—he manifested distrust of American youth and advocated abolition of the right to civil disobedience.

In his recent view, the Soviets are more capable than Americans of dealing with the genuine problems of drugs, pornography, noise, and the like. Domestic turmoil was an intrinsic barrier against America's becoming a world power. This despairing view, consistently repeated, reappeared in the 1970s in Kennan's dialogue with George Urban in *Encounter* (September 1976), in which he denied the possibility that America could have anything whatsoever to demonstrate to the world:

> URBAN: It has fallen to the United States to lead the world, but the United States can offer no leadership. Isn't this . . . an almost unique fact in history?
>
> KENNAN: Leadership cannot be given for . . . two reasons . . .: (1) because the United States has nothing to say to the outside world, and (2) because the kind of government we have does not permit, even if we had a valid message to impart, the shaping of that message into a consistently pursued foreign policy.

Kennan's gravest misgivings about American democracy arose from its behavior in world politics. In *American Diplomacy*, he railed at the peculiar American habit of applying moral and legal standards to international politics; Wilson was in this respect the foolish role model for liberal ideologues. But behind foolish Wilson lay the real monster, democracy itself, a destabilizing factor in both war and peace:

> . . . I sometimes wonder whether . . . a democracy is not uncomfortably similar to one of those prehistoric monsters with a body as long as this room and a brain the size of a pin: he lies there in his comfortable primeval mud and pays little attention to his environment; he is slow to wrath—in fact you practically have to whack his tail off to make him aware that his interests are being disturbed; but once he grasps this, he lays about him with such blind determination that he not only destroys his adversary but largely wrecks his native habitat.

Years later, in the New York *Times* on Armistice Day, 1984, Kennan would write of "the silliness of an entire people seeing itself as more virtuous, deserving and generally glorious than others, and waging self-destructive war in the service of this fatuous illusion." In this admonition he had his own countrymen in mind.

IV

FAR FROM BEING anchored to a coherent strategic vision, Kennan's approach to foreign policy might be described

[8]For further details of Kennan's early views on politics, see David Mayers, "Young Kennan's Criticisms and Recommendations," *Biography* 8:3 (1985). The chief source of Mayer's examination of Kennan's views at the time is a remarkable treatise, "The Prerequisites: Notes on Problems of the United States in 1938." In advocating withdrawal of franchise from American Negroes, Kennan then noted that repeal of suffrage would force the white population to develop a deeper sense of responsibility for the black man's welfare. "It is a national characteristic," he wrote, that "we are kinder to those who, like our children, are openly dependent on our kindness than to those who are (supposedly) able to look after themselves."

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as anti-strategic. One symptom of this is the theme of the professional antagonism between soldier and diplomat, which looms large in his histories as well as in his other policy writings. Kennan is clearly hostile not only to military thinking and military planners, but also to the discipline and logic that a strategic vision of statecraft should impose upon diplomacy. It is not diplomacy's function to serve the ends of strategy, but rather something like the reverse. For Kennan, diplomacy is *the* central element of statecraft. Diplomacy is conducted for its own sake, not as handmaiden to any grander strategic goals.

More than most historians, Kennan tends to write diplomatic history almost exclusively from the perspective of the diplomat—even more that of the diplomat proper than of the foreign secretary—the viewpoint, as it were, of a *chargé d'affaires*. One instance of this is his treatment of national frontiers and national interests, which are presented to the reader as simple givens—as they appear, for the most part, to diplomats—neither questioned nor justified.

Similarly, the actions of Otto von Bismarck, which form the shadowy backdrop of Kennan's first volume in the World War I trilogy, are never fully explicated in terms of Bismarck's strategic aims. At times one can hardly believe that Bismarck had any goals save the preservation of peace in Europe and good form in diplomacy. In Kennan's portrait, this statesman, who fought two triumphal wars that forged an empire, takes on a curiously disinterested and at times almost benevolent air. Indeed, for Kennan, the central event of Bismarck's career, the Franco-Prussian war (with which the Prussian leader achieved the unification of Germany) becomes, ironically, the Iron Chancellor's one big mistake—since it in turn laid the seeds for hostility and war with France in a later era. But as historian Kennan is uninterested in Bismarck the architect of empire; rather, he is concerned with Bismarck the guardian of European peace. Bismarck the strategist disappears, yielding to Bismarck the diplomat. Never mind that Bismarck's diplomacy was directed at preserving a favorable balance of power for the empire that, as grand strategist, he forged in the first place. He is depicted as a soulmate to a contemporary, Nikolai Karlovich Giers, the Russian foreign minister, who shares with Bismarck the diplomat's instinctive understanding of good form. Giers (the trilogy's real protagonist) is the quintessential career diplomat, "probably the most seasoned and able statesman of his time in Europe, after Bismarck," according to Kennan, "a modest, quiet, scrupulously honest man"—in short, an idealized Foreign Service officer.

The primacy of diplomacy over statecraft reflects the primacy of means over ends, form over substance, in human affairs generally. To subject means to ends is a sign of stupidity and vulgarity—likely, in Kennan's view, to cause trouble. At the heart of the diplomatic ethos, as he understands it, is a belief in the value of form for its own sake—which is one reason that diplomacy holds the key to the prevention of war. Kennan learned this lesson as a young Foreign Service officer. In his memoirs, he writes of Alexander Kirk, who served as *chargé d'affaires* of the American mission in Berlin during Kennan's tour there before Pearl Harbor:

> I am particularly indebted to him for the impressive lesson he gave me, by example even more than by precept, of the importance of the means as compared with the ends. The only thing worth living for, he once told me, was good form. He himself had little to live for; there were moments when he would have liked to leave this life; but suicide would be an abrupt act, and abruptness was the height of bad form. "Never, never, do anything abrupt," he advised me. "It never pays."

Later in the *Memoirs* the same lesson is elaborated:

> Objectives were normally vainglorious, unreal, extravagant, even pathetic—little likely to be realized, scarcely to be taken seriously . . . . But methods were another matter. These were real. It was out of their immediate effects that the quality of life was really molded. In war as in peace I found myself concerned less with

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what people thought they were striving for than with the manner in which they strove for it.

Barton Gellman has drawn our attention to an even more categorical statement of the same conviction offered by Kennan in a lecture at the University of Virginia in 1946:

> Some of us are inclined to feel that even in international affairs the observance of good form and good manners has probably done more in the end for civilization and peaceful living than all the moralizing about the content of human behavior. What is important, in other words, is not so much *what* is done as *how* it is done. And in this sense, good form in outward demeanor becomes more than a means to an end, more than a subsidiary attribute: it becomes a value in itself, with its own validity and its own effectiveness, and perhaps—human nature being what it is—the greatest value of them all.[9]

For Kennan it is the fixation on vainglorious "objectives" in politics that is likely to lead to war: such is always the preoccupation of the villains in his histories, the nationalists and the military men, who think in terms of grand (and therefore necessarily vain) accomplishments. (Bismarck becomes a hero to Kennan in direct proportion as his goals, in his later career, become modest and unobtrusive.) Against this villainy, Kennan sets the "good form" of the diplomat, who knows instinctively and fatalistically that such large objectives are futile and lead ultimately to tragedy.

THE DISSOCIATION of means from ends in the consciousness of the diplomat goes hand in hand with an alienation from the goals of the nation he represents. The diplomat is able to emphasize form in international politics precisely because of personal detachment from substance. What moves the diplomat is not any attachment to country but rather the ethos of diplomacy itself; the ideal diplomat is as likely as not to have "greater difficulties with his own government than with that to which he [is] accredited," as Kennan writes of one diplomat in *The Fateful Alliance*. He describes his own transformation into such an "expatriate" in the first volume of the memoirs:

> I came away from the summer's visit aware that I was no longer a part of what I had once been a part of—no longer, in fact, a part of anything at all. It was not just that I had left the world of my boyhood, although this too was true; it was also that this world had left me. It had left everyone else, for that matter; but its departure had been sufficiently gradual so that those who remained had been less aware of its passage, and had adjusted in varying degrees to the change. I, like all other expatriates, simply had been left behind. These feelings were only the first strong reminders of a reality which affects the situation of almost every professional diplomat. Increasingly, now, I would not be a part of my country . . . . I would continue to pay it my loyalty. This was a matter of self-respect and of a deeper faith in the values of our civilization. What else, after all, could I be loyal to? But it would be a loyalty *despite*, not a loyalty *because*, a loyalty of principle, not of identification.

The character of Giers in the World War I trilogy is modeled on this pattern: he is shown most typically countering the wishes of his own countrymen while cooperating in the program of the German chancellor, Bismarck, for European peace.

Kennan's vision of history is particularly marked by a lack of interest in the "epic" dimension of statecraft—empire-building, nation-building, the making of war itself. Nor is Kennan's curiosity aroused by the personality that approaches statesmanship in this way. Only in a small degree do the terrible or the great figure in his writing. His memoirs virtually ignore Hitler. There is no display of interest in Churchill, nor in exploring Churchill's solution to the problem of democratic statesmanship. Bismarck plays a more negligible role

[9]Quoted in Barton Gellman, *Contending with Kennan: Toward a Philosophy of American Power* (Praeger, $21.95 cloth, $11.95 paper).

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in *The Decline of Bismarck's European Order* than the title of that volume might suggest. Purposeful political actors in the grand style hold much less interest for Kennan than do more minor and passive figures, fatalists like Alexander Kirk and Giers, swept along reluctantly (though always with knowing irony) in the turbulent currents of their time.

One consequence of this perspective is a tendency to play down or denigrate what a determined tyrant can accomplish. To judge from the account in his memoirs, Kennan throughout the 1940s was impressed with nothing so much as the inherent barriers to the ultimate success of the then-expanding Third Reich. He recalls concluding that "even in the event of a complete military victory the Nazis would still face an essentially insoluble problem in the political organization and control of other peoples of the continent."

A similar perversity is apparent in Kennan's oft-repeated claim that the division of Europe under Stalin is an "unnatural" phenomenon fated to end (which is related also to the predictions in the "X" article that if the West resisted Russian expansionism, Russia would be forced to make internal adjustments):

> [B]eginning with this scrutiny of the German occupation problems in 1939–1941, I was brought to recognize the continued and undiminished relevance in the modern world of Gibbon's assertion that "there is nothing more contrary to nature than the attempt to hold in obedience distant provinces." Out of this grew my feeling that one must not be too frightened of those who would aspire to world domination. No one people is great enough to establish a world hegemony. There are built-in impediments to the permanent exertion by any power of dominant influence in areas which it is unable to garrison and police, or at least to overshadow from positions of close proximity, with its own troops.

From a certain perspective, of course, *every* political arrangement is, to use Kennan's term, "unnatural"—at least at its origins. It is the product of artifice and change, of the work of human beings. It comes to seem "natural" only with time, and normally only because the resistance that attended the moment of creation is gradually worn down. (Aron, after Kennan once complained about the "abnormal" division of Europe in the 1950s, shrewdly observed that an abnormal situation is less dangerous than an equivocal one.) Western colonization of the North American continent was in this sense "unnatural"—it certainly must have seemed so to the tribes and European empires then being displaced—though today it seems natural enough. Even where equilibrium, characteristically taking the form of the decimation of resistant forces, is never attained, "unnatural" political arrangements have been known to persist for considerable spans of time. The Roman empire itself, after all, existed for a number of years before, to use Gibbon's term, "nature's" dominion was restored. Kennan's judgment concerning the "naturalness" or "unnaturalness" of Soviet rule—and of the Soviets' ability to impose their will on the captive peoples of the East bloc—betrays a characteristic insensitivity, whether theoretical or historical, to the more seismic realities of politics.

V

OF his dual careers as diplomat and historian, Kennan writes that "the two seemingly conflicting attractions were actually interrelated and interdependent . . . . [P]art of my strength as a diplomatic historian came from the fact that I had been responsibly involved with contemporary problems of diplomacy, whereas whatever value I had as a commentator on contemporary affairs was derived, in part at least, from the belief on the part of the public that I knew something about history."[10]

When we turn to Kennan's concerns as to the causes of war, we are entering the sanctuary of an abiding personal concern that draws together both his historical and diplomatic writings, a nexus linking his thoughts about both present and past dilemmas.

[10] *Memoirs 1950–1963* (Pantheon Books, $7.95 paper).

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For Kennan, World War I was the great catastrophe of the 20th century (of course he is hardly alone in thinking so). The shadow that the causes of that war cast upon the causes of World War II shrinks the importance of the latter. In fact, one peculiar aspect of Kennan's treatment of this problem is the scant attention he pays to the causes of World War II: the second war was in his opinion a foreordained consequence of the nature and outcome of the first.[11]

This theme preoccupied Kennan in his Walgreen Lectures (1951), shortly after he left government service. Gravely wounded by the earlier struggle, the democracies could not by themselves summon the will and strength to face another war. The global balance, he said, had now turned decisively against them. Westerners' horror of another war was such that they were paralyzed; but he also pointedly sympathized with their horror at envisioning a repeat of the experience. Was war worth the price of the survival of democracy?

> Can it be that all this bloodshed and sacrifice was just the price of sheer survival for the Western democracies in the twentieth century? If we were to accept that conclusion, things would look pretty bleak black; for we would have to ask ourselves: Where does all this end? If this was the price of survival in the first half of the century, what is survival going to cost us in the second half?

Scarcely five years after Kennan's bold global prescriptions for U.S. containment policy, one notes a curious mood of defeatism in his analysis of an earlier period's confrontation with analogous problems. In the 1930s the Western democracies failed to contain and deter the challenge of Nazi totalitarianism. Yet in Kennan's view little then could have been done: "World War II seemed really so relentlessly predetermined; it developed and rolled its course with the relentless logic of the last act of a classical tragedy." The West in the 1930s had become militarily outclassed. "The world balance of power had turned decisively against it." "In the case of Germany and Russia, circumstances were bitter. Together, they could not be defeated at all. Individually, either of them could be defeated only if the democracies had the collaboration of the other."

Thus the Western democracies could not salvage their position by their own means. Western statesmen of the time—"old men"—were "actors in a tragedy beyond their making and repair." Maybe they could have summoned up some will in 1936—to resist Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland—but the hour even then was late.

What then were Kennan's retrospective prescriptions for fending off a new war? Not much—only one positive suggestion did he supply to his Chicago audience: the West might have been nicer to the Weimar Germans, who might then have repulsed Hitler's onslaught against them. But what else?

> I think [he told the Chicago audience] we have no choice but to face it—for the thought at once suggests itself that the best way to win so inauspicious a war might have been to find some way in which one would not have had to fight it at all.

This strangely defeatist line of thought was pursued no further in the lecture. No mention whatsoever was made of the policy of appeasement or of the democracies' failure, until the option had lost all credibility, to join in common deterrence of the Nazi threat. Kennan's analysis of the situation in the 1930s is crystal clear: the West managed to survive only fortuitously, thanks to Hitler's strategic decision to turn against Stalin.

This being so, how might the democracies have found "some way in which one would not have had to fight at all"? Years later Kennan came up with a formula for this, when in the 1970s he addressed (and dismissed) the (to him) foolish fear of some Westerners about their own possible "Finlandization" by the Soviet Union.

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[11]Kennan of course is not the only historian to see World War II this way. A. J. P. Taylor, for instance, advances the notion that the 1914 to 1945 period was a seamless web of conflict; the "interwar" era was only an armistice.

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Actually there was hope for weak nations faced by aggressive ones:

> Most small or militarily inferior nations are sensible enough to recognize that there is nothing to be gained by yielding to blackmail of any sort from stronger ones, because the demand acceded to today will merely be followed by another one tomorrow . . . . [A]s a general rule the smaller and weaker the country, the more sensitive its government to any hint of military pressure being applied to it, and the more ready its resistance to anything that smacks of pressure or blackmail from the stronger power.[12]

From a man who served as a diplomat in Prague in 1938–1939, this is an arresting statement, particularly when we contrast it with his own published dispatches from that tragic capital in 1939; there he had described a rather different outcome for the "small and militarily inferior" nation of Czechoslovakia. This is Kennan's own brief account of the fortunes of Czechoslovak leader Eduard Beneš, when confronted with blackmail from a stronger power:

> On October 5, 1938, five days after the Munich Conference, the Czechoslovak President Eduard Benes, abandoned by the French and the British, allowed to believe that his continuance in office would cause his country to be treated with even greater ruthlessness by the Germans, . . . resigned his position and retired to private life.[13]

VI

IF ONE leaves behind Kennan's cursory treatment of World War II as the tragic, predetermined consequence of World War I, and turns to his account of the causes of the earlier struggle, determinism gives way to choice—*that* one, it seems, could after all have been prevented. (Here Kennan turns the traditional historical teaching on its head. Churchill described World War II as the most avoidable of wars; it was the first Great War that took the British of Churchill's generation by surprise.) In these narratives of European polarization after 1890, one sees Kennan the moralist at work, charting the intrigues and dissecting the foibles of statesmen. His scholarship is animated by the aim of discovering the true, fundamental causes of August 1914. But the results are idiosyncratic and puzzling.

When one sets Kennan's histories beside recent scholarship on the antecedents of World War I, one is struck by two peculiarities. The first is the long span of time covered by his projected trilogy. Kennan begins his search for the causes of the Great War around 1875—some forty years before the war actually broke out. There is, of course, precedent for this kind of approach. But it is made a little curious by Kennan's insistence, particularly in the closing remarks of the second volume, on skipping forward twenty years—from the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance—to draw direct lessons for the outbreak of hostilities in July 1914. The other, related idiosyncrasy is Kennan's apparent failure to take cognizance of important recent scholarship on the war's origins.

Kennan's clear implication is that France and Russia share a responsibility for the causes of World War I at least equal with, if not greater than, Germany's:

> Germany was, after all, a satiated power, so far as Europe itself was concerned, and stood to gain little from a major war on the Continent . . . . The question arises as to whether, *if the purposes of the two parties to the Franco-Russian military convention were really defensive,* it was wise for them to bind their own hands and those of their successors to a given action . . . [emphasis added].

Yet in shifting the blame for the war from imperial German leaders to the shoulders of scheming Russians and Frenchmen, Kennan's work, unbeknownst to most readers, is swimming against the current of recent historical scholarship, which increasingly has emphasized that primary responsibility for events in 1914

[12] "Europe's Problems, Europe's Choices," *Foreign Policy* 14 (Spring 1974).

[13] *From Prague after Munich: Diplomatic Papers 1938–1940* (Princeton University Press, $32.00 cloth, $9.95 paper).

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lay with officials of the Reich. Accounts of the antecedents of World War I now tend to agree that by comparison with the aggressive role of the German leaders in the July 1914 crisis, the Russian and French roles were quite passive and reactive. The same is true of the Russian and French part in the decade or so of diplomatic conflict leading up to the war.[14]

INDEED, scholarly thinking about the causes of World War I has undergone a major transformation during the past quarter-century—a transformation Kennan's histories thus far show no sign of taking into account. Views of the responsibilities of various powers for the origins of the war have changed markedly as a result of the so-called "Fischer Debate," touched off by the publication in 1961 of Fritz Fischer's controversial volume *Griff nach der Weltmacht* ("Grab for World Power").[15] On the basis of a detailed review of documentary evidence concerning events leading up to 1914, Fischer, an historian at the University of Hamburg, argued that World War I resulted from a deliberate bid by Germany for European domination. Ancillary elements of Fischer's case remain in dispute—notably his severe judgment on the actions of Bethmann-Hollweg, the German chancellor of the time. But as a result of Fischer's work and the subsequent research by other scholars, as V. R. Berghahn notes, "few historians would now dispute Germany's decisive responsibility for the outbreak of the 1914–18 war."

This is extremely difficult to reconcile with the distribution of responsibilities implied in the conclusion of *The Fateful Alliance* and in Kennan's narratives generally. The significance Kennan attaches to French and Russian intrigues in the late 19th century makes sense only on the assumption that Russia and France played a much larger role in provoking the war than history now assigns them. Granted, the first two volumes of his trilogy are by and large concerned with events more than twenty years before August 1914; it is nonetheless odd that Kennan's anticipatory remarks about the causes of the war and the course of the July crisis take no account of Fischer's publications, or of the Fischer debate. On the contrary, Kennan apparently upholds a variant of the old-fashioned "revisionist" interpretation of the war's origins, the explanation that became fashionable in the West in the decade after the Versailles conference, and which persisted in many varying forms until the Fischer controversy spurred a re-evaluation of the evidence. In the 1951 Walgreen Lectures, for instance, Kennan offered the following synopsis of the assigned responsibilities for the war's outbreak: "If you tried to compute the various degrees of guilt, you got a rather fuzzy pattern: the Austrians and the Russians no doubt in first place, the Germans with less but certainly with a goodly share, and no one with none at all. Above all, you could not say that anyone had deliberately started the war or schemed it." Few historians today would accept this view.

One way Kennan manages to obscure Germany's part as aggressor is by looking back over four decades. When one gazes back a full generation—to a long era of peace—it is invariably easy to talk about a pattern of grievances and provocations on all sides. But even here Kennan shades the story so as to distract attention from Germany's prime responsibility for changes in the climate of European affairs. Kennan describes Germany, in the conclusion of *The Fateful Alliance*, as a "satiated" power. But it was the growing prowess of Germany and its transformation from a satisfied power

[14]See, for example, V. R. Berghahn, *Germany and the Approach of War in 1914* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973) and D. C. B. Lieven, *Russia and the Origins of the First World War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).

[15]Published in English under the title *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, intr. Hajo Holborn and James Joll (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1967). See also Fritz Fischer, *War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914*, forw. by Sir Alan Bullock, tr. Marian Jackson (London: Chatto & Windus, 1975) and Fritz Fischer, *World Power or Decline: The Controversy over Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974).

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into a hegemonic power that paved the way for a major European war. The shifts in policy that followed the passing of Bismarck and the accession of William II—the adoption by Chancellor Caprivi first of a "new course" of wooing England at the expense of Russia, and the movement later toward a more assertive colonial policy culminating in William's embrace of *Weltpolitik* in 1897—these great shifts are obscured in Kennan's narrative, which loses itself instead in the tortuous intrigues of minor French and Russian personalities.

But much as diplomacy, for Kennan, is an extension of good manners, war is a petty squabble writ large, the culmination of a thousand wounds and grievances that diplomacy has somehow failed to soothe, anticipate, or forestall. This orientation helps to explain his valet-like focus on personal foibles and petty conniving, as though these were the chief motive-forces in history. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that in Kennan's hands diplomatic history becomes a novel of manners, while war in turn is understood, not as the result of actions and reactions of purposeful statesmen and governments, but as the breakdown of civility.

This is no place to set Kennan's causal theory in the context of an exhaustive review of the vast corpus of quarrelsome historical writings about World War I. Suffice it to say that no historian of any persuasion currently subscribes to the strange thesis Kennan here advances.[16]

VII

Even historians who have written friendly reviews of Kennan's first two volumes have been baffled by his fixation upon the Franco-Russian alliance as cause of the events of 1914. Why these two governments? Reviewing *The Decline of Bismarck's European Order* in the *Times Literary Supplement*, A. J. P. Taylor has pointed out crucial lacunae in Kennan's account. In the first place, the French and Russian governments were at this period separately in diplomatic isolation from the powerful alliance system in Central Europe. Their major mutual adversary at the time was Britain, not Germany. (Taylor also notes that one year *before* Kennan's "fateful" alliance was concluded, the German general staff already had begun to formulate the notorious Schlieffen Plan, which called for a two-front war beginning with a pre-emptive attack through Belgium on France, followed a few weeks later by a thrust into Russia.)

Especially curious is Kennan's inattention to the one substantive shift in German policy crucial in isolating Russia and thus in laying the groundwork for Russia's new receptivity to France: Germany's refusal in 1890 to renew the Reinsurance Treaty. The refusal was part of the new German effort to shape an alliance with Britain; the concern of the new German chancellor, Caprivi, was that the secret agreement between Russia and Germany might be discovered by the British. The Franco-Russian alliance emerged, in short, only after a major change had taken place in German policy toward Russia, and Russia sought the alliance for France largely as an alternative to the treaty with Germany. In Kennan's account this critical shift in German policy is oddly submerged; it becomes merely one among the several incidental factors (which include the French crackdown on the Russian revolutionaries in Paris and the poor impression made by the young Kaiser on the Russians) leading to Franco-Russian rapprochement.

While reviews of Kennan's books generally have been favorable, more than one reviewer has been disconcerted by Kennan's emphases.

[16]Kennan's assignment of responsibilities harks back to the views of the most famous of the revisionist historians, Harry Elmer Barnes, who argued in the 1920s that France and Russia conspired to make war on Germany in 1914. Barnes's work, based on the selected state documents released by the German and Bolshevik governments for propaganda purposes after World War I, has long since been superseded. See Harry Elmer Barnes, *The Genesis of the World War: An Introduction to the Problem of War Guilt* (New York and London: Alfred A. Knopf, 1929), and Berghahn and Lieven *passim*.

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Indeed, puzzlement is inevitable unless the connection between Kennan's role as historian and his role as policy critic is understood. For the eccentricities in Kennan's narratives have to do not so much with an idiosyncratic reading of historical events per se as with his tendency to present his historical material in light of what are at bottom concerns about contemporary American foreign policy. His objection to the Franco-Russian attempt in the 1890s to join together when faced with a powerful Central European rival is rooted in his consistent fear of alliance polarization as the cause of war, the same obsession that led him to oppose the formation of NATO in the 1950s. In substance, the moral of *The Fateful Alliance* is no different from the argument (advanced in the Reith Lectures in the 1950s) about the virtues of superpower "disengagement" from Europe.

At the basis of both is his *a priori* incapacity (or refusal) to accept military strength as a means of coping with the ambitions of a rising power. His complacency at the prospect of U.S.-Soviet disengagement from Europe—which would have sent American forces packing off 5,500 miles to North America, while a huge Red Army withdrew a few hundred kilometers eastward—is analogous to his profound distress at the sight of two European powers in an earlier period evincing grave concern about the mounting power of Europe's finest and most efficient military machine, imperial Germany. As he wrote in response to opponents of his famous disengagement scheme of the early 1950s:

> [T]he ideal military posture is simply the enemy of every political detente and compromise; and whoever is not prepared to make sacrifices and to accept risks in the military field should not lay claim to any serious desire to see world problems settled by any means short of war.[17]

It takes little imagination to see how the particular identities in Kennan's historical cast of late nineteenth-century actors can be fittingly rearranged so as to drive home his recent sermons about the cold war; for Imperial Germany, substitute the Soviet Union; for Russia and France, substitute the United States and its fickle Western Europe dependents, who lured America into the alliance that set the cold war in motion. The struggle between the cosmopolitan Giers and the Russian chauvinist Katkov in the *Bismarck* book is precisely the struggle between the diplomat and public opinion, the foreign officer and the McCarthyite. The war scare with which the story begins is a similarly allegorical commentary on a familiar phenomenon of democratic politics—the kind of problem on which Kennan blames the origin of the cold war.

After all, what was Imperial Germany in the late 19th century but a "satisfied" power directed by a chancellor absorbed with consolidating order and tranquility in the domains over which his empire's long shadow was cast? Set near this industrial-military colossus, what did the two troubled governments of France and Russia do? Why, they ganged up on (post-) Bismarckian Germany. A person of common sense, noting the security dilemma of the two nations, might suppose that in framing this alliance they were consulting their own interests, resorting to a coalition as a means of self-protection if not of deterrence. Not so Kennan. For him, they were polarizing Europe. How much nicer would it have been had they not done so!

But what in fact *should* they have done other than what they did? In *The Fateful Alliance* Kennan, as it happens, has little advice for the French, who in his telling are reduced to clever Gallic cozeners of the Russian court. But his counsel for the Russians is absolute and unequivocal—Russia never should have permitted itself to have become entwined in the affairs of Europe:

> [H]ow endlessly unfortunate, primarily for Russia but scarcely less so for France and the remainder of Western Europe, turned out to be this involvement of Russia, through her ties with France, to the great Western European conflicts of the first years of this century. It was this involvement that caused what had begun in

[17]"Disengagement Revisited," *Foreign Affairs* (January 1959).

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> 1914 as a Balkan quarrel to grow into the dimensions of a general European war. And it was Russia's participation in this great war . . . that fatally interrupted the adjustment of her social and political system to the demands of the modern age and thus played a leading part in bringing on the Revolution with all its fateful consequences . . . .

Sustitute a few proper names and we have the essence of Kennan's lesson for modern readers. Leslie Gelb, writing in the New York *Times Book Review*, translates *The Fateful Alliance*'s message for the benefit of readers who might have been so obtuse as to miss the point:

> The leaders who fashioned the Franco-Russian Alliance at the core of his new book were also afflicted [as are contemporary military planners] by blind spots. Mostly, Mr. Kennan argues, they did not understand that Imperial Germany was a "satisfied" power and not an aggressive one, "at least as far as Europe was concerned." The parallel with today on the American side, according to Mr. Kennan, is in our not grasping that Russia fears nuclear war as much as we do, and that the two superpowers can work together in common self-interest . . . .

VIII

IN KENNAN'S historical verdicts on foreign policy as well as in his contemporary judgments on policy choices there remains a large and altogether obvious analytic flaw—a failure to weigh the consequences of a given decision against the consequences that would have flowed from the available alternatives. The error seems almost too elementary to be plausible in a serious historian, yet there is a peculiar tendency to blot out the alternatives while fixing monomaniacally on the consequences of the particular decision itself. Thus in the 1890s it was tragic and bad in Kennan's view for the French and Russians to do what they did—their alliance, according to him, only provoked the post-Bismarckian epigones in the Wilhelmstrasse to nastiness. But suppose one were to concede that the alliance the French and Russians agreed to was wrong: what, then, should they have done—other than nothing at all? This matter Kennan does not address, other than to advise the Russian government retroactively to pull out of Europe and attend to its interior challenges of modernization. (One might almost as easily have advised Austria-Hungary to pull out of Europe.) In his advice to Dean Acheson in 1950 concerning the question of developing the H-bomb, a similar habit of judgment is to be seen: don't do it; let them do it if they wish, let the obloquy rest upon them for undertaking such a horrid enterprise. A fastidious repugnance at distasteful choices informs the corpus of Kennan's historical and policy writings.

In analyzing the judgments that historians are called upon to make about the choices taken by historical actors, Isaiah Berlin writes:

> [W]hat is called realism (as opposed to fancy or ignorance of life or utopian dreams) consists precisely in the placing of what occurred (or might occur), in the context of what could have happened (or could happen), and in the demarcation of this from what could not . . . . [T]his capacity . . . alone makes it possible to speak of criticism, or praise and blame, as just or deserved or absurd or unfair . . . . [T]his is the sole and obvious reason why accidents, *force majeure*—being by definition unavoidable—are necessarily outside the category of responsibility and consequently beyond the bounds of criticism, of the attribution of praise or blame . . . . [A]ll the discussions of historians about whether a given policy could or could not have been prevented . . . are intelligible only on the assumption of the reality of human choices.[18]

For this view—which might be characterized as the natural or common-sense perspective on historical choices—Kennan substitutes an occult, convoluted vision of historical causation. The peculiar effect of his outlook is that the victim of aggression is almost invariably blamed not merely for his own predicament, but also for the aggressor's. The rise of Hitler becomes

[18]Isaiah Berlin, *Historical Inevitability* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954).

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the consequence of Western insensitivity to the needs of the Weimar Republic. Japanese aggression is similarly rooted in American insensitivity and in a sentimental American insistence on the "Open Door" in China. The aggression of Wilhelmine Germany in 1914 is put down to the behavior of Russia and France twenty years before. Never mind that Weimar Germany was already rearming in secret violation of the Versailles Treaty long before Hitler came along and that the crucial factor in Hitler's rise, at any rate, was a stock market crash on Wall Street over which diplomats hardly had control. Never mind that Japanese imperial ambitions in Asia amply predated World War I or that the lapse of the Reinsurance Treaty antedated the "fateful" Franco-Russian alliance.

What we are presented with, in the end, is a through-the-looking-glass world, in which control is posited over the most elusive historical forces operating over vast reaches of time, even as command over the tools immediately within the statesman's grasp—the size of one's military, the choice of one's allies—is relinquished, consigned to fate. The assumption is that strategy can accomplish nothing even as diplomacy can accomplish everything; alliances are futile as protection against an adversary, even as brilliant diplomacy can alter, it would seem, the very nature and purpose of the enemy's regime. The flattering position this vision confers upon the diplomat helps to explain its currency among the foreign-policy elite, but Kennan himself is finally too experienced a diplomat to have much faith in it. So in the end, even the diplomat is relegated to the feeble role of appeasing his nation's adversaries and cajoling its friends, such as Czechoslovakia's hapless Beneš in the late 1930s, to hope for the best.

What recourse is there in Kennan's view of the world for pacific nations confronted with the vicious strivings of tyrants or tyrannies? To these, he offers only a code of fatalism and passivity, and the tenuous hope that tyranny is perhaps always doomed to fail, at least in some ultimate point in time. We are left with a picture of human affairs as incomplete as it is idiosyncratic. Whatever Kennan's historical writings may be able to tell us about the realities of appeasement and defeat, they are oddly silent about the human possibilities of purpose and will, defiance and victory.

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The UN: 40 Years, 40 Facts

José S. Sorzano

THE PASSING SEASON has marked the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations. Its commemoration has predictably produced an untold number of speeches and editorials extolling the UN's virtues, recalling its past achievements and exhorting a disenchanted world to renew its commitment to multilateralism. In the interest of balance, objectivity, and full disclosure, the following is a list of forty facts related to the United Nations that probably did not make it into those speeches and editorials, either because they are little known or because they were conveniently overlooked.

1. According to the UN's Charter, the central purpose of the United Nations is the maintenance of international peace and security to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." Since the adoption of the Charter there have been roughly 130 military conflicts producing 16 million casualties.

2. The United Nations excels in producing paperwork. In just three months, the 1982 General Assembly produced 236 million pages of documents. The UN's 1984–1985 biennium budget earmarks funds for 2.2 billion pages of documents.

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3. The average cost of one page of the UN's summary record is larger than the annual per capita income of the inhabitants of such least developed countries as Tanzania, Haiti, Chad, and Bangladesh.

4. The United States pays 25 percent of the United Nation's assessed budget. In some UN agencies U.S. contributions represent an even higher percentage.

5. The total American financial contribution to the United Nations system in 1983 was $1.2 billion ($672 million for assessed and peacekeeping obligations and $530 million for voluntary programs). A roughly similar amount is spent to support and staff the delegations representating the United States before various UN bodies.

6. Though the U.S. contributes one-quarter of the assessed UN budget, Americans comprise only one-sixth of UN Secretariat personnel. Moreover, the share is shrinking; among assessed agency professional posts, the American contingent has melted from 14.6 percent in 1972 to 12.6 percent in 1983.

7. The non-aligned nations, which comprise a majority of UN members, vote with the USSR an average of about 85 percent of the time in the General Assembly. Only 25 percent of the time do they vote with the U.S.

8. In 1982 the United Nations held more than 11,672 meetings in New York and Geneva. That is an average of about 32 meetings a day, including weekends. These figures do not include the UN-sponsored meetings at its other

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major regional centers in Vienna, Rome, Paris, and Nairobi.

9. For the 1984–1985 budget biennium the United Nations will spend more than $280 million in expenses associated with running conferences.

10. In 1981 the United States was a member of 96 international organizations and the State Department's Office of International Conferences sent American delegations to 914 international meetings.

11. The United Nations Secretariat employs 52,000 civil servants, compared to the U.S. State Department's 4,500 civil servants and 9,500 foreign service employees.

12. UN civil servants receive, on average, 32 percent higher pay than their American counterparts. The UN pension plan is equally generous. An accountant, for example, working for the U.S. government at a GS-12 grade will earn a pension of $18,000 after 35 years of service. His counterpart in the UN will earn a pension of $33,000 for the same length of service. In addition to their pensions, UN employees depart with a tax-free, cash, lump-sum farewell bonus—$310,000 for an under secretary general with thirty years of service.

13. Over three-fourths of the UN budget goes to personnel and its related costs.

14. The cumulative financial contributions of just thirteen nations (U.S., 25 percent; USSR, 13 percent; Japan, 11 percent; the European Community, 28 percent) amount to three-fourths of the UN budget.

15. The poorest countries individually contribute 0.01 percent of the UN budget, or roughly $67,000 each. The sum of the contribution of eighty of these countries (a numerical voting majority) amounts to less than one percent of the UN budget. Thus, those who have the votes in the UN do not have to pay its bills, while those who have to pay the UN's bills do not have the votes.

16. The Soviet Union has refused since 1962 to pay its share of the United Nations peacekeeping costs and is over $230 million in arrears. Article 19 requires that a member state in arrears by more than two years of its assessed contribution to the UN be denied a vote in the General Assembly. The Soviet Union is allowed to participate in all UN activities.

17. The Soviet Union has three votes in the General Assembly—the USSR proper, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia—despite the fact that these two republics enjoy no independence in the Soviet system. This not only allows Moscow three votes in the General Assembly, but also permits three separate New York-based missions, increasing the potential for espionage.

18. At least one in three of all Soviet, East bloc, and client state diplomats posted to the U.S. engages in espionage. This figure is based on the actual record of confirmed case histories (since much espionage activity goes undetected, an estimate of one in two may be more accurate). There are 1,204 Soviet bloc officials in New York. Also, most of these "diplomats" and "international civil servants" are accompanied by spouses and/or adult dependents. U.S. intelligence experts believe that they too undertake espionage assignments.

19. In violation of Article 100 of the UN Charter, Soviet Union nationals working in the UN Secretariat are not independent international civil servants but are "seconded" to the UN and remain under tight Soviet control throughout their UN assignment.

20. Soviet nationals seconded to the UN must pay back to the Soviet Union's mission in New York the difference between their salaries in Moscow and their much more generous UN salaries in New York. It is estimated that $25–30 million in "kickbacks" is paid to the Soviet mission in New York. Since one-fourth of that amount is contributed by the U.S., the result is that American taxpayers are paying for the Soviet mission's operations in New York.

21. The Soviet Union is allowed to determine for the UN which Soviet nationals can join the UN Secretariat. The Secretary General of the United Nations dismissed a Soviet national working in the UN after his defection to the U.S. He had received excellent performance ratings from his Western supervisor.

22. The United Nations' PINS (Public Information News Service) is a news summary distributed twice daily to the highest levels of the UN Secretariat and is effectively under the

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control of Soviet bloc agents.

23. Despite pervasive human rights abuses all over the world, a double standard on human rights questions persists at the UN. From 1980 to 1984 the Third Committee exclusively concentrated on human rights violations in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Chile. Until this year's consideration of Afghanistan, human rights violations in communist countries had never been placed on the agenda of the General Assembly or any of its committees.

24. The United States was prevented by a procedural maneuver from speaking in its own defense during the Grenada debate. After "gagging" the United States, the General Assembly then voted to condemn American actions in Grenada. This took place in disregard of the essential nature of the General Assembly as an international forum where all nations may express their views.

25. United Nations negotiations on a Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations have lasted for eight years but delegations have yet to agree about what a "transnational corporation" is.

26. The UN Center for Transnational Corporations monitors exclusively American and Western corporations, on the grounds that Soviet bloc companies trading and investing in developing nations are not profit-seeking and need not be monitored. In 1983 the Center for Transnational Corporations suppressed its own report on the corporate activities of the Soviet bloc's companies in the developing world, in response to a demand by Soviet officers on its own staff.

27. UN meetings seldom start at their appointed time. In 1982 the General Assembly alone wasted three weeks of working time by starting late. Costly interpreters for the UN's six official languages are paid to wait for the meetings to start.

28. In 1975 the General Assembly declared that Zionism is racism.

29. The UN's Department of Public Information (DPI) sanctioned a PLO exhibition—on UN premises in Zimbabwe—that included posters showing a Star of David superimposed on the American stars and stripes with corpses impaled on each of the Star of David's points.

30. Though the PLO is not a state, it is well represented on the UN staff. There are 22 Secretariat staffers identified as Palestinians; of the 52 listed as "stateless" most are Arabs and many are Palestinians. According to the PLO's representative, Zehdi Terzi, members of the PLO fill the quotas of other Arab nations, such as Jordan, as well. Meanwhile, Israel is severely underrepresented on the UN staff. Though entitled to between seven and eighteen professional posts, Israel fills only four.

31. The 35 member Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, established in the aftermath of the massacre of Israeli athletes by the PLO in Munich, excluded Israel.

32. Full observer status for the PLO has been voted by several UN agencies, including the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). When ICAO awarded this privilege to the PLO in October 1977, it allowed the PLO to send observers to all meetings at which the UN discusses air security. The rationale for this: the PLO has had considerable experience with air piracy (as skyjackers) and the PLO's advice could prove valuable to these meetings.

33. The UN documentation system allows any delegation to request that documents that it submits be circulated as official documents of the UN. In this manner all sorts of propaganda are later distributed with the UN's imprimatur.

34. In 1983 the General Assembly's First Committee, dedicated to arms control and security matters, sequentially adopted in the same afternoon four opposing and mutually exclusive resolutions (respectively submitted by NATO, the Warsaw Pact, Romania, and the nonaligned bloc) regarding INF deployment.

35. At any given time on any given issue, it is unlikely that more than one-third of the delegates have precise instructions from their respective foreign ministries.

36. Soviet bloc contributions to the voluntarily funded UN development assistance programs provide less than 1 percent of the programs' resources and are made in nonconvertible currencies.

37. Western developed countries provide approximately 92 percent of total UN development assistance. On a per capita basis, Western

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nations provided roughly fifty times as much development assistance as the Soviets and East Europeans.

38. The Eastern bloc countries take more out of the UN system than they put in. They received $216.4 million in 1983, which is almost twenty times what the Soviet bloc voluntarily contributed to the assistance programs that year.

39. UN records show that since 1975 at least $116 million has been spent to support what the UN calls "national liberation movements" (NLMs). About 25 percent of this has been and is being contributed by the American taxpayer. Although Congress in 1983 prohibited U.S. contributions to the UN for activities benefiting the PLO and SWAPO (but not other Soviet-backed NLMs), the UN bureaucracy continues to channel some U.S. funds to these groups. Over the course of five years only $7 million in U.S. funds has been withheld.

40. In the midst of Ethiopia's famine and mass starvation, the United Nations voted to build a $73 million UN conference center in Addis Ababa. Only five countries (U.S., UK, and the Benelux countries) voted against this decision.

Isolationism: A Riposte

Charles Krauthammer

IT IS ENCOURAGING that a debate on the nature and consequences of neo-isolationism has been joined, and that Robert W. Tucker ("Isolation and Intervention," Fall 1985) has contributed his usual eloquence to the enterprise. Since Tucker has framed his piece as a hard-headed realpolitik riposte to my dreamy and expansive interventionism, permit me a brief exercise in containment.

In "The New Isolationism," I identified two distinct isolationist tendencies. Left isolationism is an isolationism of means: it still has internationalist aspirations but will not supply the means to carry them out. (Tucker seems to agree with me here, though he prefers the word "interventionist" to "internationalist." So as not to confuse the reader, I will adopt that usage.) Right isolationism is an isolationism of ends: it will provide means, but only for a constricted set of interests, principally those required for American security, narrowly defined.

Tucker argues, first, that my definition of isolationism is too expansive. "Historically, our policy of isolation was defined primarily by our political detachment from Europe, then the center of the state system. . . . It is our alliance relations with Western Europe and Japan that provide the litmus test. Those who support our major alliances . . . cannot be considered as isolationist however much they may oppose intervention elsewhere."

Can this possibly be true? Would a policy that would retain our relations with NATO and Japan, but would countenance, say, a communist revolution in Mexico, the fall of South Korea, and the overrunning of Israel be non-isolationist? Or consider a nontheoretical example. Consider a foreign policy opposed to the invasion of Grenada, to U.S. attempts to change the government in Nicaragua, to military aid to sustain the government in El Salva-

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dor, to U.S. aid to UNITA in Angola—in other words, the foreign policy (at least until very recently) of liberal Democrats. Are these non-isolationist policies?

As one who once provocatively advocated an isolationism that *included* giving up our alliance with Western Europe and Japan, Tucker now insists that his (now repudiated) view be the only standard by which to judge a policy to be isolationist. Anyone less radical than the 1972 Tucker will not have earned the title.

Yet this insistence that Europe is the only test is arbitrary and archaic. Even Tucker is careful to call Europe "then the center of the state system." No longer. When after World War II the structure of the state system shifted from European multipolarity to U.S.-Soviet bipolarity, its center shifted too. It is no more Bonn and Vienna than it is Havana and Managua, Tokyo and Seoul, or Cairo and Jerusalem. A bipolar world has no "center," only webs of relationships radiating from the superpowers. Moreover, isolationism is a fundamental attitude toward American global responsibilities. It is a sense of weariness and impatience with the obligations and costs of empire. A desire for, as Tucker says, "general political detachment." This characterization fits many isolationists who have yet to repudiate Europe.

BUT MORE than definitions are at stake here. Tucker presents what is essentially a defense of right isolationism. The focus of our disagreement is Secretary of Defense Weinberger and his famous November 28, 1984 speech on "The Uses of Military Power." Tucker agrees that the secretary has laid down a "set of rather exacting conditions" for intervention in the Third World. But, argues Tucker, Weinberger's motives are not isolationist. "What has moved Mr. Weinberger," it seems, is not "alleged isolationist sentiments" but "fear that today's fragile foreign policy consensus might be quickly shattered by an ill-advised use of our military power," by "another Vietnam—or even perhaps a mini-Vietnam."

First of all, it is not clear how Tucker, or anyone, divines Weinberger's inner motives. Since this is intrinsically a shadowy activity of dubious verifiability, it seems to me more useful to discuss consequences. Moreover, as Tucker himself notes, we can postulate the widest set of motives for what are undoubtedly isolationist policies. Pre-war isolationists spanned the political spectrum from Norman Thomas to Robert A. Taft. Some feared the domestic effects of intervention; others, entanglement in Europe's conflicts; still others, the loss of American capacity for unilateral action. That Weinberger's reason may be fear of another Vietnam hardly refutes the charge that he is an isolationist.

Tucker then argues, in the alternative, that Weinberger is not isolationist because he accepts the American commitment to Western Europe and Japan—the usual exclusionary clause that, by my count, gets everybody off the hook except yesterday's Robert Tucker and today's Irving Kristol.

And yet, the conservative isolationist tradition has always been, as almost all writers on the subject, from Walter Lippmann to Selig Adler to Tucker, have insisted, one of *selective* disengagement. In the 19th and early 20th century the idea was to disengage from Europe. But conservative isolationists were deeply committed to control of the Western Hemisphere and many were committed to pushing across the Pacific as well. What I'm pointing out is that the ideology of selective disengagement has returned, but with a change of venue: some of the new right isolationists wish to remain in Europe, and disengage from the rest of the world. The exchange of one territory for another is no renunciation of isolationism.

Perhaps sensing that a tie to Europe is not convincing enough, Tucker adds that Weinberger also has an "appreciation that we have a continuing vital interest in retaining access to the Persian Gulf." A slim thread. And sustained by what evidence? "For without this interest he would have little reason to support so zealously the large interventionary capability we are developing." This is an interesting bit of bootstrap reasoning: because Weinberger believes in building up our armed forces, he must believe in using them (at least for the Persian Gulf). That the facts of Weinberger's behavior

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over the last five years refute this theory is an inconvenience Tucker neglects to address.

By Tucker's reasoning, a defense secretary who pours so much money into the military could not possibly have advised against the interception of the *Achille Lauro* hijackers, been reluctant to flex American military muscle around Nicaragua, resisted most strenuously intervention in Lebanon, and been the last to come on board on Grenada. No one disputes Weinberger's devotion to large standing armies. But that in itself is not evidence that he wishes them to march.

Third, argues Tucker, Weinberger's "set of rather exacting conditions" for intervention, while not isolationist, are mere prudence. "Today, as yesterday, the zealous interventionist believes that all political leadership must do in intervening is to lead. Mr. Weinberger does not think this is nearly sufficient." And, of course, neither do I. But I do believe it is necessary. If Vietnam taught us anything, it is that in the absence of leadership, everything else—including a preponderance of power—will amount to nothing.

Without leadership (or with what amounts to the same thing: leadership that, as Weinberger has proposed, must first be led by public opinion) foreign policy must necessarily turn inward. Had a poll been held a week before Grenada, it would not now be peaceful, democratic, and pro-American.

"Clearly Mr. Weinberger is engaged in an effort to limit the uses of American power." Precisely. And his principal limitation, the requirement that intervention be preceded by popular support, is, by any reading of American history, a guarantee of isolation. It means that there will be intervention only after Pearl Harbor. In a nuclear age, there will be no Pearl Harbor.

IN THE END, I suspect that what divides Tucker and me is not so much the definition of isolationism as its wisdom. I argue that our intervention abroad should be driven not just by considerations of realpolitik or the requirements of mere physical safety, but by ideology, the ideology of freedom. Our nationalism is unlike others, in that our very nationhood is bound up with and is meant to give expression to the idea of freedom.

Tucker finds this view misty-eyed and imprudent. But since he concedes that for a superpower to concern itself solely with physical security is practically a definition of isolationism, and since he no longer wants to be known as one, he too must produce a theory of extraterritorial action. He is, therefore, in favor of the "core" alliances with NATO and Japan. How does he justify their vast expense and attendant danger? Not, as I argue, in the name of freedom, but "because nations, like individuals, need friends and kindred spirits." We do not want to be "shut out from societies that begot and that continued to nourish our culture and institutions."

To begin with, this theory has no application to Japan. If Japan were to disappear from the map tomorrow, there would be some small rejoicing among auto workers, and far smaller feelings of diminishment among the rest of us. This nation neither begot us nor particularly nourishes our culture. Even for Europe the "kindred spirit" theory is thin. Do we deplore the Soviet crushing of Czechoslovakia because it deprives us of our pre-war nourishment from Czech culture and institutions? Or is it because it wounds our idea of ourselves to witness, again, the crushing of a free nation and our helplessness in the face of such an offense?

We refuse to abandon Europe, first, because to do so would undermine our own security, and second, because we would feel that we had betrayed ourselves if we allowed the freest, most democratic nations of the world to fall under totalitarian domination. The American motive for defending Europe lies much more in aversion to totalitarianism and a desire to see the success of freedom, than in a desire for "friends and kindred spirits." As against Tucker's group therapy theory of alliances, I would posit Wilson's or Truman's democratic idealism.

I FIND Professor Tucker's final point a curious confirmation of my characterization of right isolationism. "There are many things of value that are not the proper interest of foreign policy." I agree. And "while freedom is the highest of political values"—I agree again—

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"this does not make its universalization a proper interest of foreign policy." Here, I disagree, because otherwise I am left with only one conclusion: if the *highest* value is not to animate one's foreign policy, then no value must. In fact, Tucker's brand of realpolitik denies that foreign policy is the realm of values. It is the realm of prudential calculations of safety.

However, as Tucker himself admits, such a calculation leads directly to isolationism. He escapes the charge by positing a single value (which transcends considerations of realpolitik): his only exception, the need for "kindred spirits." It is a thin barrier, indeed, that divides him from what he himself would be forced to define as full-fledged isolationism. As a motive for American intervention abroad, the "kindred spirits" hypothesis is rather unconvincing. As Whittaker Chambers once said of another similarly constricted philosophy, "If you were a marine in a landing boat, would you wade up the seabeach at Tarawa for *that* conservative position?"

I do not argue for a foreign policy animated solely by a desire to promote freedom. Considerations of prudence are essential. I do emphasize the defense of freedom as an indispensable theme of a responsible intervention, however, because this consideration seems so utterly lacking in the formulation of right isolationism. Remove that theme, and the only reason for any army at all is to prevent a landing on the beaches of Miami. And for that a coast guard and a few thousand nuclear warheads will do nicely.

Tucker writes, of people with views like mine, that "although they want us to be prudent, they also want us to be prudent in a cause and for a purpose that has betrayed prudence in the past and is all too likely, if taken up, to do so again." Thus, the fact that we have betrayed prudence in pursuit of this cause (freedom) in the past (Vietnam, I suppose) means that we should not take it up again. Is there a more succinct formulation of post-Vietnam isolationism?

Try It on South Africa

Malcolm Fraser

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick made some interesting points in justifying support for the rebels in Nicaragua ["Anti-Communist Insurgency and American Policy," Fall 1985]. She concluded, as you will recall, that morality and national security justify intervention when insurgencies are seeking independence from the Soviets.

I have no quarrel with that proposition, but it was improperly and too narrowly drawn from the evidence.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick was correct when she said "legitimate" government depends on the "consent" of the governed. That is indeed the only conclusion that can be drawn from the Declaration of Independence, which she quoted. Why then does she restrict her conclusions to those insurgencies seeking independence from the Soviet empire?

Over the years there have been a large number of dictatorships who stayed in power without the 'consent' of the governed. That is true in South Africa today. I accept what Jeane Kirkpatrick says about Nicaragua. I hope she will see that the principle applies with equal force to South Africa. It is not a sufficient response to say there is an elected government in South Africa, for the great majority have no political rights and live in a situation akin to state slavery.

Selective application of such principles does less than justice to the conservative cause and diminishes the attraction of democracy in many parts of the world.

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Brzezinski's Pragmatism

Herbert London & Eugen Loebl

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI has written an article on "Afghanistan and Nicaragua" (Fall 1985) that demonstrates the bifurcation in American foreign policy. On the one hand is the moral basis for foreign policy, rooted in democratic principles and a belief in their efficacy for mankind; on the other is realpolitik, which emphasizes trade-offs and pragmatism and argues for accommodation when that can enhance international equilibrium.

Mr. Brzezinski argues in his article that "to imply the possibility of some political linkage between the crises in Afghanistan and Nicaragua is not the same as to equate morally the roles that the two superpowers are playing in these crises." He then goes on to illustrate the significant moral difference between the superpowers in their relations with Afghanistan and Nicaragua.

Nonetheless, he contends that an environment must be contrived (his word) for some solution which will be "the *sine qua non* for wider Soviet-American accommodation, creating a somewhat more favorable climate for arms control talks." The accommodation that Mr. Brzezinski has in mind is the "external neutralization" of both states—to wit, the avoidance of alliances hostile to the relevant superpower—and "internal self-determination" based on the freely expressed views of the people in both states.

The upshot of this proposal is that moral differences between the superpowers notwithstanding, "political realities" should dictate an accommodation with the Soviet Union. Overlooked in this analysis is the salient point that we are interested in the democratization of Nicaragua, whereas the Soviets are interested in the expansion of totalitarianism in Afghanistan. It is revealing that Mr. Brzezinski writes: "Both superpowers first welcomed the internal upheavals in their respective small neighbors—and then felt that the upheavals went sour." It is certainly true that the Carter administration welcomed the overthrow of the Somoza regime, but it is misleading to argue that the Soviets welcomed an internal upheaval in Afghanistan. The Soviets overturned a sympathetic government that was insufficiently obedient; they did not welcome the upheaval, they created it.

This distinction is important to consider in the Brzezinski calculus. For despite the qualifications, Mr. Brzezinski is a pragmatist who resists moral principles as the basis for policy. Admittedly, morality when rigidly applied can undermine good intentions. An unwavering opposition to non-democratic states, for example, can result in the creation of a totalitarian state, an argument made most persuasively by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick. However, in our relations with the Soviet Union linkage of problem spots is unwise because it is asymmetrical. It equates the desire for democracy with the expansion of dictatorship.

The illusion is also created that Soviet wrong-doing in Afghanistan is somehow equivalent to our actions in Nicaragua. As realistic as Mr. Brzezinski is about the moral differences between the U.S. and the USSR, his pragmatic suggestion undermines them. By relying on a trade-off this nation might erode yet again the moral basis on which our foreign policy de-

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pends. If we are willing to accept an Ortega government in Nicaragua for stability in Afghanistan, why not a communist regime in El Salvador for a Soviet hands-off policy in Finland? In fact, where does one draw the line?

Since Soviet foreign policy is not rooted in any other principle but national and ideological aggrandizement, this nation jeopardizes the legitimacy of its foreign policy posture by ignoring the moral basis for our actions. It is precisely this moral concern that is a catalyst for our insistence on political change in South Africa. To eschew morality with the Soviets and to maintain it with other nations vitiates morality as a principle on which to conduct foreign affairs.

The recognition of our differences with the Soviets is the way to marshall support, perhaps even bipartisan support, for foreign policy. If we accept Dante's prescription that when you enter hell, you leave all morals behind, then by ignoring morality one creates a hell on Earth.

Moreover, even from a pragmatic standpoint the trade-off itself is unbalanced. What the Soviets gain is not comparable to what we can gain. Presumably the Soviets would be restrained in Afghanistan, while we are restrained in Nicaragua. But there is no "we" in Nicaragua. The external neutralization of Nicaragua would probably translate into the American acceptance of Ortega. Even if the Soviets pulled their armies out of Afghanistan the KGB would fill the political vacuum. The deal has the scent of Yalta about it.

However, the pragmatic temptation should not dictate our conduct with the Soviets, even though there are obviously moments when pragmatism is necessary. The guiding principle of our dealings with the Soviet leadership must be based on the democratic principles that set our system apart from totalitarianism. We must remind ourselves of that difference particularly when foreign problems between the superpowers are treated as "comparable." If pragmatism is our only guiding light in the conduct of foreign affairs, then we won't know where to go. As a noted folklorist once said, if you don't know where you're going, any road will get you there.

Correction: Due to an editing error, an incorrect figure for British shipbuilding was given in Figure I of Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr.'s article, "Arms Races: the Metaphor and the Facts" (Fall 1985). The British authorized construction of five Dreadnought-class ships in 1910, not seven, as stated.

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Prizes and Spies

Michael Ledeen

THE FIRST ANNUAL "best" and "worst" awards have been designated, and the lucky winners follow.

Worst Front-Page Foreign Policy Story: to the Washington *Post*, for its extremely long story of October 30, 1985 written by Boyce Rensberger and entitled "Computer Bugs Seen as Fatal Flaw in 'Star Wars.' " This story quotes a variety of specialists to the effect that the Strategic Defense Initiative can't possibly work as planned. Indeed, the lead paragraph is a sort of anticipatory epitaph. "President Reagan's dream of an effective 'Star Wars' system of antimissile defenses is almost certainly doomed to failure, according to a growing number of top computer programming experts who say there is no conceivable way to write and test the software that would be needed to operate it with adequate reliability."

You can imagine the rest. Most of it comes from a top man at the University of Victoria in Canada, with some additional pessimism from a chap at MIT and another at the University of Illinois. All of them should be forced to read the press clippings of their worthy predecessors who announced that heavier-than-air machines couldn't possibly fly, or that the atom couldn't be split, or that it was impossible to hit a "keyhole in space" and thus put a man on the moon.

It's fine with me if the *Post* wants to give space to persons skeptical of SDI, but the front page? And all that space? I doubt there'd have been so much room for it if SDI weren't one of the top items on the Geneva summit agenda.

Best Story on the Media: to the *Economist*, for a three-paragraph boxlet (June 1, 1985), announcing that the BBC had removed three correspondents from Beirut "because of the difficulty of reporting truthfully the battle of the camps." The rest of the story explained the significance of the BBC's move, along with the essential background. Dangers of being killed or kidnapped

> had driven most newsmen out of Beirut even before. . . . Of those journalists who remained, some have applied a degree of self-censorship. Copy has become blander and personal by-lines are being used less. Those traditional rivals, the international news agencies, have been consulting each other before putting out figures of casualties, on which the Shias are especially sensitive. . . .

All of which raises an interesting question. Given our passion for honesty in advertising, shouldn't all the news agencies and other media who are reporting under such circumstances label their reportage? It will be recalled that during the

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Israeli invasion of Lebanon most Western correspondents announced that their stories had had to clear the Israeli military censors. It would be interesting to see how these same media would label their own self-censorship.

Best Understanding of a Foreign Political Culture: to the *Wall Street Journal*'s man in Rome, Roger Cohen, for his November 1, 1985 story, "Was Italy's Political Crisis a Joke, Mere Verbal Acrobatics, or Both?" (Which reminds me that the award for best headline-writing goes to the *Journal*, and, as in the past, there is no runner-up). Cohen was referring to the brief death and resurrection of the Craxi government in Italy. Two short paragraphs will give you the gist of the piece:

> . . . Differences between Republican minister Giovanni Spadolini and Socialist Prime Minister Bettino Craxi on Italy's Middle East policy seemed genuinely irreconcilable. The government even appeared to have resigned, making it necessary to replace it with another.
>
> But when Mr. Spadolini realized the country, and even the United States, was happy with Mr. Craxi, his iron determination gave way to infinite malleability. And the Italian genius for political compromises based on documents of impenetrable verbal acrobatics flowered splendidly.

It's the best short account of an Italian political crisis in years.

Espionage and the Media

THE EFFORTS of the American government to prevent the leakage of its secrets have always been controversial, except in those rare, clear-cut cases in which an individual is caught more or less red-handed passing sensitive information to a representative of a hostile foreign power. In all other instances (for example, the complicated question of East-West technology transfer), there is always an American ox being gored. The most vociferous opponents of any effort by the government to keep its secrets secret are the media, who have decided that *they* are best equipped to decide when things should be made public and when they should be kept secret. In the most extreme version of this view, the government should be subject to all manner of inquiry (ranging from the use of the Freedom of Information Act to clandestine contacts with journalists), and assume all the risk. Thus, the government is given the right to police its own people, but not to take any steps against journalists or broadcasters who make this secret information public. And now there is a dispute over what the government can do to its own people.

There have been a lot of espionage stories recently, one of which got the New York *Times* and *The New Republic* quite excited. This was the case of Samuel Loring Morison, an intelligence analyst for the U.S. Navy who was found to have given classified information to a British publication. The information was of two sorts. He gave *Jane's Defense Weekly* three photographs taken by an American spy satellite, and also information based on satellite imagery. As George Lardner Jr. described the jury's task, they had to decide "whether the information about the KH-11 satellite system that could be gleaned from the photographs and the Weekly Wires [a classified publication that showed the source of Morison's information] was still that 'closely held' in light of past leaks . . . [and] whether disclosure, again in light of past leaks, would cause 'potential' damage to the United States or 'potential' advantage to a foreign power." After six hours, the jury decided "guilty."

The *Times* editorialists hated it (October 19, 1985). First, they reduced his activities to handing over only a single photograph. Then they noted that this was the first time that anyone had been convicted of espionage for passing classified information to the press. To be sure, they granted that it was a crime to transmit a secret to "any person not authorized to receive it," but quickly added that "only the delivery of secrets to an enemy, or publication of certain specified things, like secret codes, is clearly punishable under the Espionage Act." *TNR* used almost identical language (November 18, 1985).

Harper's did a real service in airing the complexities of this issue: it published (Novem-

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ber 1985) an edited version of an extended "game" on government and the media that was broadcast at the beginning of 1985 on PBS. The players were all well-known, and in some cases distinguished representatives of the two sides: James Schlesinger, William Colby, and Alexander Haig for the government team; Daniel Schorr, Fred Hiatt, Floyd Abrams for the media, along with Judge Antonin Scalia and others representing the legal profession. The crucial exchange involved Schlesinger, Schorr, and Scalia. The press team had been arguing that, in a case where a very sensitive American intelligence system had been revealed to a journalist, it was right to publish the story even though it might damage the ability to monitor Soviet military activities and actually thwart our efforts to monitor Soviet compliance with arms-control agreements. Schlesinger observed that the "responsibility for national security . . . does not rest with the U.S. press."

Schorr leaped to the attack: "I will not yield patriotism to the government. I will not yield a monopoly on patriotism to those who happen to be elected or appointed officials . . . I will not accept the idea that we are less patriotic than those in government who play their games for their own purposes and then come and say, 'This is national security.' "

Scalia then delivered the case for letting the system work: "this is not a question of patriotism at all. It's a question of who it is that the people . . . chose to make decisions as to what should be kept secret and what should not be kept secret. Now, maybe the press does know better. . . . But . . . the people have given it to the secretary and to the president to keep the information secret."

In other words, the media have overstated their case. It is fair to believe that the Espionage Act means what it says, namely that passing secret information to persons who are not specifically authorized to possess it, is a criminal act. In fairness to the New York *Times*, its editorialists know that it is *wrong* to do that (and they think it would be fine if people like Morison were fired); they doubt that it's criminal.

What remains to be worked out is the proper balance between press freedom and national security. Is it, for example, permissible for journalists to protect their sources—*all their sources*—even when they protect criminal activity by so doing? It's tougher than it looks, because if you try to put all the burden for protecting secrets on the government (saying it's okay for the press to publish, but not okay for government employees to leak), then you're in essence putting the power of decision back into the hands of the press. Yet if journalists aren't permitted to protect their sources, then no end of legitimate and important stories will be stillborn, because the sources won't take the risk.

ONE MIGHT have hoped that *Harper's* would pursue this delicate question with some sophistication, but instead it unaccountably published a particularly mean-spirited essay by Walter Karp, arguing that the Reagan administration—from which a record number of leaks has emerged—was an implacable enemy of freedom. Indeed, at one point Karp seemed to be accusing the administration of murdering its critics:

> Political refugees from friendly tyrannies are another source of objectionable opinions: they know too much about the regimes they fled.
>
> After seeing its February white paper on El Salvador, which presented "evidence" that the Salvadoran guerrillas were being heavily armed by Cuba and the Soviet Union, exposed as a pack of lies, the Administration begins to deport Salvadorans en masse. In August, the tortured corpse of one deportee turns up by a Salvadoran roadside.

And the grand finale of this essay is sheer hysteria:

> Imagine a faction that would throw honorable men into prison so that it could impoverish the public treasury with impunity and bend a sovereign people to its will, not just this year and the next, but long after it has fallen from power. Imagine a venerable republic, the hope of the world, where the habits of freedom are besieged, where self-government is assailed, where the vigilant are blinded, the well informed gagged, the press hounded, the courts

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> weakened, the government exalted, the electorate degraded, the Constitution mocked, and laws reduced to a sham . . .

Now of course this sort of thing is rare, even at a time when the media are particularly incensed about public and governmental criticism, and about efforts to cut down on the leakage of sensitive information. But the fact that it exists at all, and is published at considerable length in what used to be a fairly distinguished magazine, shows that the media advocates are not eager to make concessions.

But it seems only a matter of time before the public will demand that the media, like the other three "Estates," become accountable in some manner. If you want to know why, simply look at the front page of the Sunday Washington *Post* of November 3, 1985. It features a Bob Woodward story, "CIA Anti-Qaddafi Plan Backed; Reagan Authorizes Covert Operation to Undermine Libyan Regime." Woodward wrote that such a plan had been approved by the White House, but contested by the congressional oversight committees. The leak was evidently from someone who favored the congressional view of the matter, for such leaks generally put an end to such operations. The president was reported to have been greatly angered by the leak, and to have ordered an investigation into the matter.

The president is right to be angered, and the public should be angry, too. It is not part of anyone's constitutional right to be told about the secret operations of the United States government. Such articles serve the interests of the ruler of Libya and his allies. And if the Department of Justice can identify the leaker and prosecute him or her for espionage, that's fine with me. The fact that Qaddafi learned of this by reading the paper rather than by paying an American government official to transmit the documents is of purely academic concern. And the reasonable leaders of the media are going to have to find a way to protect their First Amendment rights while also coming to terms with the government's right to protect national security secrets. It's not going to be easy.

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The Uncertainty Principle

Owen Harries

IN THE EARLY FALL I attended two conferences, one at Ditchley Park in England and the other in Columbia, South Carolina. Both conferences brought together groups of Americans and Europeans (mainly English) who have a serious interest in international affairs: politicians, diplomatists, academics, military men, think-tankers, bureaucrats, and journalists.

There have been hundreds of such conferences since 1945, nearly all of them having as at least one of their aims the promotion of transatlantic "understanding." Yet, what these two conferences demonstrated was the extent to which American and European assumptions and perceptions still differ profoundly, and the degree of ignorance that persists. Aneurin Bevan's remark about the problem of overcoming the barrier of a common language has not lost its point.

Ditchley Park is one of the loveliest sites imaginable for a conference. The handsome 18th century house was designed for the Earl of Litchfield by James Gibbs, the architect of St. Martin-in-the-Fields, one of London's great churches. It sits in its own park, complete with lake, oak trees, and grazing kind—just down the road from Oxford and next door to Blenheim palace. The style of the occasion lived up to the setting: portraits by Lely and Raeburn on the walls, crackling log fires, a butler and maids, cholesterol-despising breakfasts and afternoon teas, a black-tie dinner. In the summer, croquet on the back lawn is offered.

The subject on this occasion was defense (or rather "defence") and security in the Pacific region. The prevailing European view was that the notion of an emerging crisis in the Pacific region is unduly alarmist. While it was conceded that there is a real and serious problem in the Philippines, assessments of Soviet intentions, prospects, and military strength in the region were generally sanguine. Soviet policy was confidently described as foolish, blundering, and counterproductive. The underlying motives of that policy were interpreted as fear and a legitimate concern with "catching-up," which, according to one formulation, necessitates a measure of "global out-reach" (a marvelously benign phrase, suggesting a kind of ambitious welfare program). Sympathy was expressed for Moscow's problems with and apprehensions about China. It was maintained that Gorbachev, preoccupied with internal reform and Europe, was not really interested in the Pacific—clearly another case of a man who cannot simultaneously walk and chew gum. The Soviet military build-up was seen as creating more difficulties than opportunities, with phrases like "handicapped" and "caught in

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problems of its own making" used to describe the Soviet strategic posture. Comfort was taken from the fact, undoubtedly true, that the United States still has superior military force and a better geopolitical network in the region.

Coming to the conference soon after sending Irving Kristol's article on "The War of Ideology" to the printer, for me one of the interesting features of the meeting was that Soviet aims and policy were discussed without any mention of ideology. Indeed, in the three reports produced to sum up the group discussions that occupied most of the time of the conference, the word did not figure once. Which is strange, even if one does not believe that ideology is the sole, or even the main, determinant of Soviet policy; for surely it has *some* role. (Needless to say, there was also no discussion of the Soviet *nomenklatura* and of the powerful argument, advanced by Richard Pipes and others, that there is a logical connection between the interests of that elite and an expansionist foreign policy.) Oddly, ideology (of a kind) was more evident in the discussion of Western policy. One English participant, for instance, complained of the absence of an interest in arms control in the Pacific region and saw an urgent need for a concerted missionary effort "to spread the gospel" (his phrase) there.

The conference did not, of course, divide cleanly into Europeans and Americans. Some of the American participants shared the view outlined above while a few of the Europeans, particularly some of the French, dissented from it. But, in the main, the opposing position was held by the Americans. It was expressed in power political rather than ideological terms, stressing the extent of the build-up of Soviet arms and arguing that Soviet policy was much more purposeful and systematic than the Europeans allowed. Instead of taking consolation from the fact that the U.S. was still leader in the region, concern was expressed that the *trend* over the last decade was extremely unfavorable to it, and that current developments in Indochina, the Philippines, ANZUS, and elsewhere were not reassuring as to the future.

At the very end of the meeting, one of the English participants said something that very neatly summed up the difference between the two positions. He and most of those present, he said, thought of Pacific security essentially in terms of reaching a *modus vivendi* with the Russians. But he got the impression that some of the participants did not share this objective, that they were concerned to *undermine* the Soviet position in the region. He and others present found this deeply disquieting. Quite so.

IF THE SETTING of the second conference, organized by the University of South Carolina, did not quite match the splendor of Ditchley, the occasion was certainly at no disadvantage as far as the distinction of its participants was concerned. Vice-President Bush, Lord Carrington, Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, Senator Wallop, and Lawrence Eagleburger were among those in attendance. As at Ditchley, there was a roughly equal representation of Americans and Europeans. In this case, the subject of the conference—The Future of the Western Community—raised directly the question of trans-atlantic understanding.

To facilitate discussion, an interesting background paper—"The United States and its Allies: An End of Western Consensus?"—had been prepared by Donald J. Puchala of the University of South Carolina. In it he analyzed European attitudes toward the U.S. and the alliance, as reflected in opinion polls. Significantly, there was no corresponding paper analyzing American attitudes toward Europe. I say significantly because it seems to me that one of the great European successes in the alliance relationship is to have established, tacitly, that while European attitudes and concerns are important "given" data—which Americans have an obligation to note, worry about, and allow for in their dealings with allied governments—corresponding American attitudes can either be ignored or treated as aberrations to be corrected. Adjustment, in other words, is treated as very much a one-way process: something Americans (and, it goes without saying, European governments) must practice in response to European "realities," but which it would be unreasonable and unfair to demand of Euro-

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peans in response to the facts of American political life. Considering the relative importance of the U.S. to Europe and Europe to the U.S., this success is, in its way, an impressive achievement. It seems to me to involve, among other things, the exploitation of a residual "cultural cringe" on America's part, something the English, in particular, do with great skill (we have recently witnessed a particularly blatant and pathetic manifestation of this phenomenon in Washington's reaction to the English country house exhibition at the National Gallery, and the royal visit associated with it). But if it is an impressive achievement, it is also dangerous. For it must increase the likelihood that Europe will neglect warning signals from America until very late in the day.

To return to Dr. Puchala's paper, its central conclusions are: first, that "while the symbol 'NATO' still strikes responsive chords among Europeans, most of the substance of the alliance is objectionable to them"; second, that "Atlanticism among Western Europeans is being challenged by an alternative international orientation best described as 'neutralism/anti-hegemonism' "; and third, that this challenge is an elite-led phenomenon, in that the attitudes sustaining it (distrust of the two superpowers, lack of confidence in American leadership, a desire to stay out of U.S.-Soviet disputes) are more strongly evident among the educated than the population at large.

It is a measure of where we are in the Western alliance that when such facts are presented, with detailed supporting evidence, they cause no pronounced consternation. Indeed, as often as not, there is more European concern to play down their significance than to come to terms with it. Thus it is likely to be pointed out that, whatever the position of the elites, most of the governments of Western Europe are still firmly pro-NATO; that polls also show European publics to be strongly anti-Russian; that West Germany has the draft; that in the teeth of an intensive Soviet campaign the Pershing missiles were installed—and so on. While all this is true, it is mostly beside the point. It is not charged that Europe is pro-Soviet; neither is it maintained that Europe does not want to be protected. The serious concern is centered on the tendency toward neutralism, as frequently expressed in the desire to be "equidistant" from the "superpowers." As for the European governments, while their continuing commitment to NATO is commendable, the fact that the elites are increasingly distancing themselves from that commitment must raise serious questions as to its durability.

If Dr. Puchala's paper did not have the impact it should have had, one delivered late in the conference by Senator Wallop, giving his views on the state of NATO, caused something approaching alarm. In very trenchant terms, the senator maintained that "because the allies are there, and for the sake of the alliance, we Americans find ourselves materially and geographically less secure with every passing year." Among other things, he accused the European members of NATO of acting to delay and limit an adequate American response to the Soviet arms build-up; of supporting the Soviet economy through export credit subsidies, to the tune of a net annual capital flow of $3 billion (the OECD estimate); of putting pressure on the U.S. to overlook Soviet arms control violations; of failing to fight head-on the anti-Americans in their midst; and of engaging in "inexpensive political posturing" against the U.S. in Central America.

He went on to refer to the several proposals that have recently come before the U.S. Senate for reducing the 300,000 U.S. troops in Europe ("flesh-and-blood human beings—not trip wires"), describing those proposals as "a kind of reality therapy" designed to shock people into thinking seriously about the future of the relationship.

Senator Wallop's was a powerful statement. But for someone who follows the discussion of such matters it was scarcely new. What was striking, however, was that for many of the Europeans present it *was* new, shockingly so. One well-connected Englishman was so affected that he promised to see that a copy of the speech would be on Prime Minister Thatcher's desk the following Monday. Several Europeans came up to me after the session to ask rather anxiously whether there was significant support in this

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country for Senator Wallop's views. These were, I repeat, people with a special interest in international affairs.

This kind of ignorance seems to me a matter of greater concern than the existence of anti-Americanism in Europe (even than the supercilious anti-Americanism that comes clothed in professions of affection and Turnbull and Asser shirts). A certain amount of the latter is implicit in the relationship, and in any case it is more important for a great power to be understood than to be liked. Ignorance can only signify that otherwise responsible Europeans do not feel the need to keep informed properly about their most important ally. After all, if they did there would be no great difficulty in getting the information.

WHY, THEN, do they not feel that need, and how might they be made to do so? People do not worry about what they consider to be, at the same time, beneficial, certain, and fixed, however intrinsically important it is; they worry about what is uncertain, changeable, and potentially nasty. Over the years, and with considerable cause, Europeans have come to take the American commitment to the alliance for granted. However strong a case can be made for doing so in cold strategic terms, ultimately such an attitude is bound to make the alliance psychologically untenable. For it means that Europeans concern themselves less with American views than with those of their domestic foreign policy constituencies and their adversaries. As long as the American alliance continues to be taken for granted, this scale of priorities will persist. It will not be changed by preaching about the importance of "will" or anything else, and it will not be changed by fiddling with the organizational structure of NATO.

Change requires the creation of political circumstances that will compel Europe, as an urgent matter of self-interest, to attend more closely and respectfully to the perceptions and interests of the United States. That, in turn, involves *not* the building up of confidence and trust (the instinctive State Department reaction to the problem), but its opposite: the deliberate creation of a degree of *uncertainty* regarding American intentions, which will require a reordering of European priorities. Or, in terms that Melvyn Krauss has been using recently, it involves bringing political incentives and disincentives to bear on alliance relationships. A little of this would concentrate the European mind wonderfully.

For the many Americans accustomed to thinking of the Western alliance in terms of shared values and cultural unity, this will seem unpalatable. Nor will it appeal to those who think of the alliance essentially in terms of "management" rather than of political relations. But the time when values alone could sustain the alliance, or when the United States was so dominant that it could easily "manage" the relationship, is long past; it ended, really, with de Gaulle, that supreme exponent of alliance politics. If the alliance is to survive in an acceptable form, the United States must realize that the principles of realpolitik apply in dealing with *all* sovereign states, allies as well as adversaries.

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